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In the late 1990s, as members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) began 
preparing themselves for the next round of multilateral trade negotiations, the 
Australian Government commissioned a study on The Impact of Agricultural Trade 
Liberalisation on Developing Countries (Freeman et al. 2000). Its purpose was to provide 
a better understanding of the specific concerns of developing countries in the farm 
trade policy space.  
Since then, following the launch of the WTO’s so-called Doha Development 
Agenda (DDA) in late 2001, some developing country members have sought to keep 
certain agricultural trade matters high on the negotiating agenda. They have not been 
able to reach a consensus with other WTO members on several of those matters, 
however. Certainly some progress was made at the biennial Trade Ministerial 
Meetings in Bali in late 2013 and Nairobi in late 2015, but for many WTO members 
there is no longer an expectation that a comprehensive single undertaking will 
emerge from the DDA process.  
The purpose of this study is to review how matters have developed in recent 
years and, in the light of that, to explore ways in which further consensus might be 
reached so as to progress multilateral or plurilateral farm trade policy reforms on 
Doha issues, and in ways that ensure welfare is improved in developing countries, 
especially for those food-insecure households still suffering from poverty, hunger 
and malnutrition. 
The study was launched at a Cairns Group Farm Leaders’ Seminar at the 
WTO Secretariat in Geneva, 11 November 2016. The author is grateful to WTO 
Ambassadors and their staff for their helpful comments at that seminar. He also 
wishes to thank the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 
for financial support, and Joe Glauber, who as part of this project prepared a short 
issues paper for DFAT in August 2016 entitled ‘Unfinished Business in Agricultural 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
This study reviews policy developments in recent years and, in the light of that, 
explores ways in which further consensus might be reached among WTO members 
to reduce farm trade distortions – and thereby also progress the multilateral trade 
reform agenda. Particular attention is given to ways that would boost well-being in 
developing countries, especially for those food-insecure households still suffering 
from poverty and hunger.  
Why open agricultural trade matters 
There is overwhelming conceptual and empirical support for the claim that opening 
to trade can raise the level and growth of national income. That can in turn provide 
the wherewithal to reduce poverty, hunger and under-nutrition, and also boost diet 
diversity, food quality and food safety, and thereby ultimately boost national and 
global food security, health and well-being. The economic benefits of openness are 
proportionately greater, the smaller is the national economy. Such gains are even 
greater if accompanied by a freeing up of domestic product, factor and other input 
markets.  
Policy reforms since the 1980s: much achieved, much still needed 
For several decades prior to the 1980s, agricultural protection and subsidies in high-
income countries had been depressing international prices of farm products. As well, 
governments of newly independent developing countries often directly taxed farm 
exports, as well as harming farmers indirectly with an industrialization strategy that 
involved restrictions on imports of manufactures and an overvalued currency. Since 
an important aspect of those price-distorting policies was their anti-trade bias, they 
reduced the quantity of farm products traded internationally. This meant that food 
prices were more volatile in international markets than they otherwise would have 
been.  
Since the mid-1980s, many countries have been reforming their agricultural, 
trade and exchange rate policies. In addition to farm policy reforms in high-income 
countries, reforms in developing countries since the 1980s have reduced greatly their 
anti-agricultural distortions. These two parallel sets of reforms are as dramatic as the 
policy changes in those countries in the preceding three decades.  
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) sought to reduce 
farm export subsidies, increase import market access, and cut domestic producer 
subsidies. Its implementation during 1995-2004 led to less liberalization of markets 
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for farm products than had been hoped for, but accessions to WTO (especially of 
China) and other unilateral trade policy developments meant markets were 
considerably less distorted by 2004. Since then there has been only limited reform, 
however, and plenty of diversity remains in the extent of farm protection. 
Importantly, a strong anti-trade bias persists. 
More specifically, the evidence shows that (a) both high-income and 
developing countries continue to insulate their domestic food markets from the full 
force of fluctuations in international prices, (b) some large emerging countries have 
transitioned from an anti- to a pro-agricultural policy regime that could be equally 
wasteful, and (c) plenty of diversity in price distortions remains across countries, and 
across commodities within each country. In particular, export-focused farmers in 
developing countries are still discriminated against by farm policies in two respects: 
by the anti-trade structure of assistance that remains within their own agricultural 
sector, and by the assistance still afforded farmers in high-income countries.  
Hence there remains considerable scope for continuing the reform process 
which would further boost farm trade, ‘thicken’ international food markets, and thus 
not only raise the average level but also lower the volatility of prices in those markets. 
It would as well ensure that productive resources within the farm sector of each 
country – and hence globally – are put to their best use. 
Huge scope still for welfare gains from further trade reform 
Shortly after the WTO’s first round of multilateral trade negotiations was launched 
in the capital of Qatar (the so-called Doha Development Agenda or DDA) in late 
2001, there was a great deal of ex ante economic modelling analysis of the prospective 
effects of a DDA agreement. Indeed the quality of that analysis was far higher and 
far more comprehensive than prior to any of the GATT’s seven negotiation rounds 
that preceded it, including the Uruguay Round. Given the focus on development, 
many analyses gave special attention to the likely effects on developing countries in 
particular. And because distortions were still greatest in agriculture, that sector got 
more attention than any other. The model results gave insights into possible effects 
of options under consideration, allowing negotiators and observers an opportunity 
to evaluate the prospective effects of various packages of reform. They also offered 
cautions as to what to avoid.  
To provide a sense of what was at stake, some modellers first simulated full 
trade liberalization of all merchandise globally. This of course was not a realistic 
immediate prospect, but the exercise is useful in providing a benchmark against 
which to compare various partial reforms. What the study by Anderson and Martin 
(2006) revealed, for example, was that: 
• The potential gains are huge from further global trade reform: nearly
US$300 billion per year by 2015, plus whatever productivity growth it would
generate;
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• Developing countries would gain disproportionately from full global
trade reform: as a share of GDP, their gain would be one-third greater than
that for developed countries;
• Agriculture is where cuts are needed most, because of the very high rates
of assistance in that sector relative to other sectors: food and agricultural
policies are responsible for more than three-fifths of the welfare foregone
globally – and in developing countries – because of merchandise trade
distortions; and
• Increased market access in agriculture is far more crucial than subsidy
cuts: 93% of the global welfare cost of agricultural policies was due to market
access barriers and only 2% to export subsidies and 5% to domestic support
measures.
Ways forward within the WTO 
The clear consensus of empirical studies is that the agricultural market access pillar 
that offers by far the largest scope for benefits for developing countries and the 
world economy. One proposal is to abandon the complicated formula considered in 
the DDA and instead focus on a simpler tariff-reduction formula that sets an average 
reduction level and gives WTO members the flexibility to meet the average 
reduction.  
A simplified set of formulae also might lubricate domestic support reforms: 
product-specific caps could help; support for cotton could be limited to a percentage 
of the value of agricultural production; the Green Box could be maintained but 
subjected to a comprehensive review by the OECD; and reporting requirements for 
domestic support could be extended to get more timely and detailed notifications. 
For safeguards, the Special Safeguard could be eliminated, which might 
encourage food-importing developing countries to put in place more-efficient 
domestic measures (see below) rather than seek to use trade measures to deal with 
international price slumps or import surges.  
Disciplining export restrictions is now more-obviously needed following the 
recent price spikes which saw them exacerbate international price volatility and 
undermine confidence in imports as a trustworthy source of food.  
New reasons and opportunities for unilateral action 
The core message from this study is that open agricultural markets maximize the 
role that trade can play to boost developing country welfare and global food security 
and ensure the world’s agricultural resources are used most sustainably. Declining 
costs of trading internationally reinforce that message, with thanks to the 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution. As well, the WTO’s 
Trade Facilitation Agreement, once ratified by members over coming months, will 
add to that lowering of trade costs. If global warming and extreme weather events 
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are to become more damaging to food production as climate change proceeds, that 
provides all the more reason for countries collectively to open up food markets to 
allow trade to encourage more production and buffer seasonal yield fluctuations. 
The more countries do that, the less volatile will be international food prices. 
By contrast to price-distorting measures, which re-distribute well-being 
between farmers, food consumers and taxpayers but at the expense of overall 
national welfare, investments in rural public goods can raise national income, boost 
economic growth and, in some cases, enhance the food security of both farm and 
nonfarm households in the country. That is certainly true of public agricultural 
research investments, which slows any decline in food self-sufficiency and may lower 
domestic consumer prices for some foods and so benefit not only farmers but also 
net buyers of those foods – unlike food import restrictions, which raise domestic 
prices and thus benefit net sellers of food but at the expense of net buyers of food. More 
people will be harmed than helped by such a policy measure in countries where the 
majority of workers are (or will be in a few years) net buyers of food. Improving 
poor rural infrastructure such as roads would lower both the cost of procuring off-
farm inputs and the gap between the farm-gate and market prices of outputs, and 
thereby raise farm incomes and consumers’ economic access to food. And 
expanding basic rural education and health investments would boost the 
productivity of future farm workers and the prospects for those wishing to work 
part- or full-time in non-farm jobs. The ICT revolution is making it far cheaper and 
easier for governments to provide contingent income supplements to poor and 
hence most food-insecure households, whether they be urban or rural. Such 
payments, which were unaffordable in developing countries in the past because of 
the high cost of administering small handouts, have already begun to lower the 




Half-way through the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (1986-1994), 
the world’s most prominent agricultural trade economist published a revised version 
of his seminal 1973 study entitled World Agriculture in Disarray (Johnson 1991). That 
book described a world in which the northern hemisphere’s high-income countries 
had been increasingly protecting their farmers for the previous three decades with 
import restrictions and subsidies, while developing countries assisted industrialists 
at the expense of their farmers. Global agricultural resources were thus being 
squandered, with too much farm production and investment in rich countries and 
too few income-earning opportunities for farmers in developing countries – who 
constitute two-fifths of the world’s workforce and two-thirds of the world’s extreme 
poor (Castañeda et al. 2016) – to expand and possibly export their way out of 
poverty. 
The hope of many was that the Agreement on Agriculture that eventually 
emerged from those Uruguay Round negotiations, and which came into force with 
the new World Trade Organization (WTO) on 1 January 1995, would bring 
agriculture under the trade rules of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT) and reverse that wasteful and globally inequitable situation described by 
Johnson. The Cairns Group of agricultural-exporting countries,1 in its first 
submission to the GATT following the launch of the Uruguay Round, made clear 
that it expected to “achieve fully liberalised trade in agriculture, to eliminate 
distortive agricultural policies, and to bind the necessary undertakings under 
strengthened GATT rules and disciplines” (GATT 1987).  
As it turned out, the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) fell 
far short of requiring full trade liberalization and subsidy elimination. However, it 
did contain new disciplines on domestic support and export subsidies and 
commitments to replace nontariff barriers with bound tariffs and reduce those tariff 
bindings over the decade to 2004. This was a significant first step towards fairer 
1 The 14 foundation countries in the Cairns Group are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, 
Columbia, Fiji, Hungary, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, New Zealand, Thailand, and 
Uruguay. The group is named after the Australian city where they first met in August 1986 (see 
http://cairnsgroup.org). Higgott and Cooper (1990) provide an assessment of the group’s initial 
impact. 
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competition and less distortions to trade in farm products. Importantly, Article 20 
of that Agreement also envisaged a continuation of the farm policy reform process. 
In several ways the global policy situation began improving during the Uruguay 
Round trade negotiations. For example, the European Union started to reform its 
highly-distortive Common Agricultural Policy, and many developing countries 
began opening their economies and phasing out their agricultural export taxes. As 
well, Europe’s and Asia’s communist countries began transitioning from central 
planning to market economies. Many transition and developing countries have since 
applied to join the WTO, raising its membership from 128 to 164, with another 20 
Observer countries as of November 2016, most of which are in the midst of 
negotiating their accession. 
The WTO’s so-called Doha Development Agenda (DDA) was launched in 
late 2001. Like the Uruguay Round, the aim from the outset was to reach agreement 
on a single undertaking, by building on the progress made in the previous round, 
including on farm trade issues. Agricultural trade matters have remained high on the 
negotiating agenda, partly because it is well recognized that trade in farm products 
continues to be far more distorted than trade in other goods, notwithstanding the 
URAA’s implementation. Yet developing country members of WTO are far from 
unanimous in their concerns: some share the Cairns Group’s aim of ridding the 
world of price- and trade-distorting farm and food policies, while others insist on 
special treatment for politically sensitive issues. To date that divergence has kept a 
consensus among WTO members out of reach. Some limited progress was made at 
the WTO Trade Ministerial Meetings in Bali in late 2013 and in Nairobi in late 2015, 
but DDA negotiations now seem unlikely to conclude successfully with a 
comprehensive package. Nonetheless, negotiations are continuing on key farm trade 
issues highlighted in the DDA.  
Soon after the last of the Uruguay Round commitments were implemented, 
the world’s agricultural markets and policies took another turn. In 2008, and again 
in 2010-12, food (and fuel) prices shot up in international markets (Figure 1.1). Many 
developing country governments scrambled to insulate their domestic markets from 
that shock, not least by altering their border restrictions on trade in food staples. 
Those responses exacerbated the international price spikes and so worsened the 
situation for other countries. They also underlined the fact that the URAA plus the 
WTO’s related and subsequent agreements were not yet able to prevent the 
emergence or reinstatement of farm policies capable of undermining global food 
security.  
The purpose of the present study is to review how policies have developed in 
recent years and, in the light of that, to explore ways in which further consensus 
might be reached among WTO members so as to progress multilateral or plurilateral 
farm trade policy reforms on Doha issues, and in ways that would boost welfare in 
developing countries, especially for those food-insecure households still suffering 
from poverty, hunger and malnutrition.  
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Figure 1.1: Real international prices of food and fossil fuel, 1960 to 2015 
(2010 = 100, based on real 2005 US dollars) 
Source: World Bank (2016). 
The study begins in Chapter 2 by explaining why trade openness maximizes 
national (hence global) food security and economic welfare even in cases where it 
does not ensure a country will be 100% food self-sufficient. The chapter explains 
why attempts to reach long-run food self-sufficiency using farm trade barriers are 
likely to undermine rather than strengthen national food security, nutrition and 
health. They also reduce long-run prospects for export growth by developing 
countries’ more-competitive farmers. In addition, the chapter shows why national 
attempts by many countries to insulate their domestic food markets from 
international price volatility are likely to be unsuccessful and to exacerbate those 
fluctuations in the international marketplace. 
Chapter 3 summarizes the state of disarray in world food markets by the mid-
1980s and the achievements since then in reducing that disarray, including as a 
consequence of GATT and WTO agricultural negotiations, and particularly as they 
affect developing countries. It reviews in particular the impacts of the Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture and its implementation, of accessions to WTO 
(especially of China), and of other trade policy developments up to 2004 when 
Uruguay Round implementation was completed. It concludes by summarizing the 
modest contributions by WTO to multilateral policy reforms in the dozen years since 
2004. 
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Chapter 4 assesses the extent of recent (including unilateral) reforms to past 
distortive policies and the opportunities that remain to boost economic welfare and 
improve food security and nutrition by further opening markets for farm products. 
It does so by summarizing the empirical evidence that is revealed by comparing 
domestic and international prices over time. Wedges between those prices can be 
due to market access restrictions, to domestic support policies for farmers, to export 
subsidies (and in some cases export taxes), and to consumer subsidies. Those 
indicators of price distortions suggest there has been only limited reform over the 
past dozen years unilaterally and under WTO and preferential trade agreements, 
compared with the progress made in the previous two decades. Wedges between 
domestic and international food prices did narrow in food-importing countries when 
the latter rose between 2005 and 2012, but those changes are reversing as 
international prices return to trend. Plenty of diversity remains in the extent of farm 
protection both across countries and across commodities within countries, and a 
strong anti-trade bias persists. 
Chapter 5 summarizes estimates of the likely economic effects of further 
multilateral reform to policies affecting global agricultural trade. It shows how those 
effects would be distributed between high-income versus developing countries, and 
also within the developing country grouping. It includes projections of the effects of 
both full liberalization (so as to provide a sense of the cost of current programs, or 
of potential gains against which to compare benefits from partial reforms) and of 
different degrees of partial reform as proposed under the WTO’s Doha 
Development Agenda (DDA). 
Chapter 6 turns to the key ongoing and emerging issues in agricultural trade 
negotiations. As revealed in Chapter 4, by far the most important farm policies 
economically continue to be import market access restrictions. Some other issues 
have to do with export competition, such as export credits, state trading enterprises, 
and food aid. Export restrictions also are a concern, especially after they were 
imposed by some countries when international food prices spiked in 2007-08. 
Domestic support programs are generally less disruptive of global markets than trade 
measures, but they attract much attention because they are very visible in national 
budget papers each year. Among them is the program of supports for the cotton 
industry in the United States, which understandably aggrieves those developing 
countries specialized in exports of cotton. Also of concern are subsidies for public 
stockholding of food, as are safeguards. The ‘Group of 33’ developing countries has 
been strongly pushing for an agricultural Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM), but 
the proposal has been equally strongly opposed by other WTO members who 
believe it would effectively undermine previous agreements reached on tariff 
bindings – and would not even achieve its stated aim. The impasse over a SSM was 
one of the principle causes of the breakdown in the DDA negotiations in July 2008. 
In the light of the preceding chapters, the final chapter examines possible 
ways forward. It reiterates the basic point from Chapter 2 that each country can 
improve its own food security, nutrition and health by unilaterally replacing market 
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access restrictions and domestic price subsidies with generic social safety nets for 
dealing with adverse situations. But it recognizes that it is politically easier for a 
nation to reform multilaterally rather than unilaterally. Hence a number of proposals 
are laid out as options that could be pursued even if it proves impossible to resurrect 
the DDA as a single undertaking. Those options are rapidly becoming more feasible 
and cheaper to implement thanks to the dramatic spread of the information 
technology revolution among even the poorest of developing countries.  
6 
Chapter 2 
WHY OPEN AGRICULTURAL TRADE 
MATTERS  
Since food is the most basic of human needs, it is not surprising that food security 
is a sensitive policy concern, particularly in countries that are somewhat dependent 
on food imports and that have experienced interruptions to import supplies. 
European countries felt that acutely during and following World War II, which led 
them to develop a Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) soon after the formation of 
the predecessor to the European Union, the European Economic Community 
(EEC). A key objective of the CAP was self-sufficiency in basic foods. Likewise, 
Japan sought imperial rice self-sufficiency in the first half of the 20th century 
(Anderson and Tyers 1992). After it lost its colonies of Korea and Taiwan in 1945, 
Japan then sought national self-sufficiency for rice and a range of other farm 
products. More recently, numerous developing countries have placed long-run food 
self-sufficiency high on the list of their policy priorities.  
The first section of this chapter explains why attempts to reach long-term food 
self-sufficiency using farm trade barriers are more likely to undermine than to boost 
national food security – and at the same time reduce prospects for export growth by 
competitive farmers in more-open developing countries.  
Trade measures are also brought into play to deal with short-term food security 
concerns, such as at times of international price spikes. By altering food trade 
restrictions at a country’s border, governments hope to insulate their domestic food 
markets from international price volatility. This chapter’s second section explains 
why such actions by a combination of food exporter and importer countries will 
offset each other and, at the same time, exacerbate those fluctuations in the 
international marketplace for other countries.2 
2.1 Trade policies and long-run food security 
Achieving long-term food self-sufficiency is possible for all but the most densely 
populated countries simply by banning imports of food. That raises domestic food 
prices, which encourages local farmers to increase their production. The domestic 
2 Further elaboration of these issues can be found in Anderson (2017). 
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price rise also discourages food consumption, however. That trade policy therefore 
undermines food security, which refers to the condition in which all people, at all times, 
have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to 
meet their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life (FAO 
2015).  
More than that, import restrictions also limit a nation’s export opportunities, 
and hence lower the gains that come from national production and trade 
specialization that David Ricardo so eloquently explained two hundred years ago 
(Ricardo 1817).  
Gains from production specialization have been going on since the hunter-
and-gatherer era. Think of a tribe in a pre-agrarian country of men and women both 
young and old. The strongest (mostly adult men) spend their time hunting wild 
animals and carrying their kill back to camp, while women and the older children 
gather wild fruits, nuts and roots. All members of the tribe may have the same food 
preferences, and some of the men may well be able to gather fruit quicker than 
women and children; but by specializing in tasks in which each group has a 
comparative (cost) advantage, they collectively bring in a larger aggregate quantity 
and variety of foods than if each person had to both hunt for and gather their own 
food.  
One can expand on that example to imagine a second nearby tribe with a 
different demographic makeup and different mix of hunting and gathering 
opportunities in their territory and with improved hunting or gathering tools. Those 
different endowments and technologies would provide another source of potential 
gains from trade, in this case inter-tribal. If one of the tribes discovered the benefits 
of collecting the best seeds and planting them in tilled soil, their new farming 
operation would provide further scope for trade gains. And if, by interacting through 
trade, the other tribe learns how to select seeds and grow crops or pasture, even 
more opportunities open up for both tribes to gain from production specialization 
and trade.  
The improvement in welfare, food security, nutrition and health via trade is 
greater the more the hunting, gathering, cropping or livestock management by one 
or more of the trading partners is subject to seasonal fluctuations – as is most plant 
and animal growth. The direction of trade in surpluses following the harvest season 
could well be reversed in the off-season for such foods. This is even truer if one or 
more regions is subject to natural disasters that occasionally wipe out some food 
supplies. 
Of course if the two tribes decided to go to war with each other, or if the 
second tribe formed an alliance with a third tribe that required trade between the 
first two to cease, the benefits of the initial inter-tribal trade would evaporate. But 
so long as the first tribe had maintained those skills in hunting and gathering or 
farming, it would be no worse off in the future than before it began its inter-tribal 
trade – and it still would have had the benefit of greater welfare and food security 
throughout that period of trade.  
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Generalizing from these simple examples, it is clear that broadening to 
regional, national, international and ultimately inter-continental and global trade 
multiplies the gains from production specialization and market exchange, and 
reduces the extent of food insecurity, malnutrition and risk of famine. The increased 
competition that comes from trade opening also has been shown to boost both farm 
productivity growth (Yu and Nin-Pratt 2011) and overall economic growth 
(Anderson and Brueckner 2016). Furthermore, it expands the scope for raising diet 
diversity and food safety and quality, the demands for which tend to rise with per 
capita income (Clements and Si 2015).  
Improving food security requires improving the three interrelated elements 
of food availability, access and utilization, as well as reducing market instability. How 
much access households have to available food supplies depends heavily on their 
income, assets, remittances or other entitlements. How well household heads utilize 
the foods that are accessible to them depends on their knowledge and willingness to 
ensure a healthy and nutritious diet for all members of their household. That in turn 
depends on the level of education in the household, particularly of adult females, 
which again is closely related to household income and wealth or other entitlements. 
Thus food insecurity is a consumption issue that is closely related to 
household poverty. Any initiative whose net effect is to raise real incomes, especially 
of the poorest households, may also enhance food security, nutrition and health. 
Since openness to trade raises national income (and increases food diversity, quality 
and safety for the reasons mentioned above), it should be considered among the 
food policy options open to national governments. If all countries were open to 
international trade and investment, the use of resources devoted to producing, 
marketing, distributing and retailing the world’s food would be optimized, and 
fluctuations in trade volumes and international food prices would be minimized. 
Openness thus contributes to all four key components of food security: availability, 
access, utilization and market stability. 
Opening up to trade would be especially beneficial to food security for two 
categories of countries: those that are restricting food imports and where the 
majority of the poor and under-nourished are net buyers of food, and those where 
the majority of the poor and under-nourished are net sellers of food and their 
governments are restricting food exports. In both cases, reducing those trade 
restrictions will tend to raise the real income, food security, nutrition and health of 
those countries’ poor households. As for the other two categories of countries (food-
importers where the majority of the poor are net sellers of food, and food-exporters 
where the majority of the poor are net buyers of food), opening such economies of 
trade would still raise their average national income, and that increases the scope for 
assisting the poor with more-efficient domestic policy measures. Such measures, 
discussed more in the final chapter, include increased investments in agricultural 
R&D and rural infrastructure for the first category and conditional cash e-transfers 
to the most vulnerable households in the second category.  
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Trade openness has increased dramatically over the past half-century, but the 
world is still a long way short of fully open trade, especially in farm and food 
products (see details below in Chapter 4). As well, in recent years politicians in 
numerous countries have failed to find strong support for trade-liberalizing 
initiatives, including – indeed especially – at the multilateral level of the WTO. So 
before going any further, it is worth reviewing in more detail the potential benefits 
from trade reform, starting with static economic gains-from-trade arguments and 
then considering additional dynamic gains. 
Static economic gains from own-country trade reform  
The standard comparative static analysis of national gains from international trade 
emphasize the economic benefits from exploiting comparative advantage in 
situations where a nation’s costs of production and/or preferences differ from those 
in the rest of the world. Distortionary policies such as trade restrictions or subsidies 
diminish those benefits. 
More specifically, an export tax or its equivalent lowers the domestic price 
below the border price of a tradable product such as grain (as does an import 
subsidy), whereas an import tax or its equivalent raises its domestic price above the 
border price (as does an export subsidy). Also, an import tax (or export subsidy) is 
the equivalent of a consumer tax and a producer subsidy, hence lowering it reduces 
the extent to which the measure assists producers of that tradable product. 
Conversely, lowering an export tax (or import subsidy), which is the equivalent of a 
consumer subsidy and a producer tax, reduces the extent to which the measure 
harms producers of the good in question. 
This is part of the more general theory of the welfare effects of market 
distortions in a trading economy, as summarized by Bhagwati (1971) and Corden 
(1997). Those gains from opening an economy are larger, the greater the variance of 
rates of protection among industries. Likewise, the more productive domestic firms 
within industries expand by drawing resources from less productive firms that 
contract or go out of business when the economy is opened. Indeed theory and 
empirical studies suggest the shifting of resources within an industry may be more 
welfare-improving than shifts between industries when protection is cut. 
Furthermore, if trade barriers are managed by inefficient institutions (such as 
distributors of import or export quota licences), gains from removing such barriers 
will be larger than removal of standard trade taxes (Khandelwal, Schott and Wei 
2013). 
The static gains from trade opening tend to be greater as a share of national 
output the smaller the economy, particularly where economies of scale in production 
have not been fully exploited and where consumers (including firms importing 
intermediate inputs) value variety so that intra- as well as inter-industry trade can 
flourish. Less-than-full exploitation of scale economies is often the result of 
imperfect competition being allowed to prevail in the domestic marketplace, which 
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again is more common in smaller and poorer economies where industries have 
commensurately smaller numbers of firms. The gain comes from firms having to 
reduce their mark-ups in the face of greater competition. This applies to numerous 
links of the food value chain, many of which are becoming increasingly concentrated 
in the hands of a few firms (Reardon and Timmer 2012, Sexton 2013). 
Those gains from opening up will be even greater if accompanied by a freeing 
up of domestic markets and the market for currency exchange. The more stable is 
domestic macroeconomic policy, the more attractive will an economy be to capital 
inflows. And the more domestic microeconomic policies are friendly to markets and 
competition for goods, services and productive factors, the greater the likelihood 
that adjustments by firms and consumers to trade liberalization will lead to a more-
efficient utilization of national resources, lower consumer prices (in most cases) and 
greater economic welfare (Corden 1997). If domestic policy reforms included 
improving the government’s capacity to redistribute income and wealth more 
efficiently and in ways that better matched society’s wishes, concerns about the 
distributional consequences of trade liberalization also would be lessened. 
Trade in services goes alongside and facilitates most trade in goods. Recent 
data compiled by the OECD/WTO (2016) reveal that nearly one-third of the gross 
value of exports of goods is made up of services (banking, insurance, transport, etc.). 
For processed food that share was 36% in 2009, and for primary agriculture it was 
26%. Hence freeing up a country’s markets for services can boost national welfare 
not only directly but also indirectly via lowering the cost of exporting farm products 
and other goods (Francois and Hoekman 2010).  
Dynamic economic gains from own-country trade reform  
The standard comparative static arguments can be supplemented with links between 
trade and economic growth. The mechanisms by which openness contributes to 
growth are gradually getting to be better understood and appreciated. Channels 
through which openness to trade can affect an economy’s growth rate include the 
scale of the market when knowledge is embodied in the products traded, the degree 
of redundant knowledge creation that is avoided through openness, and the effect 
of knowledge spillovers. The latest surge of globalization has been spurred also by 
the technology ‘lending’ that is involved in off-shoring an ever-rising proportion of 
production processes. As Baldwin (2016) points out, this joining of a supply chain 
has made industrialization potentially far less complex and far faster – especially for 
countries with reliable workers, a hospitable business environment and located near 
large industrial countries such as China. To the extent that boosts manufacturing in 
some emerging economies, so it generates more export market opportunities for 
farmers in other developing countries. 
Greater openness to international financial markets also boosts growth via 
the stimulation to investment that more risk-sharing generates. When trade reform 
includes financial markets, more is gained than just a lower cost of credit. The 
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resulting financial deepening can stimulate growth too (Townsend and Ueda 2010). 
A study by Hoxha, Kalemli-Ozcan and Vollrath (2013) examines potential gains 
from financial integration and finds that a move from autarky to full integration of 
financial markets globally could boost real consumption by 9% permanently in the 
median developing country, and up to 14% in the most capital-scarce countries. In 
a case study of Thailand, Townsend and Ueda (2010) estimate welfare gains from 
financial liberalization as high as 28%. 
Importantly from a policy maker’s viewpoint, the available empirical evidence 
strongly supports the view that open economies grow faster (see the surveys by 
Winters 2004, Billmeier and Nannicini 2009 and Francois and Martin 2010). Notable 
early macroeconometric studies of the linkage between trade reform and the rate of 
economic growth include those by Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and Romer 
(1999). More-recent studies also provide some indirect supportive econometric 
evidence. For example, freeing up the importation of intermediate and capital goods 
promotes investments that increase growth (Wacziarg 2001). Indeed, the higher the 
ratio of imported to domestically produced capital goods for a developing country, 
the faster it grows (Lee 1995; Mazumdar 2001). In a more recent study that revisits 
the Sachs and Warner data and then provides new time-series evidence, Wacziarg 
and Welch (2008) show that dates of trade liberalization do characterize breaks in 
investment and GDP growth rates. Specifically, for the 1950-1998 period, countries 
that have liberalized their trade (defined as those raising their trade-to-GDP ratio by 
an average of 5 percentage points) have enjoyed on average 1.5 percentage points 
higher GDP growth compared with their pre-reform rate. A new study by Coelli, 
Moxnes and Ulltveit-Moe (2016) estimates the effect on innovation of trade policy 
reform during the 1990s in over 60 countries using international firm-level patent 
data. It finds that 7% of the increase in knowledge creation during the 1990s can be 
explained by those policy reforms. 
Easterly (2001) reminds us that a robust conclusion that can be drawn from 
available empirical evidence is that people respond to incentives. Hence getting 
incentives right in product, input and factor markets is crucial – and removing 
unwarranted subsidies and trade barriers is an important part of that process. 
Evidence from 13 case studies reported in Wacziarg and Welch (2008) adds further 
empirical support to that view, as does the fact that there are no examples of autarkic 
economies that have enjoyed sustained economic growth, in contrast to the many 
examples since the 1960s of reformed economies that boomed after opening up. 
Specifically, economies that commit to less market intervention tend to attract 
more investment funds, ceteris paribus, which raise their stocks of capital (through 
greater aggregate global savings or at the expense of other economies’ capital stocks). 
More-open economies also tend to be more innovative, because of greater trade in 
intellectual capital, and because greater competition spurs innovation (Aghion and 
Griffith 2005; Aghion and Howitt 2006), leading to higher rates of capital 
accumulation and productivity growth (Lumenga-Neso, Olarreaga and Schiff 2005). 
More-open economies also tend to be less vulnerable to foreign shocks such as 
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sudden stops in capital inflows, currency crashes and severe recessions (Frankel and 
Cavallo 2008). 
In short, international trade and investment liberalization can lead not just to 
a larger capital stock and a one-off increase in productivity but also to higher rates 
of capital accumulation and productivity growth in the reforming economy because 
of the way reform energizes entrepreneurs. For growth to be maximized and 
sustained, though, there is widespread agreement that governments also need to (a) 
have in place effective institutions to efficiently allocate and protect property rights, 
(b) allow domestic factor and product markets to function freely, and (c) maintain
macroeconomic and political stability (Rodrik 2007; Wacziarg and Welch 2008;
Baldwin 2004; Chang, Kaltani and Loayza 2005).
Does trade reform alleviate poverty? 
A careful survey by Ravallion (2006) of empirical evidence suggests aggregate 
economic growth differences have been largely responsible for the differences across 
developing countries in poverty alleviation. Initiatives that boost economic growth 
are therefore likely to be helpful in the fight against poverty, and trade liberalization 
is such an initiative. But cuts to trade barriers also alter relative product prices 
domestically and in international markets, which in turn affect factor prices. Hence 
the net effect on poverty depends also on the way those price changes affect poor 
households’ expenditure and their earnings net of remittances and taxes. If the 
consumer and producer price changes (whether due to own-country reforms and/or 
those of other countries) are pro-poor, then they will tend to reinforce any positive 
growth effects of trade reform on the poor. 
How poor households within developing countries are affected by trade 
reforms depends on each country’s circumstances (Winters 2002, Winters and 
Martuscelli 2014). We know from myriad empirical studies that reforms of 
agricultural policies of developed countries could provide a major source of 
developing country gains from trade liberalization, and lowering barriers to textiles 
and clothing trade also is important. Both would boost the demand for unskilled 
labor and for farm products produced in poor countries. Four-fifths of the world’s 
extreme poor (earning less than US$1.90 a day in 2011 PPP) live in rural areas and 
two-thirds work in agriculture (Castañeda et al. 2016; OECD 2003, p. 3). Since many 
poor rural households are net sellers of farm labor and/or food, one would expect 
such reforms to reduce the number in extreme poverty. A set of analyses reported 
in Anderson, Cockburn and Martin (2010, 2011), in which global and national 
economywide model results are carefully combined with household income and 
expenditure survey data for nearly a dozen developing countries, tests this 
hypothesis. It finds strong support for it in most of the country case studies 
considered. If full global trade reform were to be undertaken, that study concludes 
that it would reduce the number of people in extreme poverty by at least 26 million 
(Anderson, Cockburn and Martin 2011, Table 4). Bear in mind, too, that those 
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estimates are from comparative static models, and so are very much lower-bound 
estimates because they do not include the poverty-reducing dynamic effects on 
economic growth of such reforms (World Bank and WTO 2015).   
Would openness improve nutrition and health? 
Openness to trade and investment also allows diets to become more diversified, and 
therefore potentially more nutritious, healthier and safer. Insofar as investment 
openness speeds the development of supermarkets, that certainly increases the range 
and safety of food products available for those who find it more convenient to shop 
there, even if it reduces the number of small shops available in nearby 
neighbourhoods (Reardon, Henson and Gulati 2010).3  
The WTO’s Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement encourages countries to 
adopt international food standards so as not to unduly limit trade, but allows 
countries to adopt stricter standards so long as they are credibly justified and apply 
equally to both domestic and imported products (Josling, Orden and Roberts 2010). 
One of those standard-setting bodies is the Codex Alimentarius Commission. It is 
being encouraged to broaden its focus beyond toxic substances so as to also deal 
with the nutritional content of foods. But there is nothing in WTO agreements 
preventing nations from adopting, for example, a traffic light set of labelling 
regulations to indicate to consumers the extent of fats, salt and sugar in a product 
(James et al. 2010). 
The extent to which diet diversity is increasing can be seen by comparing 
indexes of diversity of national food production versus national food availability. 
Remans et al. (2014) provide estimates of two diversity indexes: the Shannon entropy 
diversity index, which reflects how many different types of food items there are in 
the country, and a modified functional attribute diversity index, which reflects the 
diversity in the nutrients provided by the different food items. According to those 
estimates averaged during 2000-09, both indicators are greater (= more diversity) in 
availability than in production, especially in terms of nutrients (Table 2.1). This is 
3 Some observers worry about the advertising strength of multinational processing or retail 
companies selling low-priced processed foods, some of which may be considered less nutritious 
than the more-expensive traditional foods they replace (e.g., Hawkes, Grace and Thow 2015). In 
such circumstances, there are more-efficient policy responses than preventing such trade or foreign 
direct investment (which, by limiting competition, may simply lead to higher-cost domestic firms 
providing a smaller range of similar but more-expensive foods). A more-appropriate response is 
to ensure there is adequate nutritional information available (e.g., on product labels); and education 
campaigns could guide consumers to healthy food choices, regardless of whether the firms 
processing or retailing the available foods are local- or foreign-owned. Taxing the use of 
ingredients considered unhealthy (sugar, salt, oils, … ?) is another approach some countries have 
begun adopting (Alston, Macewan and Okrent 2016), although care is needed to ensure this does 
not lead to their substitution by untaxed alternative ingredients that are similarly unhealthy. 
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Table 2.1: Coefficient of variation of global production and consumption of key 
food products, 1970 to 2010 
   Production     Consumption 
1970-94 1995-2010 1970-94 1995-2010 
Soybean 11.0 8.8 9.0 7.2 
Maize 8.1 6.0 5.3 4.5 
Wheat 5.7 4.4 4.4 2.0 
Rice 4.4 3.2 4.1 2.2 
Sugar 4.7 5.1 4.3 3.1 
Milk 7.9 5.0 7.4 5.8 
Beef 3.7 2.2 3.6 2.4 
Source: Liapis (2012). 
expected to continue with economic growth and urbanization,4 and will have more 
potential to do so the more open is each economy to international trade and 
investment.  
The first two of the United Nations’ 17 Sustainable Development Goals are 
to eliminate poverty and hunger by 2030, and the third one is to ensure health and 
well-being for all at every stage of life. Yet on current trends, undernourishment in 
developing countries will only halve from its current 13% by 2030, as will the 
prevalence of stunting among children under five (currently 28%), according to FAO 
(2016a). To accelerate those developments, opening up to food trade is one of the 
most feasible initiatives that national governments could take. 
Would more trade reform expand the number of food-exporting countries? 
Global merchandise trade grew faster in the second half of the 20th century than in 
any other half-century in history: between 1950 and 2000 world exports of all goods 
grew at 5.3% per year, compared with the previous record rate of 3.5% in 1850-1913 
(Federico 2005). However, agricultural trade grew less rapidly than trade in other 
goods from 1950, and slower than agricultural trade in the first wave of globalization: 
3.2% in 1950-2000 and 3.4% in 1850-1913. As a result, agriculture’s proportion of 
global goods trade fell from 0.5 in 1913 and 1937 to 0.4 in 1951, 0.24 in 1961, 0.12 
in 1981 and 0.07 in 2001 and 2011, before rising temporarily to 0.09 in 2012-14 
(Federico 2005, p. 29; WTO 2015). 
The slower growth of farm trade is partly due to the fall in agriculture’s share 
of global GDP (it is now only 3%, down from more than 50% not much earlier than 
1900), partly to the growth in agricultural protectionism, and partly to the recent 
4 In 1950, just 30% of the world’s population lived in urban areas. By 2015 that share had reached 
50%, and by 2050 it is projected to reach two-thirds, with even the poorest region (Sub-Saharan 
Africa) having the majority of its population in urban areas, according to the United Nations 
(Bloom 2016). 
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fragmentation of industrial production into ever-more processes and the associated 
rapid expansion in the number of links in their global value chains (Baldwin and 
Robert-Nicoud 2014; Baldwin 2016). The latter shows up in the global shares of 
sectoral exports to sectoral GDP, which rose during 1995-2010 from 66 to 105% 
for manufacturing while hardly changing (a rise from 53 to 58%) for agriculture. 
Those trends are reflected in the slower growth of global exports of farm versus all 
goods (Figure 2.1), and notwithstanding the rise since 1950 in the share of global 
farm production that is exported (Figure 2.2). 
One consequence of relatively little food production being traded 
internationally is that just a few countries dominate each product’s international 
trade. Table 2.2 shows the data for eight major traded foods in 2013. The top four 
countries account for 90% of both soybean and oil palm exports, and the top six 
account for 80% of both rice and sugar, for 77% of maize, and for around 70% of 
wheat, beef and milk. How the concentration of countries exporting or importing 
key food products is changing over time is shown in Table 2.3: the number of 
countries exporting them has doubled since the 1970s, while the number importing 
them has risen by only one-third. Another indicator is the Herfindahl Concentration 
Index, which indicates more concentration the closer it is to one. Figure 2.3 suggests 
that concentration of global production in the exporting countries has fallen for all 
of those key products virtually every decade since the 1970s, and is high only for 
maize and soybean. Were there to be less of an anti-trade bias in policies affecting 
farmer incentives in all countries, it is likely that an even larger number of countries 
would emerge as significant exporters of major food products. That would reduce 
the concern in some potentially food-importing countries that they would feel too 
vulnerable to supply disruption if they were to allow themselves to become more 
import-dependent. 
The variability of global production of key food items is greater than the 
variability of consumption, indicating the important role that changes in stocks can 
play in stabilizing global food availability. The variability of both has been less in the 
1995-2010 period than during 1970-95 (Table 2.4). On the supply side, that could be 
associated with changes in technologies and input use that reduce yield variability, 
or with changes in the location of production, but it is contrary to what one might 
have expected as climates change and with the perceived associated increase in 
extreme weather events. On the demand side, it could be a result of financial 
deepening, which provides more options for households to borrow in times of 
greater need and repay the loans when higher incomes allow. At the individual 
country level, the breaking of the link between production and consumption because 
of consumption smoothing through time can be the result of greater openness to 
trade in food, and even in capital (Islamaj and Kose 2016). The extent to which farm 
products are traded still varies widely across commodities though (Figure 2.4). 
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Figure 2.1: Volume of global agricultural and total merchandise exports, 1950 to 
2013 
(index of value at constant prices, 2005 = 100) 
Source: WTO (2015). 
Figure 2.2: Volume of global agricultural production and exports, 1950 to 2013 
(index of value at constant prices, 2005 = 100) 














































































































Table 2.2: Top six exporting countries for eight key traded farm products, 2013 
(% by value of global exports of each product) 
Wheat Rice Maize Sugar, raw 
USA 21 India 34 USA 20 Brazil 54 
Canada 13 Thailand 18 Brazil 18 Thailand 9 
France 12 USA 9 Argentina 17 Australia 7 
Australia 12 Pakistan 9 Ukraine 11 Guatemala 6 
Russia 7 Viet Nam 7 France 7 Mexico 3 
Germany 5 Italy 3 India 4 Cuba 3 
TOP SIX 71 TOP SIX 80 TOP SIX 77 TOP SIX 80 
Soybean+oil Oil palm Beef, boneless Milk,  powder 
Brazil 36 Indonesia 47 Brazil 18 
New 
Zealand 45 
USA 33 Malaysia 36 Australia 18 Argentina 7 
Argentina 12 Netherlands 5 USA 15 Netherlands 7 
Paraguay 4 PNG 1 Netherlands 7 Australia 4 
Canada 3 Thailand 1 Ireland 6 France 3 
Netherlands 2 Germany 1 NewZealand 5 UAE 3 
TOP SIX 90 TOP SIX 92 TOP SIX 68 TOP SIX 69 
Source: FAO (2016b), accessed 5 April. 
Table 2.3: Indexes of diversity of national food production and availability, by 




      Modified functional 
attribute diversity 
index 
Production Availability Production Availability 
South Asia  0.71 0.85 0.13 0.71 
East Asia  0.76 0.88 0.12 0.71 
Sub-Saharan Africa   0.80 0.83 0.05 0.71 
Middle East+N. Africa 0.92 0.86 0.08 0.82 
Europe+Central Asia  0.82 0.88 0.08 0.80 
Latin America  0.78 0.92 0.08 0.80 
Source: Remans et al. (2014). 
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Figure 2.3: Hirfendahl index of concentration of production of key food products 
among the countries exporting them, 1970 to 2009 
Source: Liapis (2012). 
Figure 2.4: Share of volume of global production of farm products traded 
internationally, 2013-15 (%) 
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Table 2.4: Number of exporting and importing countries for key food products, 1970 to 2009 
Wheat 
    1970s 1980s 1990s 2000s 
Exporters Importers Exporters Importers Exporters Importers Exporters Importers 
36 136 40 146 61 162 91 177 
Maize 58 142 55 149 80 169 102 196 
Rice 63 175 61 175 90 202 114 219 
Sugar 60 165 56 174 81 207 111 222 
Beef 62 159 64 175 82 202 109 216 
Milk 48 184 49 186 81 206 116 219 
Soybean 30 71 38 91 63 118 87 161 
Source: Liapis (2012). 
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2.2 Trade policies and short-run food security 
 
The pattern of government distortions to agricultural incentives, detailed in Chapter 
4 below, reveals that there has been under-production of farm products in 
developing countries for many decades. Also, the anti-trade bias of those policies 
reduced international trade in farm products below what would have been the case 
under global free trade. That means international markets for these weather-
dependent products are ‘thinner’ and thus more volatile. The consequent price 
volatility has been exacerbated by the tendency for both rich and poor countries to 
alter their border measures from year to year in an attempt to stabilize prices and 
quantities in domestic food markets. Using a stochastic model of world food 
markets, Tyers and Anderson (1992, Table 6.14) found that instability of 
international food prices in the 1980s was three times greater than it would have 
been under free trade in those products. 
The tendency for fluctuations around trend levels of international food prices 
to be transmitted less than fully to national markets means the percentage by which 
the domestic price exceeds the border price also fluctuates from year to year around 
its long-run trend, and in the opposite direction to the international price.  
This propensity of national governments to insulate domestic markets has not 
diminished in either developing or high-income countries as part of the trade-related 
policy reforms that began in the mid-1980s. Indeed, it has been exacerbated by the 
spread of policies involving biofuel subsidies and mandates that have linked the 
prices of food to the even-more-volatile energy raw material prices (de Gorter, 
Drabik and Just 2015).   
To estimate the proportion of any international price fluctuation that is 
transmitted to domestic markets within twelve months, Anderson and Nelgen (2012) 
estimate short-run transmission elasticities for each of nine key traded food products 
for all countries for the period 1985 to 2010. Those elasticity estimates range from 
0.73 for soybean down to just 0.43 for sugar. The unweighted average across those 
nine products is 0.56, suggesting that, within one year, barely one-half the movement 
in international prices of those key primary food products is transmitted to domestic 
markets.  
It has long been recognized that when some governments alter the 
restrictiveness of their food trade measures to insulate their domestic markets 
somewhat from international price fluctuations (including through using specific 
rather than ad valorem tariffs), the price volatility faced by other countries is amplified. 
That reaction therefore prompts more countries to follow suit. The irony is, 
however, that when both food-exporting and food-importing countries so respond, 
each country group undermines the other’s attempts to stabilize its domestic 
markets. That is to say, what seems like a solution to each importing (or exporting) 
country’s concern if it were acting alone turns out to be less effective, the more 
exporting (or importing) countries – presumably for the same loss-aversion political 




To see this more clearly, Martin and Anderson (2012) consider the situation 
in which a severe weather shock at a time of low global stocks causes the 
international food price to suddenly rise. If national governments wish to avert 
short-term losses for domestic food consumers, and they do so by temporarily 
altering their food trade restrictions (e.g., by raising export taxes or lowering import 
tariffs), then only a fraction of that price rise is transmitted to their domestic market. 
That response raises the consumer subsidy equivalent/lowers the consumer tax 
equivalent of any such trade measure, and does the opposite to the distortion to 
producer incentives. However, if such domestic market insulation is practiced by 
similar proportions of the world’s food-exporting and -importing countries, it turns 
out to be ineffective in keeping domestic price volatility below what it would be in 
the international marketplace if no governments so responded. It is like everyone in 
a crowded stadium standing up to see better: if people are of equal height, no-one is 
better off. 
Martin and Anderson (2012) also point out that, with the help of some 
simplifying assumptions, it is possible to get at least a back-of-the-envelope (BOTE) 
estimate of the percentage contribution of government trade policy reactions to an 
international price spike such as in 2006-08. Updated estimates for the key grains are 
40% for rice, 19% for wheat, and 10% for maize (Anderson and Nelgen 2012). It is 
possible to apportion those policy contributions between country groups. Anderson 
and Nelgen (2012) estimate that developing countries were responsible for the 
majority of the policy contribution to all three grains’ international price spikes 
during 2006-08, whereas in 1972-74 the opposite was the case except for rice. As for 
exporters versus importers, it appears exporters’ policies had the majority of the 
influence, other than for wheat in the 1970s, but importers made a very sizeable 
contribution as well.  
It is also possible, in the light of these estimates, to get a sense of how effective 
were changes in trade restrictions in limiting the rise in domestic prices. The numbers 
for 2006-08 suggest that, on average for all countries in the sample, domestic prices 
rose slightly more than the adjusted international price change for wheat, and only 
slightly less for maize and just one-sixth less for rice. The conclusion drawn from 
these results is that the combined responses by governments of all countries have 
been sufficiently offsetting as to do very little to insulate domestic markets from the 
previous decade’s international food price spike. 
A new study, by Jensen and Anderson (2017), has sought to fine-tune these 
BOTE estimates by using the same estimates of price distortions but inserting them 
in a global economy-wide model (GTAP – see Hertel 1997). The GTAP model is 
able to take account of the interactions between markets for farm products which 
are closely related in production and/or consumption, and is able to estimate the 
impacts of those insulating policies on grain prices and on the grain trade and 
economic welfare of the world’s various countries. 
In terms of the aggregate contribution of altered domestic price distortions to 




remarkably close to those from the GTAP model, although least so for wheat. Those 
GTAP results suggest that for rice, the main contributors via lowered import 
restrictions are Indonesia and the Philippines, and the main contributors via higher 
export barriers are (in order) India, Pakistan, Thailand and China. In the case of 
wheat, Japan and India contributed most on the import side while the main 
contributors on the export side are Argentina, Pakistan and China. China, Argentina, 
Central Asia and India are the dominant contributors as exporters to the rise in the 
international price of coarse grains, while Western Europe is the main contributor 
among the importers.  
The international price impacts of exporting countries’ actions dominate those 
of grain-importing countries in all three cases, but the extent of that domination is 
greatest for rice. On average in the GTAP results, domestic prices rose nearly one-
quarter less than the adjusted international price change for rice, but only slightly 
less for wheat and coarse grains. The extent of insulation was greater in developing 
countries, which is not inconsistent with the finding that their policymakers 
contributed more to the price spike than governments of high-income countries. 
These results suggest that the combined responses by governments of both 
groups of countries (food exporters and food importers) were sufficiently offsetting 
as to do very little to insulate domestic markets from the 2006-08 international food 
price spike.  
Moreover, a related study shows that those policy responses did not even 
reduce global poverty when account is taken of the combined effect of all countries’ 
actions in exacerbating the international price spikes (Anderson, Ivanic and Martin 
2014). On the contrary, that study estimates that those combined policy actions 
contributed an extra 82 million people to the world’s poverty pool (Table 2.5).  
 
Table 2.5: Poverty effects of countries insulating themselves from the 2006-2008 
spike in international food prices 
 







Indonesia  1.6 0.1 
China  -5.7 3.6 
India -59.0 4.4 
Pakistan -9.9 -5.9 
Nigeria  -4.4 -1.2 
Other Sub-Saharan Africa  -0.9 0.7 
Rest of world  -4.3 5.6 
World  -81.6 7.5 
  
Source: Anderson, Ivanic and Martin (2014).
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2.3  Implications of rising food demand: projections to 2030   
 
With the recent slowdown in Western economies and the relatively rapid 
economic growth in emerging economies, the global industrial centre of gravity 
has been shifting away from the north Atlantic and raising the importance of 
natural resource-poor Asian economies in world output and trade, especially of 
manufactures. The industrialization of Asia in turn has been increasing the 
region’s demand for food, feed, fibres and other primary products, and thus prices 
and quantities of exports from natural resource-rich economies.  
This development is a continuation of a process begun in Japan in the 1950s 
and followed by Korea and Taiwan from the late 1960s and subsequently by some 
Southeast Asian countries. Most recently it has involved far more populous China 
and India.  
The early Northeast Asian group represents just 3% of the world’s 
population, hence its rapid industrial growth was accommodated by the rest of 
the world without much difficulty, including in food and other primary product 
markets. This was possible because real prices in international markets for farm 
products followed a steep downward trend throughout the 20th century.5 
Agricultural prices spiked upwards in 1973-74, in part because the Soviet Union 
chose unexpectedly to enter the international grain market after a crop shortfall; 
but they and the oil price fell in the mid-1980s and stayed flat for another two 
decades (Figure 1.1).  
Such price spikes in competitive markets for farm products rarely last long 
because they stimulate a positive production response on the supply side of the 
market and also substitution toward cheaper alternatives on the demand side. 
Soon after the recent turn of the century, however, the real prices of primary 
products began rising unexpectedly, with food and energy prices moving in 
parallel (Figure 1.1). Some fingers were pointed toward China and India, which 
together account for more than two-fifths of humanity. Their rapid and persistent 
economic growth has great significance for primary product markets and for such 
things as food and energy security and greenhouse gas emissions nationally, 
regionally and globally. Market and government responses to these concerns will 
have non-trivial effects in both the emerging economies and their trading partners, 
including for food. 
To investigate the possible magnitudes of effects, Anderson and Strutt 
(2014a, 2016) have used the GTAP economy-wide model to project the world 
economy to 2030. Their baseline projection reflects relatively conservative growth 
assumptions, including for China and India, and assumes trade-related policies of 
                                            
5 That was also the case for many minerals and metals (Pfaffenzeller, Newbolt and Rayner 2007). 
As well, the price trend for fossil fuels had been flat for many decades through to the early 
1970s. However, when the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 
cartelized by agreeing in 1973 on restrictive production quotas, the US dollar price of oil in 
international markets quadrupled; and it doubled again in 1979-80 following the Islamic 




each country do not change. The rates of total factor productivity (TFP) growth 
in each sector is assumed to be similar to the recent past and so is somewhat 
higher in most primary sectors, and somewhat lower in services, than in 
manufacturing. For agriculture it is higher for North America than for Europe on 
the assumption that Europe continues to reject applications to allow genetically 
modified crop production.  
Differences across regions in rates of growth of factor endowments and 
factor productivity, and the fact that sectors differ in their relative factor intensities 
and their share of GDP, ensure that the structures of production, consumption 
and trade across sectors within countries, and also between countries, is going to 
be very different in 2030 than in the model’s base period which is 2007. Real food 
prices in international markets in 2030 are projected to be only slightly higher than 
in 2007 though, and hence well below the historically high levels of 2008-12 and 
consistent with the latest agricultural model projections by OECD/FAO (2016). 
In particular, developing economies (especially the faster-growing ones of 
Asia) will account for considerably larger shares of the projected global economy 
by 2030. Their aggregate share of world GDP (measured in 2007 US$, not PPP 
dollars in which developing country shares are much larger) is projected to rise 
from 27% in 2007 to 40% in 2030 in the baseline scenario. Most of that rise is in 
Asia, but the shares of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa excluding South 
Africa (hereafter LA and SSA) also rise non-trivially. Europe’s share, meanwhile, 
is projected to fall from 36 to 29%, and NAFTA’s from 30 to 26%. Economically 
active population shares change less, so their incomes per capita converge 
considerably. For example, the average incomes in LA and SSA are projected to 
rise relative to the global average between 2007 and 2030 by one-sixth and one-
third, respectively. 
When global value added is broken down by sector, the changes are more 
striking. China by 2030 is projected to return to its supremacy as the world’s top 
producing country not only of primary products but also of manufactures. The 
global manufacturing share remains close to 4% for LA and rises to just under 1% 
for SSA, while the global share of overall GDP rises by more than one percentage 
point each for LA and SSA. This reflects the projected rise in importance of 
(especially non-agricultural) primary production in LA and SSA. As a result, LA 
and SSA exports of non-farm primary products increase their combined share of 
global exports from 18 to 29%, while their combined farm product share of world 
trade rises from 15 to 18%. Meanwhile, the Asia region doubles its share of world 
agricultural and food imports, while increasing its share of other primary imports 
by more than a third by 2030. 
As for the sectoral shares of national trade, the projected consequences for 
LA differ considerably from those for SSA. SSA is a net importer of farm 
products, and that dependence increases slightly over the projection period as low 
African incomes and thus food consumption levels rise, whereas LA is a large net 
exporter of agricultural goods whose share of total LA exports rises slightly 
between 2007 and 2030. As for other primary goods, they account for two-thirds 
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Table 2.6: Projected shares of agricultural imports under different tariffs for China and India, 2030 (%) 
 
 China India 
















































*Ricea 1 0 2 196 65 0 0 43 256 80 
Wheata 0 0 2 115 65 7 0 100 326 80 
Coarse grains 0 1 2 2 65 0 0 24 25 60-80 
Fruit & veg 8 16 7 8 11 23 26 35 35 25-50 
Oilseeds 11 15 2 2 3 1 1 41 41 75 
Vegetable oils 18 30 2 2 3 28 30 82 81 75 
Sugar 1 2 0 0 50 1 1 96 96 na 
Cotton 3 4 4 4 40 7 8 10 10 na 
Other crops 1 2 8 8 na 17 21 48 48 na 
Beef & sheepmeata 1 0 11 255 12 0 0 17 136 na 
Other meatsa 26 0 8 164 12 3 0 17 156 na 
Dairy productsa 4 0 8 159 11 1 0 31 153 60 
Other+processedfood 25 30    13 13    
TOTAL 100 100    100 100    
Prop’n of total  13 10    9 8    
 
a Indicates sectors subject to the self-sufficiency policy. 
Source: Derived from GTAP Model results reported in Anderson and Strutt (2016). 
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of SSA’s 2007 exports and that becomes only slightly larger by 2030, while in LA 
their share is projected to rise from one-fifth in 2007 one-third by 2030. Thus LA’s 
very strong comparative advantage in farming is projected to be maintained and its 
moderately strong comparative advantage in mining to increase, and for SSA the 
changes in comparative advantage are more modest because its exports are already 
highly specialized in non-food primary products.   
The sectoral structure of imports is projected to change relatively little for LA 
and SSA but very considerably for China and South Asia under the assumption that 
trade policies do not change over the projection period. In particular, the share of 
farm products in imports doubles for South Asia and trebles for China, and the 
shares of other primary products in imports also rise, nearly doubling in China by 
2030. Whether in fact China and India allow such an increase in food import 
dependence is a moot point, to be taken up below. As a result, the shares of farm 
exports going to Asian developing countries are projected to increase by more than 
one and a half times for LA and by two and a half times for SSA, almost all at the 
expense of exports to high-income countries rather than to other developing 
countries. The changes in importance of developing Asia for non-farm primary 
products from SSA and LA are not quite as dramatic as for farm products, but by 
2030 it will be the destination for more than one-third of LA’s and two-fifths of 
SSA’s exports of those products, having been around one-quarter in 2007. Clearly 
this represents a huge change in the direction of primary product trade in just one 
generation for both LA and SSA – provided Asian governments don’t raise barriers 
to those imports. 
 
What if China and India ban imports of key foods? 
 
If the projected decline in self-sufficiency in farm products by 2030 for China and 
South Asia in the baseline scenario were of concern to those countries, it may trigger 
a trade policy response. That is, it may lead China and India to follow the earlier-
industrializing Northeast Asian countries in imposing import restrictions on key 
food grains and, in the interest of boosting farm incomes to reduce the yawning 
urban-rural income gap, imposing import restrictions on meat and milk products 
(but not on coarse grains and oilseed products required for animal feedstuffs). 
Indeed there are signs already of such a rise in agricultural supports for farmers in 
these two countries (Figure 2.5).  
According to the GTAP model, if such a trade policy response by China and 
India were in the form of tariff equivalents severe enough to eliminate imports of 
those selected products in 2030, that would raise substantially the share of imports 
of agricultural products that are not protected (Table 2.6). As resources moved 
toward rice, wheat and livestock production, self-sufficiency would fall further for 
crops that provide inputs into livestock feedstuffs, and also for other crops.  
The tariff equivalents of such import restrictions in that simulation range 




Figure 2.5: Agricultural nominal rates of assistancea in China, India and Indonesia, 
1990 to 2015 (%) 
 
 
a The Nominal Rate of Assistance is the percentage by which gross returns to farmers have been 
raised by national farm policies (predominantly import restrictions and, in India’s case, farm input 
subsidies). The final blue column for India is just for 2010. 
 




for those products in India. These are well above bound out-of-quota tariffs in 
numerous cases (compare the last two columns for China and for India in Table 2.6) 
and so would be inconsistent with WTO commitments under international law.  
Moreover, such a policy response would impose a burden on Chinese and 
Indian households that are net buyers of those grain, meat and milk products, 
because domestic consumer prices for those products would increase along with the 
producer price hikes. This may substantially undermine national food security and 
nutrition in China and India by reducing households’ economic access to food. It 
would also reduce agricultural exports from Latin American and other food-surplus 
developing countries.  
 
What if all developing countries become more protective of their farmers?  
 
How different might farm policies be in 2030 if there were no further multilateral or 
major preferential trade agreements? Anderson et al. (2016) address this question by 
making projections of agricultural price distortions to 2030, based on knowledge of 
current WTO-bound tariffs and political economy theory. The latter suggests a 












important agricultural products. Once estimated by Anderson et al. (2016), they use 
those equations in conjunction with the GTAP model  to project future agricultural 
distortions for any country in the absense of further trade reform.6 Their estimates 
reveal that for developing countries as a whole, the average nominal rate of 
agricultural protection (NRA) would rise from 9% to 16% by 2030, with the biggest 
tariff increases being in East Asia and Latin America and, by product, for grains, 
beef, oilseeds and sugar. 
 If such protection growth were to occur instead of policies remaining 
unchanged through to 2030, the welfare cost to developing countries would be $13 
billion higher per year by 2030. To put it another way, if the alternative to not 
agreeing multilaterally to lower agricultural protection rates is not to do nothing but 
rather to raise protection rates unilaterally as incomes grow and comparative 
disadvantage in farming continues, then the benefit foregone from that failure to 
agree is even larger than traditionally estimated. 
 This thought experiment also is a reminder of the value of legally binding 
tariffs in the WTO – something that was not done for farm products under the 
GATT prior to the conclusion of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture. 
Had Japan and Korea been required to bind their agricultural tariffs at the rates in 
place when they signed onto the GATT in 1955 and 1967, respectively, estimates of 
the economic benefits of their membership of that club would have been much 
lower had it been assumed their farm tariffs would remain unchanged over the 
following quarter-century rather than rise – as indeed they did, and spectacularly so 
(Figure 2.6).  
At the time of China’s accession to WTO in December 2001, its NRA was 
less than 5% (see Figure 11.4), or 7% for just import-competing agriculture 
according to Anderson and Valenzuela (2008). Its average bound import tariff 
commitment was about twice that (16% in 2005), but what matters most is out-of-
quota bindings on the items whose imports are restricted by tariff rate quotas. The 
latter tariff bindings as of 2005 for China were 65% for grains, 50% for sugar and 
40% for cotton (WTO, ITC and UNCTAD 2007, p. 60). Hence China, too, has 
scope to raise its agricultural protection substantially. 
 
 
2.4  Implications of climate change for food supplies and trade policy  
 
The above projections of the world economy have a ‘business as usual’ baseline that 
has not incorporated allowance for climate change. This is understandable because 
the confidence bands around what those impacts might be are still very wide, and 
more so the further out in time one seeks to project (Tol 2014). What is clear, 
however, is that climate change is altering agricultural production not only in the  
                                            
6 Bouët and Laborde (2010) also seek to assess the implications for the world economy of 
protection growth that might result from failure of the WTO’s Doha round. However, their 




Figure 2.6: Nominal rate of agricultural assistance (NRA) in Japan, Korea and 
China and date of accession to GATT or WTO, 1955 to 2005 (%) 
 
Source: Anderson (2009, Figure 1.14).  
 
long term but also year to year. In terms of the latter, many areas of the world are 
experiencing increased volatility of weather patterns and more intense or more 
frequent extreme weather events that can ruin a year’s production in minutes. Few 
models explicitly incorporate this uncertainty, and thus most underestimate worst-
case scenarios (Burke et al. 2015). Openness to international (as well as intra-
national) trade can be hugely important in mitigating the short-term effects of 
extreme weather that would otherwise drastically undermine food security (Burgess 
and Donaldson 2010). Hence this aspect of climate change underscores the 
importance of food trade openness. 
As for the long-term effects of climate change, there are already signs that the 
optimal locations for producing the world’s various foods are altering (Donaldson, 
Costinot and Smith 2016). One response to date is rural workers migrating to urban 
areas of their country or to foreign countries, but this has proven less possible, for 
financial liquidity reasons, for poorer households and countries (Cattaneo and Peri 
2015). Another response is breeding crop varieties for different climates. 
Agricultural research has been spectacularly successful in expanding the climate 
range for growing wheat (Olmstead and Rhode 2007, 2011).7 However, R&D takes 
                                            
7 The case of maize is a little different: the varieties developed in the United States at least are more 
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decades. Faster options such as opening up more to trade in food therefore also 
need to be considered as possible long-run policy responses to climate change. 
Numerous global economic modelling studies have been undertaken to assess 
the role trade can play in the wake of long-run climate change. Their results vary 
greatly depending on the modellers’ assumptions (von Lampe 2014, Elbehri 2015, 
Ch. 10, Baldos and Hertel 2015),8 but they all confirm the very positive role of trade 
openness. Just four sets of results are mentioned here to illustrate the types of 
conclusions being drawn. 
First, Hertel, Burke and Lobell (2010) find that the adverse poverty effects of 
climate change are most severe among non-farm households in Africa and South 
Asia, but that farm households are likely to become less poor in regions such as Latin 
America. This difference results from lower yields outweighing any price rises for 
farm incomes in Africa and South Asia and the opposite for farmers in food-
exporting countries of South America. 
Second, while the average level of international food prices is expected to rise 
as a result of climate change, the extent is widely contested (Weibe et al. 2015). For 
example, quite large rises are predicted by IFPRI’s modelling of agricultural markets 
(Nelson et al. 2010), whereas others using global economywide models, such as 
Roson and van der Mensbrugghe (2012), are able to allow for intersectoral 
adjustment and tend to get smaller price rise projections. The range of projections 
is from zero to above 20% for some crops by 2050. The aggregate real price rise by 
2030 may be well under 5% though. 
Third, when economywide models are used, they can also incorporate effects 
of climate changes on other sectors (e.g., tourism in low-lying islands) and on factor 
productivity (e.g., the debilitating effect of higher temperatures and humidity on 
labour productivity in the tropics). Such spillover effects to the agricultural sector 
may be more important for some farmers or consumers than the direct effects of 
climate change on crop yields (Valenzuela and Anderson 2011). 
And fourth, Baldos and Hertel (2014) show that standard drivers of food 
market developments focused on in the previous section, such as growth in 
populations, incomes and farm productivity, are likely to have a much bigger impact 
on long-run trends in prices and food security than are changes in climate. 
In addition to climate change itself impacting food markets, so too are policy 
responses to climate change. One response in the US and EU has been to introduce 
biofuel subsidies and renewable fuel mandates. Another is to impose taxes on 
greenhouse gas emissions, which may eventually apply to and harm agricultural more 
than manufacturing and services production.9 On the other hand, payments for CO2 
absorption may expand the demand for farm workers and farm land.  
                                            
8 To aid model transparency and convergence for this and general foresight work, the Agricultural 
Model Inter-comparison and Improvement Project (AgMIP) has been established. See 
www.agmip.org. 
9 If methane emissions were taxed, production of ruminant animals (especially beef and dairy 




Clearly, the net effect of all of these types of developments on the future of 
any one farm product market remains highly uncertain, as do the net effects on 
poverty, food security, nutrition and health in each nation. One thing is certain 
though: food trade openness will become even more important in a world 
undergoing climate change, because it will ease the pain for those adversely affected, 
and it will allow expansion for those farmers lucky enough to benefit more from 




                                            
al. (2013) and Springmann et al. (2016). On the other hand, the more carbon emissions are taxed 
and markets for carbon credits evolve, some farmers will find it profitable to grow trees or alter 
their crop mix and agricultural practices so as to sequester more carbon in the soil and in perennial 




Chapter 3  
 
 
REFORM ACHIEVEMENTS SO FAR, AND 




Notwithstanding the virtues of trade openness summarized in the previous chapter, 
throughout history most countries have intervened at their border with measures 
that distort the country’s trade and drive a wedge between domestic and international 
market prices. An exceptional period was the mid-nineteenth century, which saw 
repeal of Britain's Corn Laws and the 1860 trade agreement between Britain and 
France. Those milestone events triggered a gradual opening up of world trade, and 
contributed to rapid growth in advanced economies. That first globalization wave 
was brought to an abrupt halt by the First World War and then the protectionism of 
the 1930s. When followed by the Second World War, leaders of key trading 
economies felt driven to establish a set of rules to govern international trade. The 
resulting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) came into force in 1948. 
The GATT also provided for Contracting Parties to conduct multilateral 
rounds of negotiations to gradually lower simultaneously their barriers to trade. 
Those rounds resulted in major reductions between the late 1940s and early 1980s 
in manufacturing protectionism in developed countries. However, they were unable 
to stop – let alone reverse –growth in agricultural protectionism in those countries 
over that period. Those policies inevitably depressed international prices of farm 
products, and ultimately led to surpluses in Western Europe. When export subsidies 
were provided to help dispose of them, an export subsidy war erupted across the 
north Atlantic. That drove international prices of farm products to a record low in 
the mid-1980s, just as the next (seventh) GATT Round of negotiations were to be 
launched in Uruguay. It also triggered the formation of the so-called Cairns Group 
of agricultural-exporting countries, whose sole aim was to keep agriculture on the 
top of the Uruguay Round’s agenda. As a result, an agreement on agriculture was 
among those that came into force along with the World Trade Organization (WTO) 
on 1 January 1995. Those commitments were implemented over the following 
decade. 
This chapter summarizes the extent of the increase in disarray in world 
agricultural markets up to the mid-1980s before assessing the economic welfare and 
other effects of trade reforms between then and 2004. It also compares them with 




The chapter’s final section reviews the comparatively modest trade agreements over 
the subsequent dozen years.   
 
 
3.1 The disarray by the mid-1980s 
 
Apart from the mid-nineteenth century repeal of Britain's Corn Laws, the history of 
industrial and post-industrial development has been overlaid with a history of 
agricultural protection growth. Poor agrarian economies tend to tax agriculture 
relative to other tradables sectors, but as nations industrialize their policy regimes 
tend to gradually change from negatively to positively assisting farmers relative to 
other producers (and conversely from subsidizing to taxing food consumers). The 
period from the 1950s to the 1980s saw substantial growth in agricultural 
protectionism in the advanced industrial economies and its spread to newly 
industrializing economies, tendencies that accelerated and came to a head in the mid-
1980s.  
 Given this history, the attempt in the Uruguay Round to reduce farm price 
supports was seen as both exciting and daunting: exciting, because a successful 
liberalization would reduce the huge and growing waste of resources that would be 
associated with the continuation of past trends in farm policies; and daunting, 
because the history of those policy trends across many countries and over a long 
period suggests major counter-acting of domestic political forces would be needed 
for a multilateral agreement to be reached. 
 Why has the growth of farm protectionism historically been so difficult for 
societies to avoid? It seems almost incredible that the Uruguay Round could have 
been held up for years by a farm trade dispute affecting products that account for 
less than one-tenth of world trade and less than one-twentieth of GDP and 
employment in the main countries seeking exceptional treatment for agriculture. It 
seems all the more incredible given that the economies hurt most by these policies 
are those of the protecting countries themselves. Those protectionist policies are 
wasteful in terms of raising consumer prices for food; requiring ever-larger treasury 
outlays to farmers; redistributing welfare with increasing inefficiency (not only 
because it costs consumers and taxpayers much more than one dollar for every dollar 
received by farmers, but also because the largest producers receive the lion's share of 
the benefits); making non-agricultural producers less competitive in so far as farm 
programs retain resources in agriculture; and damaging the natural environment, not 
least because these price-support policies typically encourage excessive use of farm 
chemicals (Tyers and Anderson 1992).  
 To understand why agreement on farm trade reform had been so difficult to 
achieve in the Uruguay Round, it needs to be understood that this involved not just 
a dispute between the United States and France, as some media commentators 
implied. Those countries just happened to be the most vocal representatives of two 




food-exporting contracting parties to the GATT, involving not only the members of 
the Cairns Group but also numerous other developing countries. And on the other 
hand, there are other highly protected industrial countries, namely the Norway, 
Switzerland, Japan and Korea, as well as the European Union. 
 Nor is it only recently that farm policy has become a contentious issue in trade 
negotiations. Indeed it is because those policies are so contentious (a) that the first 
four rounds of GATT-based multilateral trade negotiations virtually ignored them 
and the next three eventually had to drop them, and (b) that many regional and other 
preferential trade agreements exclude farm products. We should therefore not be 
surprised that the inclusion of farm policies in the Uruguay Round caused problems. 
Their inclusion was considered necessary, however, because they had become 
extremely distortionary by the 1980s, both absolutely and relative to non-farm trade 
policies, and because there was every indication that agricultural protection growth 
would continue to spread, cancer-like, unless explicitly checked. 
 While much of the government intervention in agricultural trade over the 
centuries has been aimed at stabilizing domestic food prices and supplies, there has 
been a general tendency for such policy interventions to gradually change in the 
course of a country's development from effectively taxing agriculture relative to other 
tradable sectors to effectively subsidizing farmers. From the late 1100s to the 1660s, 
prior to the first industrial revolution, Britain used export taxes and licences to 
prevent domestic food prices from rising excessively. During 1660-90 a series of Acts 
gradually raised food import duties (making imports prohibitive under most 
circumstances) and reduced the export restrictions on grain, provisions that were 
made even more protective by Britain’s Corn Law of 1815. The famous repeal of the 
Corn Laws in the mid-1840s heralded a period of relatively unrestricted food trade 
for Britain, but agricultural protection gradually returned in Europe during the last 
decades of that century, spiked in the early 1930s, and increased again after the 1940s. 
Meanwhile, tariffs on West European imports of manufactures have been 
progressively reduced since the GATT came into force in the late 1940s -- adding to 
the encouragement of agriculture relative to manufacturing production. 
 Japan provides an even more striking example of the tendency to increasingly 
assist agriculture relative to other industries. Its industrialization began later, after the 
opening up of the economy following the Meiji Restoration in 1868. By early in the 
20th century Japan had switched from being a small net exporter of food to becoming 
increasingly dependent on rice imports. This was followed by calls from farmers and 
their supporters for rice import controls. Their calls were matched by equally 
vigorous calls from manufacturing and commercial groups for unrestricted food 
trade, since the price of rice at that time was a major determinant of real wages in the 
nonfarm sector. The heated debates were not unlike those that led to the repeal of 
the Corn Laws in Britain six decades earlier. In Japan, however, the forces of 
protection triumphed, and a tariff was imposed on rice imports from 1904. That 
tariff then gradually rose over time, providing a nominal rate of protection for rice 




 Even when there were food riots because of shortages and high rice prices 
just after that war, the Japanese government's response was not to reduce protection 
but instead to extend it to its colonies and to shift from a national to an imperial rice 
self-sufficiency policy. That involved accelerated investments in agricultural 
development in the colonies of Korea and Taiwan behind an ever-higher external 
tariff wall that by the latter 1930s had driven imperial rice prices to more than 60% 
above those in international markets.  
 After post-war reconstruction Japan continued to raise its agricultural 
protection, just as had been happening in Western Europe, but to even higher levels: 
from an average nominal rate for grains and meats of around 50% in the late 1950s 
to around 100% by the early 1970s and to more than 200% by the late 1980s. 
 An import-substituting industrialization strategy was adopted in the 1950s in 
liberated South Korea and Taiwan, which harmed agriculture there; but that was 
replaced in the early 1960s with a more-neutral trade policy that resulted in very rapid 
export-oriented industrialization in those densely populated economies. That 
development strategy imposed competitive pressure on the farm sector which, just 
as in Japan in earlier decades, prompted farmers to lobby (successfully, as it 
happened) for ever-higher levels of protection from import protection in those newly 
industrialized economies as well (Anderson, Hayami and Others 1986, Ch. 2). 
 From the latter 1970s Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy also provided of 
export subsidies to dispose of its induced surpluses. That stimulated the United 
States to defend its export markets by subsidizing US farm exports as well -- a move 
that contributed to international food prices falling by 1986-87 to their lowest level 
in real terms. The export subsidies under the US Export Enhancement Program were 
very costly to the US, added only very modestly in proportional terms to the 
budgetary cost of Europe’s Common Agricultural Policy, and imposed large costs on 
other actual or would-be agricultural-exporting countries. 
 As a consequence of these policy developments, the deadweight welfare losses 
in those protecting countries from distorting their food markets more than doubled 
over the 1980s, while the benefits to their farmers as a group increased by about 50%. 
According to one set of estimates from a multi-commodity model of world food 
markets, the annual benefits of these policies to farmers of Western Europe, the 
United States and Japan rose from $94 to $141 billion over the 1980s (in 1985 US 
dollars), while the cost to consumers in those countries rose from $120 to $216 
billion. That study estimated the direct global loss of economic welfare because of 
industrial country food policies trebled in the 1980s, rising from $16 billion to $50 
billion (Tyers and Anderson 1992, Tables 6.5, 6.6). And that does not include the 
costs of lobbying for and administering the policies, nor the collection and by-
product distortion costs of raising the government revenue needed to finance the 
subsidies, let alone the indirect cost these policies imposed in terms of holding up 






3.2 Evaluating the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
 
In the light of the long history of agricultural protection growth in industrial 
countries, even achieving a standstill in agricultural protection growth via the 
Uruguay Round would have to be described as progress. It would be an advance over 
what otherwise might have been the case, in part because it would reduce the risk of 
newly industrializing countries following the more advanced ones down the 
agricultural protection growth path. But in fact more (although only a little more) 
than a standstill on farm policy was agreed to in the Uruguay Round. The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) has three main components: reductions 
in farm export subsidies, increases in import market access, and cuts in domestic 
producer subsidies. The implementation period for developed countries was six 
years, and for developing countries it was ten years, and the extent of reform required 
of developing countries was less. 
 The fact that farm export subsidies were still to be tolerated continued to 
distinguish agricultural from industrial goods in the GATT, a distinction that stems 
from the 1950s when the United States insisted on a waiver for agriculture of the 
prohibition of export subsidies. Moreover, even by the turn of the century farm 
export subsidies needed to be only about one fifth lower than they were in the late 
1980s to comply with the URAA. True, the budgetary expenditure on export 
subsidies was to be lowered by 36% from the base period (24% for developing 
countries), but for some commodities it was only the agreed cut in the volume of 
subsidized exports (21% for industrial countries, 14% for developing countries) that 
bit. This is because nominal international food prices were considerably higher in the 
implementation period than in the more-depressed 1986-90 base period, in which 
case less export subsidy payments were required to maintain a particular domestic 
price.  
 A second distinguishing feature of the URAA is that it required nontariff 
import barriers to be converted to tariffs.10 Those tariffs were then to be reduced and 
bound. However, the extent of tariff reduction by the end of the century was even 
more modest than for export subsidies: the unweighted average tariff cut must be 36% 
(24% for developing countries), but it could be less than one sixth as a weighted 
average, since each tariff item need be reduced by only 15% of the claimed 1986-88 
tariff equivalents (10% for developing countries). Tangermann (1994) gives the 
example of a country with four items subject to tariffs, three sensitive ones with 
100% duty rates and one with a 4% duty. Reducing the three high rates to 85% (a 
15% cut) and eliminating the 4% rate (a 100% cut) would give an unweighted average 
cut of 36.25%. This would meet the requirement for an unweighted average cut of 
                                            
10 Important exceptions are Japan and Korea. They managed to avoid tariffying their rice policies 




36% and minimum cuts per item of 15%, but it would allow high protection on 
sensitive products to remain and it may increase the dispersion of rates.11  
 Moreover, the claimed tariff equivalents for the base period 1986-88, and 
hence the initial tariff bindings, are in many cases far higher than the actual tariff 
equivalents of the time. The European Union, for example, set them on average at 
about 60% above the actual tariff equivalents of the CAP in recent years, while the 
United States set theirs about 45% above recent rates. This ‘dirty’ tariffication has 
two consequences. One is that actual tariffs may provide no less protection by 2000 
than did the non-tariff import barriers of the early 1990s. Indeed in the case of the 
EU the final bindings for the year 2000 were almost two-thirds above the actual tariff 
equivalent for 1989-93, and for the United States they were more than three-quarters 
above (final column of Table 1). The other consequence of binding tariffs at such a 
high level is that it allows countries to set the actual tariff below that but to vary it so 
as to stabilize the domestic market in much the same way as the EU has done in the 
past with its system of variable import levies and export subsidies. This means there 
has been much less than the hoped-for reduction in fluctuations in international food 
markets that tariffication was expected to deliver.     
 Dirty tariffication is not confined to industrial countries. On the contrary, 
developing countries are even more involved in the practice. This is possible because 
they were allowed to convert unbound tariffs into ‘ceiling bindings’ unrelated to 
previous actual rates of protection. Many developing countries chose to bind their 
tariffs on agricultural imports at more than 50% and some as high as 150% -- far 
above the tariff equivalents of restrictions actually in place in the 1980s/early 1990s. 
 It is true that some countries have agreed also to provide a minimum market 
access opportunity, such that the share of imports in domestic consumption for 
products subject to import restrictions rises to 5% by the year 2000 under a tariff 
quota (8% in the case of rice in Japan in lieu of tariffication; less in the case of 
developing countries). But that access is subject to special safeguard provisions, so it 
only offered potential rather than actual access (another form of contingent 
protection). As well, there is scope to minimize the impact on those imports on the 
domestic market: Yap (1996) gives the example of Japan, whose required rice imports 
could be of low feed quality and/or could be re-exported as food aid. Furthermore, 
market access rules formally introduced scope for discriminating in the allocation 
between countries of these tariff quotas. And perhaps even more importantly, the 
administration of such quotas tends to legitimize a role for state trading agencies such 
as Indonesia’s BULOG. When such agencies have selling rights on the domestic 
market in addition to a monopoly on imports and exports of farm products, they can 
choose to charge ‘mark-ups’ and thereby distort domestic prices easily and relatively 
covertly. 
                                            
11 An increase in the dispersion of rates within the sector could itself be welfare-reducing even if 
the mean rate was unchanged. This is more likely the more resources (including agricultural land) 




 There are thus elements of quantitative management of both export and 
import trade in farm products now under the WTO, including scope for 
discriminatory limitations on trade volumes, rather than just limitations on price 
distortions. This feature of the agricultural agreement is unfortunate, for it reduces 
the degree of flexibility of economies to adjust to changing market circumstances, 
and while it may reduce uncertainty for some traders (those lucky enough to be 
granted import quotas, for example), it does so at the expense of greater uncertainty 
for all other traders. 
 The third main component of the URAA is that the aggregate level of 
domestic support for farmers was required to be reduced to four-fifths of its 1986-
88 level by 2000 (and to 87% by 2004 for developing countries). That too required 
only modest reform in most industrial countries because much of the decline in that 
measure of support had already occurred. In the EU and US, for example, their 
bound tariff levels in 2000 were about two-thirds above the actual tariff equivalents 
during 1989-93 on average. Moreover, there are many forms of support that need 
not be included in the calculation of the aggregate measure of support (AMS), the 
most important being direct payments under production-limiting programs of the 
sort adopted by the US and EU. That meant the use of such “Green Box” 
instruments (including environmental provisions) could spread to other developed 
countries and commodities as farm income support via trade measures becomes less 
of an option. For budgetary reasons developing countries use domestic farm support 
measures much less than developed countries and so this possibility is likely to be 
less attractive to them. However, under the Special and Differential Treatment 
clauses of the URAA, they have some additional exempt policy measures, should 
they wish to provide more domestic support for their farmers in the future. These 
include investment subsidies and broadly based farm input subsidies. 
 The Uruguay Round included also a separate Agreement on the Application 
of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures. Its purpose is to ensure that any claims that 
import restrictions are necessary for human, animal, or plant health or safety be more 
scientifically based and more transparent in the future than has been the case in the 
past. This may help to reduce the abuse of SPS measures, although there is still 
sufficient vagueness in the wording to ensure that the protectionist use of these 
measures will not be removed entirely. 
 In short, implementing the agricultural reforms agreed to in the Round 
involved only very modest liberalization in industrial countries and even less in 
developing countries, with plenty of room for disputes over compliance during the 
implementation period. Agriculture's relative decline and loss of farm jobs in heavily-
protected industrial countries may have accelerated as a result of implementing the 
URAA, but only slightly. But at least it brought agriculture into the mainstream of 
the WTO (which allowed the Uruguay Round to be concluded), and it promised to 
reopen agricultural negotiations and continue the process of farm reform into the 
new millennium. Moreover, the important need to tariffy nontariff import barriers 




and to include domestic producer subsidies in the reform package, has been 
acknowledged and explicitly incorporated in the URAA. The new rules and 
obligations eventually will constrain further farm protection growth in both industrial 
and developing countries (if not immediately), thereby promising greater certainty 
and stability to international food markets this century and so encouraging 
developing countries with a natural comparative advantage in farm products to 
exploit the new market opportunities, not least through seeking reductions in their 
own country’s direct and indirect policy discrimination against agriculture. 
 Moreover, there has been considerable reduction in the degree of tariff 
escalation affecting markets for tropical export products. In the cases of rubber, jute, 
oilseeds, spices, tobacco and wood, for example, tariffs on the primary and semi-
processed products traditionally have been lower than on the final manufactured 
products but the latter have been reduced much more than the former thanks to the 
Uruguay Round (ESCAP 1995, pp. 128-30). 
 
 
3.3 Impact of Uruguay Round agreements on developing countries 
 
The Uruguay Round was not only about agriculture. Manufacturing tariffs (already 
quite low) were reduced further; ‘voluntary’ export restraints were phased out; the 
Multifibre Arrangement was abolished and protection to textiles and clothing 
lowered; a (small) beginning was made to liberalize trade in services; there is now 
greater discipline on abuse of intellectual property rights; tighter rules have been 
introduced on technical barriers to trade, rules of origin, pre-shipment inspection, 
trade-related investment measures, import licensing, safeguards, subsidies, and 
countervailing measures; a plurilateral agreement on government procurement was 
signed; and much-improved dispute settlement procedures were put in place in the 
new WTO.  
 All of these changes have enhanced global economic welfare (Anderson 2016). 
Whether and to what extent a particular country shared in that welfare gain depends 
largely on how much (a) its trading partners lowered barriers to its exports, (b) its 
competitors lowered their trade barriers, and especially (c) how much the country 
concerned lowered its own trade barriers. Since the Uruguay Round involved so 
much more than just agriculture, and since this freeing up of global trade and the 
associated boost to economic growth has altered countries’ comparative advantages, 
it is only possible to think about the impact of the Round on a country from a global, 
economy-wide perspective. In particular, did the Uruguay Round, which was fully 
implemented by 2004, improve the country’s terms of trade and, if not, were its own 
policy reform commitments sufficient to ensure its citizens were nonetheless better 
off from the Round’s implementation? And how did it affect the country’s 






3.4 Effects of the Uruguay Round and other trade policy reforms by 2004 
 
Of course the Uruguay Round was not the only reason for trade policy changes over 
the two decades to 2004. Two other notable events were the accession of China and 
Taiwan to the WTO by early 2002, and the enlargement of the European Union 
from 15 to 25 members. What were the net economic effects of trade policy changes 
around the world over those two decades? And how do the effects on farm incomes 
and economic welfare in developing countries compare with the effects of those 
price distortions still in place as of 2004? Valenzuela, van der Mensbrugghe and 
Anderson (2009) use a global economy-wide model (the World Bank’s Linkage 
model – see van der Mensbrugghe 2005) to provide a combined retrospective and 
prospective analysis that seeks to assess how far the world has come, and how far it 
still had to go following the implementation of the Uruguay Round, in removing the 
disarray in world agriculture. That study quantifies the impacts both of past reforms 
and remaining policies by comparing the effects of price-distorting policies in the 
period 1980-84 with those of 2004.  
Several key findings from that economy-wide modeling study, summarized in 
Table 3.1, are worth emphasizing. First, the policy reforms from the early 1980s to 
the mid-2000s is estimated to have improved global economic welfare by $233 
billion per year, and removing the distortions remaining as of 2004 would add 
another $168 billion per year (both in 2004 US dollars). This suggests that in a global 
welfare sense the world moved three-fifths of the way towards global free trade in 
goods over that quarter century. 
 
Table 3.1: Effects on developing countries (DCs) and the world of reforming global 
goods markets between 1980-84 and 2004, and of removing remaining price and 
trade distortions as of 2004 (2004 US billion dollars and %) 
 Reform from 
1980-84 to 2004 
 
Move to  
free trade  
as of  2004 
Global economic welfare, US$b (%) $233b (0.8%) $168b(0.6%) 
DCs’ economic welfare, US$b (%) $73b (1.0%) $65b (0.9%) 
DCs’ share of  global agric output 58%à 62% 62%à 65% 
DCs’ share of  global agric exports 43%à 55% 55%à 64% 
% rise in DCs’ agric (nonag) GDP 4.9% (0.4%) 5.6% (1.9%) 
% rise in international agric. prices 13% <1% 





Second, developing countries benefited proportionately more than high-
income economies (1.0% compared with 0.7% of national income) from those past 
policy reforms, and would gain nearly twice as much as high-income countries by 
completing that reform process (an average increase of 0.9% compared with 0.5% 
for high-income countries). Of those prospective welfare gains from global 
liberalization, 60% would come from agriculture and food policy reform. This is a 
striking result given that the shares of agriculture and food in global GDP and global 
merchandise trade are only 3 and 6%, respectively. The contribution of farm and 
food policy reform to the prospective welfare gain for just developing countries is 
even greater, at 83%. 
Third, the developing countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural 
exports rose from 43 to 55%, and its farm output share from 58 to 62%, because of 
those reforms to 2004, with rises in nearly all agricultural industries except rice and 
sugar. Removing remaining goods market distortions would boost developing 
countries’ export and output shares to 64 and 65%, respectively. 
Fourth, for developing countries as a group, net farm income (value added in 
or GDP from agriculture) is estimated to be 4.9% higher than it would have been 
without the reforms of the past quarter century, which is more than ten times the 
proportional gain for non-agriculture. If policies remaining in 2004 had been 
removed, net farm incomes in developing countries would have risen a further 5.6%, 
compared with just 1.9% for non-agricultural value added. As well, returns to 
unskilled workers in developing countries – the majority of whom work on farms – 
would rise more than returns to other productive factors from that liberalization.  
 
 
3.5 WTO contributions to multilateral policy reforms since 2004 
 
Despite the considerable potential for global welfare gains from another round of 
multilateral trade negotiations, the WTO’s Doha Round has struggled to gain traction 
over the past dozen years – and not least because of difficulties in reaching consensus 
on agricultural issues. An agreement on trade facilitation was reached in the WTO 
ministerial meeting in Bali in late 2013, which will help mostly developing countries. 
Then in December 2015, at the WTO Tenth Ministerial Conference in Nairobi, a 
package of Decisions was agreed, a number of which are relevant to agriculture. The 
most important is a commitment to abolish farm export subsidies (with the exception 
of scheduled export subsidies for processed dairy products and pork, which have 
been given until 2020 to be phased out). Developing countries have until the end of 
2018 to phase out their export subsidies, apart from marketing and transport 
subsidies which can continue until the end of 2023. Least developed countries 





The Nairobi Decisions also contain disciplines to prevent the use of other 
export policies as subsidies. These include limitations on financing support for 
agricultural exporters, such as export credits, export credit guarantees or insurance 
programmes; rules for agricultural-exporting state-owned enterprises; and disciplines 
to ensure that international food aid does not adversely impact domestic markets. 
Public stockholding for food security purposes and cotton were mentioned 
again. The stockholding Decision reaffirms the commitment of WTO members to 
negotiate and make all concerted efforts to agree and adopt a “permanent solution” 
to this issue. The cotton Decision calls on developed countries – and developing 
countries that declare themselves able to do so – to grant listed “cotton-related” 
exports from LDCs duty-free and quota-free access from 1 January 2016 to the 
extent provided for in their respective preferential trade agreements in favour of 
LDCs. As well, cotton export subsidies are required to end immediately for 
developed countries and by 1 January 2017 by developing countries.  
Developing countries again sought to have recourse to a Special Safeguard 
Mechanism (SSM) based on import quantity and price triggers. All that was agreed 
though was that those negotiations will continue to be pursued in the WTO 
Committee on Agriculture. This issue is taken up in Chapter 6, along with other 
ongoing and unresolved issues. But before addressing those issues, the next chapter 
examines remaining barriers to agricultural trade, and Chapter 5 then looks at the 





Chapter 4  
 
 




As already noted, agricultural protection and subsidies in high-income (and a few 
upper middle-income) countries have been depressing international prices of farm 
products for many decades, thereby lowering the earnings of farmers and associated 
agribusinesses in developing countries (Johnson 1991). Those policies almost 
certainly added to global inequality and poverty, since two-thirds of the world’s 
extremely poor people are farmers and four-fifths live in rural areas in developing 
countries (Castañeda et al. 2016). As well as this external adverse influence on 
incomes of farmers in developing countries, their own governments taxed them 
following independence until at least the 1980s. This involved both directly taxing 
farm exports, and in some cases (in-kind) production, as well as harming farmers 
indirectly with an import-substituting industrialization strategy that involved 
restrictions on imports of manufactures and an overvalued currency.  
An important aspect of those price-distorting policies was their anti-trade 
bias: they reduced the quantity of farm products traded internationally. Such 
‘thinning’ of the international market meant that its prices have been more volatile 
than they otherwise would have been, and that has induced national governments to 
insulate somewhat their domestic food markets from international price volatility – 
so adding further to those fluctuations in international prices. 
While many developing country governments have reformed their 
agricultural, trade and exchange rate policies, thereby reducing their anti-agricultural 
bias, and some high-income countries have reduced their farm price supports too, 
both groups of countries continue to have an anti-trade bias in their policies and to 
insulate their domestic food markets from international price fluctuations. As well, 
in the most advanced developing economies, the gradual removal of their previous 
discrimination against the agricultural sector is being followed by rising levels of 
support for their farmers, which will further depress the economic conditions facing 
farmers in poorer countries. 
This chapter begins by outlining ways of measuring the price-distorting 
impacts of policies (which have improved considerably over the past half-century), 
before summarizing empirical evidence of domestic price distortions since the mid-
1950s. When placed in historical perspective, the reforms since the mid-1980s are as 
dramatic as the policy changes in the preceding three decades. Therefore, in tracing 




subdivide the period into the years to the mid-1980s, which were characterized by 
policies that were strongly anti-trade, and the subsequent decades which saw the 
gradual undoing of those policies. Despite those policy reforms, the evidence shows 
that countries continue to insulate their food markets from international price 
fluctuations, and to assist more their import-competing farmers. As well, plenty of 
diversity in distortions remains across countries, and across commodities within each 
country. Hence a continuation of the reform process would still expand farm trade, 
‘thicken’ international food markets, and raise the mean and lower the volatility of 
prices in those markets.  
 
 
4.1 Indicators of national distortions to prices  
 
The most common indicators of government interventions in agricultural markets 
of high-income countries and a few large middle-income countries are the producer 
and consumer support estimates (PSEs and CSEs) and related measures that have 
been computed annually by the OECD (2016). Those estimates only begin in 1986 
though, and they refer only to the farm sector with no comparable numbers for non-
farm sectors. 
For present purposes it is helpful to go back further in time, to include also 
the world’s developing countries since they account for half of global agricultural 
production, and to compare the price-distorting effects of government policies on 
farm products with those affecting the tradable products of other sectors of the 
economy. A World Bank study, summarized in Anderson (2009) and updated by 
Anderson and Nelgen (2013), sought to do that for 82 countries that together 
account for more than 90% of the world’s population and global trade, employment, 
GDP and poverty. 
For that World Bank study, the Nominal Rate of Assistance (NRA) for each 
farm product in any country has been defined as the percentage by which 
government policies have directly raised gross returns to farmers above what they 
would be without the government’s intervention (or lowered them, if NRA<0 – see 
Anderson et al. 2008).12 That measure has been used to estimate a weighted average 
NRA for all covered products (accounting for more than two-thirds of the gross 
value of national farm production in each of the 82 studied countries). The NRA is 
expressed as a percentage of the value of production at undistorted prices – unlike 
the OECD’s PSE and CSE, which are expressed as a percentage of the distorted 
price and so cannot exceed 100%.  
                                            
12 The NRA takes account of not only trade taxes-cum-subsidies but also non-tariff measures 
(NTMs) that alter prices. Of course some of those NTMs, including domestic regulations and 
standards, may be introduced to overcome externalities and thus may raise rather than lower 
national welfare (Beghin, Maertens and Swinnen 2015; Swinnen, Vandeplas and Vandemoortele 
2016). In such cases the NRA is an imperfect indicator of distortions, but these cases are expected 




To that NRA for covered products is added a ‘guesstimate’ of the NRA for 
non-covered products and an estimate of the NRA from non-product-specific forms 
of assistance or taxation in each country.13 Each farm industry is classified either as 
import-competing, or a producer of exportables, or as producing a nontradable (with 
its status sometimes changing over the years). That classification makes it possible 
to generate for each year the weighted average NRAs for import-competing and 
exportable farm products, thereby providing an indication of the extent of anti-trade 
bias.  
Also computed for the World Bank project is a production-weighted average 
NRA for nonagricultural tradables, for comparison with that for agricultural 
tradables via the calculation of a percentage Relative Rate of Assistance (RRA), 
defined as RRA = 100*[(100+NRAagt)/(100+NRAnonagt)-1] where NRAagt and 
NRAnonagt are the percentage NRAs for the tradables parts of the agricultural 
(including non-covered) and non-agricultural sectors, respectively.14 Since the NRA 
cannot be less than -100% if producers are to earn anything, neither can the RRA 
(since the weighted average NRAnonagt is non-negative in all 82 country case 
studies). And if both of those sectors are equally assisted, the RRA is zero. This 
measure is useful in that if it is below (above) zero, it provides an internationally 
comparable indication of the extent to which a country’s sectoral policy regime has 
an anti- (pro-)agricultural bias (Anderson et al. 2008).  
 The extent to which consumers are taxed or subsidized also has been 
examined by that World Bank project. To do so, a Consumer Tax Equivalent (CTE) 
is calculated by comparing the price that consumers pay for their food and the 
international price of each food product at the border. Differences between the 
NRA and the CTE arise from distortions in the domestic economy that are caused 
by transfer policies and taxes/subsidies that cause the prices paid by consumers 
(adjusted to the farm gate level) to differ from those received by producers. In the 
absence of any other information, the CTE for each tradable farm product is 
assumed to be the same as the NRA from border distortions.  
In calculating the NRAs and CTEs for each sector of the economy, the 
methodology outlined in Anderson et al. (2008) also includes the implicit trade tax 
distortions generated by dual or multiple exchange rates, drawing on the 
methodology of Dervis, de Melo and Robinson (1981). 
                                            
13 Since the 1980s, governments of some high-income countries have provided so-called 
‘decoupled’ assistance to farmers too (Orden, Paarlberg and Roe 1999, Gardner 2002, Swinnen 
2008, Josling and Tangermann 2015). However, because that support in principle does not distort 
resource allocation, its NRA has been computed separately and is not included in the World Bank 
study for direct comparison with the NRAs for other sectors or for developing countries. 
14 Farmers are affected not just by prices of their own products but also by the incentives non-
agricultural producers face. That is, it is relative prices and hence relative rates of government 
assistance that affect producer incentives. Eighty years ago Lerner (1936) provided his Symmetry 
Theorem that proved that in a two-sector economy, an import tax has the same effect as an export 





The cost of government policy distortions to incentives, in terms of resource 
misallocation, tends to be greater the greater the variation of NRAs across industries 
within the sector (Lloyd 1974). A simple indicator of dispersion is the standard 
deviation of the covered industries’ NRAs. However, it is helpful to have a single 
indicator of the impact of the sector’s price-distorting policies on overall welfare or 
trade at any time, and to trace its path over time and make cross-country 
comparisons. To that end, the family of indexes first developed by Anderson and 
Neary (1994, 2005) under the catch-all name of trade restrictiveness indexes has been 
drawn on to generate indicators of distortions imposed by each country’s agricultural 
policies on its economic welfare, and also on its agricultural trade. Lloyd, Croser and 
Anderson (2010) define and estimate a Welfare Reduction Index (WRI) and a Trade 
Reduction Index (TRI) for the same 82 countries.  Both the WRI and TRI take into 
account that, for some covered products, the producer distortions (NRA) differ 
from the distortions faced by consumers (CTE). As their names suggest, these two 
new indexes respectively capture in a single indicator the direct welfare- or trade-
reducing effects of distortions to consumer and producer prices of covered farm 
products from all agricultural and food price and trade policy measures in place.  
Specifically, the TRI (or WRI) is that ad valorem trade tax rate which, if 
applied uniformly to all farm commodities in a country that year, would generate the 
same reduction in trade (or economic welfare) as the actual cross-commodity 
structure of agricultural NRAs and CTEs for that country, other things equal. 
The WRI measure indicates the partial equilibrium welfare cost of agricultural 
price-distorting policies better than the NRA because it recognizes that the welfare 
cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the square of the price 
wedge. It thus captures the disproportionately higher welfare costs of peak levels of 
assistance or taxation, and is larger than the mean NRA or CTE. Furthermore, the 
WRI is positive regardless of whether the government’s agricultural policy is 




4.2 Empirical estimates of policies’ distortions to prices: NRAs  
 
To gauge how farmer incentives in high-income and developing countries have 
evolved since the 1950s, we draw on the time series evidence from the above-cited 
World Bank study compiled by Anderson and Valenzuela (2008), summarized in 
Anderson (2009), and updated to 2011 by Anderson and Nelgen (2013). Of the 82 
countries in that study, more than half are developing countries. It turns out that the 
NRA and CTE in that database are very highly correlated for most products in all 
countries, reflecting the dominance of border trade measures among the policies 
adopted. For that reason, and to conserve space, only producer price distortions are 




For developing countries, the main comprehensive set of pertinent estimates 
over time was, until recently, for the period just prior to when reforms became 
widespread. They were generated as part of a major study of 18 developing countries 
from the 1960s to the mid-1980s by Krueger, Schiff, and Valdés (1988, 1991). That 
study by the World Bank shows that the depression of incentives facing farmers has 
been due only partly to various forms of agricultural price and trade policies, 
including subsidies to food imports. Much more important in many cases were those 
developing countries’ non-agricultural policies that hurt their farmers indirectly. The 
two key ones were manufacturing protectionism (which attracts resources from 
agriculture to the industrial sector) and overvalued exchange rates (which attract 
resources to sectors producing nontradables, such as services).  
The more-recent World Bank database, as updated by Anderson and Nelgen 
(2013), covers 45 developing countries but also 13 European transition economies 
as well as 24 high-income countries. The results from that study (which are 
compared with the earlier Krueger/Schiff/Valdés ones in Anderson 2010) reveal 
that there have been substantial reductions in distortions to agricultural incentives 
in developing countries over the past three decades. They also reveal, however, that 
progress has not been uniform across countries and regions, and that the reform 
process is far from complete. More specifically, many countries still have a wide 
dispersion in NRAs for different farm industries, and in particular have a strong anti-
trade bias in the structure of assistance within their agricultural sector.  
The global summary of those new results is provided in the following series of 
Figures. Figure 4.1 reveals that the nominal rate of assistance (NRA) to farmers in 
high-income countries rose steadily over the post-World War II period through to 
the end of the 1980s, apart from a dip when international food prices spiked around 
1973-74. After peaking at more than 50% in the mid-1980s, when real international 
food prices were at a near-record low, the average agricultural NRA for high-income 
countries has fallen very substantially.15 This is so even when the new farm programs 
that are somewhat ‘decoupled’ from directly influencing production decisions are 
included. For developing countries, too, the average NRA for agriculture has been 
moving towards zero, but from a level of around –25% between the mid-1950s and 
early 1980s. Indeed it ‘overshot’ in the 1990s by becoming positive, and is now close 
to the average NRA for high-income countries. 
  
                                            
15 This is true even for the high-income countries of the Middle East that were not included in the 
World Bank study. For example, in 2015 Saudi Arabia abandoned its 3-decade program of huge 
support for wheat production, and announced a 3-year phase-out of support for green fodder 
production (both of which have been completely irrigated). The main reason for the policy change 
was a strong concern over the depletion of the country’s scarce water reserves. The Saudi 
government is instead encouraging agricultural companies to invest in foreign countries that have 
a comparative advantage in producing those two crops plus rice, maize, barley and soybean, and 









a Five-year weighted averages, with decoupled payments included in the dashed line. The non-EU 
transitional economies of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia (ECA) are included in the 
high-income country group. 
 
Source: Anderson (2009), updated from estimates in Anderson and Nelgen (2013) 
and, for 2010-14, www.ag-incentives.org. 
 
 
The developing country average NRA conceals the fact that the exporting and 
import-competing subsectors of agriculture have very different NRAs. While the 
average NRA for farm product exporters in developing countries has been negative 
throughout (coming back from –50% in the 1960s and 1970s to almost zero in 2000-
10), the NRA for import-competing farmers in developing countries has fluctuated 
around a trend rate that has risen from 10 and 30% – and it even reached 40% in 
the years of low international prices in the mid-1980s (Figure 4.2). This suggests that 
export-focused farmers in developing countries are still discriminated against by 
farm policies in two respects: by the anti-trade structure of assistance within their 
own agricultural sectors, and by the protection still afforded farmers in high-income 
countries.16 That anti-trade bias also reflects the more-general fact that NRAs are 
not uniform across commodities, which in turn indicates that resources within the 
farm sector of each country are not being put to their best use – a point picked up 
in the next chapter. 
                                            
16 Farmers in some war-torn states continue to be discriminated against by those in charge, as for 




Figure 4.2: NRAs to exportable, import-competing, and all agricultural products in 
developing and high-income countries, 1955 to 2014 (%) 
 








Source: Anderson (2009, Ch. 1), updated using Anderson and Nelgen (2013) and, 





4.3 Empirical estimates of policies’ distortions to prices: RRAs 
 
The improvement in farmers’ incentives in developing countries is understated by 
the above NRA estimates, because those countries also have reduced their assistance 
to producers of non-agricultural tradable goods, most notably manufactures. The 
decline in the weighted average NRA for manufacturers, depicted in Figure 4.3, was 
greater than the increase in the average NRA for tradable agricultural sectors for the 
period to the mid-1980s, and both caused the estimated RRA to rise somewhat. For 
the period since the mid-1980s, changes in both sectors’ NRAs have contributed 
almost equally to the further improvement in farmer incentives. The RRA for 
developing countries as a group went from minus 46% in the second half of the 
1970s to just above zero in the first decade of the present century. This increase 
(from a coefficient of 0.54 to 1.01) is equivalent to an almost doubling in the relative 
price of farm products, which is a huge change in the fortunes of developing country 
farmers in just one generation.  
China was among the key countries contributing to this major change and, in 
its case, reducing the overvaluation of its official exchange rate was an important 
part of its reform.17 China’s RRA rose from -61% in 1981-84 to -31% in 1990-94, 
1% in 2000-04, and 17% in 2010-14. India’s RRA similarly rose, albeit somewhat 
slower than China’s, from -41% in the 1970s to -12% in the 1990s and 12% in 2000-
10. These are two of the most important developing economies to have policy 
regimes that have transitioned from taxing to subsidizing farmers relative to 
producers of other tradable products – but they are certainly not the only ones. 
Korea and Taiwan preceded them by a quarter-century, and seven other developing 
countries monitored by the OECD also have reached the status of having an NRA 
at least half the current average for the OECD as a whole (Figure 4.4). Moreover, 
evidence from a soon-to-be-released new global database that extends the series 
depicted here reveals that the NRA for all developing countries as a group had, by 




                                            
17 In China, the distortion in the domestic market for foreign currencies was gradually reduced in 
an indirect way, by allowing exporters to sell an increasing share of their foreign currency earnings 
on a higher-priced secondary market that (unlike in many other countries with an overvalued 
currency) was legal. This lowered the trade tax equivalent of that distortion over time, and hence 
its impact on the NRA for farm and non-farm sectors, depending on the extent to which they 
were net-exporting or net-importing sectors. That currency market distortion made China’s RRA 
estimates about one-fifth larger than they would have been in the mid-1980s, but that difference 




Figure 4.3: Developing and high-income countries’ NRAs to agricultural and non-
agricultural tradable sectors, and RRAs,a 1955 to 2011 (%) 
 
(a) Developing countries 
 
 
(b) High-income countries 
 
 
a Five-year averages. Calculations use farm production-weighted averages across countries. RRA is 
defined as 100*[(100+NRAagt)/(100+NRAnonagt)−1], where NRAagt and NRAnonagt, 
respectively, are the NRAs for the tradable segments of the agricultural and non-agricultural 
sectors.  
 

















































Figure 4.4: Nominal rates of assistance to agriculture in key emerging countries and 
the OECD, 1995 to 2014a (%) 
  
 
a The Indian estimates are from Anderson and Nelgen (2013) and its final period refers to just 
2010. The final bars refer to the average NRA for all member countries of the OECD. 
 
Source: OECD (2016). 
 
 
4.4 Empirical estimates of policies’ distortions to prices: TRIs and WRIs 
 
The NRA averages hide the fact that there is still a wide range of NRAs across both 
countries and commodities (Figure 4.5).18 Because the cost of government policy 
distortions in terms of resource misallocation within a country tend to be greater the  
                                            
18 The farm products least protected from import competition tend to be those that are inputs into other 
(often highly protected) industries such as meat and dairy production. That openness, together with rapidly 
growing demands for livestock products and edible oils as incomes grow in developing countries, and 
rapidly growing supplies in a few key countries of (a) maize and soybean thanks to new transgenic varieties 
being adopted and (b) oil palm as a result of forest clearing in Southeast Asia, means that international trade 
in those products has expanded dramatically. Byerlee, Falcon and Naylor (2016) describe it a as revolution 
akin to the green revolution that began in Asia in the 1960s. Over the period from 1995 (just prior to the 
adoption of GM crops) to 2013, the US$ values of global exports of vegetable oils (including meal) increased 
6.2-fold, while that for cereals, meats, and dairy products each increased slightly less than total agricultural 
trade (3.2-fold). Exports of vegetable oils and meals amounted to $123 billion in 2013, compared with just 












Figure 4.5: NRAs across developing countries and across products globally, 2005-
10(%) 
 
(a) by country                                                                                 (b) by product 
  
 
Source: Derived from estimates in Anderson and Nelgen (2013).  















































































greater the dispersion of commodity NRAs, it is informative to also report estimates 
of the trade- and welfare-reduction indexes (TRI and WRI). The WRI recognizes 
that the welfare cost of a government-imposed price distortion is related to the 
square of the price wedge; and both indexes are appropriately positive regardless of 
whether the government’s policy is favouring or hurting producers in a particular 
sector.  
The cross-commodity variability of NRAs around the overall national sectoral 
average each year was no less in the most-recent decade than it was in the three 
previous decades for both the developed and the developing country groups, 
suggesting that the reduction in the mean NRA has not been accompanied by a fall 
in the NRA variance across commodities within the sector. This is why the WRI in 
Figure 4.6 is still well above zero.  
A crucial component of the NRAs’ (and CTEs’) commodity product 
dispersion is that the agricultural policy regime across countries still tends to have 
an anti-trade bias. This bias has declined over time for the developing country group, 
mainly because of declines in agricultural export taxation and in spite of growth in 
their agricultural import protection. For the high-income group, the anti-agricultural 
trade bias has also declined over time, despite a rise and then decline in agricultural 
export subsidies that offset slightly a similar trajectory in import protection. Hence 
the inverted U-shaped trends in the TRI for both country groups reported in Figure 
4.6. 
These two indicators suggest that the adverse trade and welfare effects of 
agricultural policies of the mid-1980s have lessened since then, notwithstanding the 
large range of NRAs that Figure 4.5 reveals still remain across countries and 
commodities. But there have also been declines in manufacturing protectionism over 
the past few decades, as revealed in Figure 4.3.  
The WRI is also helpful in checking on the changing relative importance of 
various policy instruments. Among the trade-distorting policy instruments, Figure 
4.7 reveals how much export taxes have been phased out by developing countries 
while assistance to import-competing agricultural sub-sectors of developing 
countries has grown, according to the WRI estimates. Among the high-income 
countries, the growth of decoupled, more-direct income-support measures in 
Western Europe means that region now has a far different pattern of assistance than 
that in Northeast Asia where border-measure supports continue to dominate (Figure 
4.8). That conclusion is also drawn from the OECD’s PSE estimates, which contrast 
the relatively high proportion of support that is not directly market-distorting for US 
and Western European farmers versus the dominance of such measures in the so-





Figure 4.6: WRIs and TRIs among high-income, transition, and developing countries 
for tradable farm products, 1960 to 2010 (%) 
 




(b) Trade-reduction index 
 
 



































Figure 4.7: Contributions of various instruments to the border component of the 




Source: Derived from estimates reported in Croser and Anderson (2011), updated 





The TRI and WRI estimates are useful as supplements to the NRA and RRA, and 
together they help explain why the global economy-wide modelling reported in the 
previous chapter suggested the world moved more than halfway towards free trade 
in the two decades to 2004 but still had substantial scope to add more to global 
welfare via further trade policy reform. The above estimates suggest developing 
countries have not taken as much advantage of those opportunities as high-income 
countries during the past dozen years. Plenty of diversity in price distortions remains 
across countries, and across commodities within each country.  
In particular, export-focused farmers in poorer developing countries are still 
discriminated against by farm policies in two respects: by the anti-trade structure of 
assistance that remains within their own agricultural sector, and by the assistance still 
afforded farmers in high-income and advanced developing countries. A continuation 
of the reform process would boost farm trade, ‘thicken’ international food markets, 
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Figure 4.8: Contributions of various policy instruments to the producer component 
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Figure 4.9: Contributions of market-distorting and other policy instruments to the 






Source: OECD (2016). 
 
 
those markets. It would also ensure that productive resources within the farm sector 
of each country and globally would be put to their best use. However, for that 
process to help export-focused farmers in poorer developing countries, import 
restrictions need to be reduced not only in high-income countries but also in 
developing countries themselves. This is because an increasing share of developing 
country exports go to other developing countries: in 2005 that share was 46% but 
by 2015 it was 58%, even though the share of developing countries as a group in 
global merchandise exports was just 45% in both years (UNCTAD 2016).  
With this in mind, the next chapter examines what has been proposed under 








































































































TRADE AND WELFARE EFFECTS OF 




With the decade-long implementation of the Uruguay Round agreements to be 
completed at the end of 2004, including the historic URAA, and the WTO’s 
membership expanded to cover all but a small fraction of world trade, it was 
expected that a new round of multilateral trade negotiations would be launched as 
early as the WTO’s 1999 Trade Ministerial Meeting in Seattle. However, that meeting 
had to be abandoned because of anti-globalization protesters. It was only after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 on the United States that the membership of 
the WTO convened in the capital of Qatar to launch a new comprehensive round, 
the so-called Doha Development Agenda.  
 In the first few years of the DDA there was a great deal of ex ante analysis of 
the prospective effects of a DDA agreement. The quality of that analysis was far 
higher and far more comprehensive than prior to any of the GATT’s seven 
negotiation rounds that preceded it, including the Uruguay Round. Given the focus 
on development, many analyses gave special attention to the likely effects on 
developing countries in particular. And because market distortions were still greatest 
in agriculture, that sector got more attention than any other. 
 It now seems unlikely that all the policy reform proposals tabled in the first 
few years of the DDA will ever become part of a single-undertaking agreement at 
the WTO. Nonetheless, analyses of them are worth examining because they give 
insights into what might have been, and why the package was insufficiently appealing 
to enough of the key members of the WTO. They also offer cautions as to what to 
avoid in future. So after providing some background, this chapter summarizes the 
main questions that were addressed in the economic analyses that focused on the 




5.1 Background to the DDA 
 
Agriculture has a habit of causing contention in international trade negotiations. It 
caused long delays to the Uruguay Round in the late 1980s and 1990s, and again it 




The political sensitivity of this declining sector means there are always self-
interested groups suggesting it be side-lined in trade negotiations – as indeed it has 
been in numerous sub-global preferential trading agreements, and in the GATT 
prior to the Uruguay Round.19 Today the groups with that inclination include not 
just farmers in the highly protecting countries and net-food-importing developing 
countries. Also included are food exporters receiving preferential access to those 
markets, including holders of tariff rate quotas, and members of regional trading 
agreements, not to mention parties to non-reciprocal preference agreements which 
include all least-developed countries.  
However, because agricultural earnings are so important to a large number of 
developing countries, the highly protective farm policies of a few wealthy countries 
have been targeted by them in the DDA negotiations. Better access to rich countries’ 
markets for their farm produce is a high priority for them.20 
Some developing countries have been granted greater access to developed-
country markets for a selection of products under various preferential agreements. 
Examples are the EU’s provisions for former colonies in the Africa, Caribbean and 
Pacific (ACP) program and for Least Developed Countries under the Everything-
But-Arms (EBA) agreement. Likewise, the United States has its Africa Growth and 
Opportunity Act (AGOA) and Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI). These schemes 
reduce demands from preference-receiving countries for developed-country farm 
policy reform, but they exacerbate the concerns of other countries excluded from 
such programs and thereby made worse off through declining terms of trade. 
Moreover, their trade-diverting effects may even be worsening rather than 
improving aggregate global welfare – and even developing country welfare.  
In addition, many in developing countries feel they did not get a good deal 
out of the Uruguay Round. From a merchantilist viewpoint, the evidence seems to 
support that claim: Finger and Winters (2002) report that the average depth of tariff 
cut by developing countries was substantially greater than that agreed to by high-
income countries. As well, developing countries had to take on costly commitments 
such as those embodied in the SPS and TRIPS agreements (Finger and Schuler 
2001). They therefore have been determined in the Doha round that they get 
significantly more market access commitments from developed countries before 
they contemplate opening their own markets further.  
 
                                            
19 The rules of the GATT are intended, in principle, to cover trade in all goods. However, in 
practice, trade in agricultural products was largely excluded from their remit as a consequence of 
a number of exceptions. Details are to be found in Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996) and in 
Anderson and Josling (2005). 
20 Around half of the economically active population in developing countries is engaged in 
agriculture, which is several times larger than the sector’s measured GDP share. While some of 
that difference in shares is due to under-reporting of subsistence consumption and of the extent 
of part-time off-farm work by farm families, it nonetheless implies that these people on average 





Table 5.1: Average applied import tariffs, by sector and region, 2001 





HICsb DCsa WORLD 
 Agriculture and food    
High-income countriesb 18 18 17.8 
Developing countriesa 14 18 15.6 
All countries 16 18 16.7 
  Textiles and apparel    
High-income countriesb 8 15 12.0 
Developing countriesa 7 20 9.3 
All countries 8 17 10.2 
  Other manufactures    
High-income countriesb 2 9 4.1 
Developing countriesa 1 7 2.5 
All countries 1 8 3.5 
 
  All merchandise    
High-income countriesb 3 10 5.4 
Developing countriesa 3 10 4.9 
All countries 3 10 5.2 
 
a These import-weighted averages incorporate tariff preferences provided to developing countries, 
unlike earlier versions of the GTAP database. They assume the EU is a single customs territory. 
b High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian territories of Hong Kong, 
Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU in April 
2004. 
 
Source: Anderson and Martin (2006, Table 1.1). 
 
 
Greater market access for developing countries’ exporters, and especially for 
poor producers in those countries, is to be found in agriculture (and to a lesser extent 
in textiles and clothing). This can be seen from a glance at Table 5.1. It shows that, 
at the time of the launch of the DDA in 2001, developing country exporters faced 
an average tariff (even after taking account of preferences) of 16% for agriculture 
and food, and 9% for textiles and clothing, compared with just 2.5% for other 
manufactures. The average tariff on agricultural goods is high not just in high-
income countries but also in developing countries, suggesting even more reason why 





Table 5.2: Agricultural weighted average import tariffs, by region, 2001 
(%, ad valorem equivalent, weights based on imports) 
  








    
Developed countries 27 22 14 
Developing 
countries 
48 27 21 
    of which: LDCs 78 14 13 
WORLD 37 24 17 
 
 
a Includes preferences and in-quota TRQ rates where relevant, as well as the ad valorem equivalent 
of specific tariffs. Developed countries include Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU 
in April 2004. The ‘developing countries’ definition used here is that adopted by the WTO and so 
includes East Asia’s four newly industrialized tiger economies, which is why the 21% shown in 
column 3 is above the 18% and 14% shown in the first column of Table 5.1. 
 
Source: Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006, Table 4.2). 
 
 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) converted all 
agricultural protection to tariffs and limited future increases in them through tariff 
bindings, but the process of converting non-tariff barriers into tariffs (inelegantly 
termed “tariffication”) provided numerous opportunities for backsliding that greatly 
reduced the effectiveness of the agreed disciplines (Hathaway and Ingco 1996). In 
developing countries, the option for “ceiling bindings” allowed countries to set their 
bindings at high levels, frequently unrelated to the previously prevailing levels of 
protection. Hence agricultural import tariffs were still very high in both rich and 
poor countries when the DDA was launched, with bound rates half as high again as 
MFN applied rates (Table 5.2). 
As well, agricultural producers in some countries were being supported by 
export subsidies (still tolerated within the WTO only for agriculture) and by 
domestic support measures. Together with tariffs and other barriers to agricultural 
imports, these measures supported farm incomes and encouraged agricultural output 
to varying extents. The market price support component also typically raised 
domestic consumer prices of farm products. For OECD member countries as a 
group, the producer support estimate (PSE) was almost the same in 2001-03 as in 
1986-88, at about $240 billion per year. However, there was a significant increase in 
the proportion of that support coming from programs that are somewhat 
“decoupled” from current output, such as payments based on area cropped, number 




Nonetheless, the achievements of the URAA provided some scope for 
optimism about what might be achieved via the WTO as part of the DDA and 
beyond. The Doha round has the advantage over the Uruguay Round of beginning 
from the framework of rules and disciplines agreed in that previous Round. In 
particular, it has the three clearly identified “pillars” of market access, export 
subsidies, and domestic support on which to focus. A framework for the current 
negotiations, reached in July 2004 (WTO 2004), provided a strong basis for 
undertaking ex ante analysis of various options potentially available to WTO 
members during the Doha negotiations.  
This section provides a summary mostly of one study (Anderson and Martin 
2006), but that study built on numerous analyses of the DDA and agricultural trade, 
including five books that appeared in 2004.21 What distinguishes the Anderson and 
Martin (2006) collection of studies from those 2004 studies and other books with 
similar titles is that (a) its ex ante analysis focuses on the core aspects of the July 2004 
Framework Agreement from the viewpoint of agriculture and developing countries, 
taking account also of what might happen to non-agricultural market access and the 
other negotiating areas, (b) it does so in an integrated way by using the Global Trade 
Analysis Project (GTAP) Version 6 database (amended to account for key protection 
changes to early 2005)22 and the World Bank’s global, economy-wide Linkage model 
described above in Chapter 4 and details of which are documented in van der 
Mensbrugghe (2005),23 and (c) it involved an intense program of integrated research 
                                            
21 One edited by Aksoy and Beghin (2004) provides details of trends in global agricultural markets 
and policies, especially as they affect nine commodities of interest to developing countries. 
Another, edited by Ingco and Winters (2004), includes a wide range of analyses based on papers 
revised following a conference held just prior to the aborted WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in 
Seattle in 1999. The third, edited by Ingco and Nash (2004), provides a follow-up to the broad 
global perspective of the Ingco and Winters volume: it explores a wide range of key issues and 
options in agricultural trade reform from a developing country perspective.  The fourth, edited by 
Anania, Bohman, Carter and McCalla (2004), is a comprehensive tenth-anniversary retrospective 
on the URAA as well as a look ahead following also numerous unilateral trade and subsidy reforms 
in developed, transition and developing economies. And the fifth focuses on implications for Latin 
America (Jank 2004). 
22 The Version 6 GTAP database is a major improvement over the previous version for several 
reasons. One is that it includes global trade and protection data as of 2001 (previously 1997), the 
year the DDA was launched. Another is that protection data are available, for the first time, on 
bound as well as applied tariffs, non-reciprocal as well as reciprocal tariff preferences, the ad valorem 
equivalents of specific tariffs (which are plentiful in the agricultural tariff schedules of many high-
income, high-protection countries), and the effects of agricultural tariff rate quotas. In addition, 
key trade policy changes to the start of 2005 have been added, namely, the commitments associated 
with accession to WTO by such economies as China and Taiwan, the implementation of the last 
of the Uruguay Round commitments (most notably the abolition of quotas on trade in textiles and 
clothing at the end of 2004), and the eastward enlargement of the European Union from 15 to 25 
members in April 2004. 
23 This analysis is vastly more sophisticated than the ex ante analyses undertaken for the Uruguay 
Round. At that time there were very few economy-wide global models, so primary reliance was on 








5.2 What questions have been in focus? 
 
Among the core questions addressed in the multi-authored study reported in 
Anderson and Martin (2006) are the following: 
• How much are each of the three “pillars” of agricultural distortions (market 
access, export subsidies and domestic support) contributing to the welfare 
losses from price-distorting policies as of 2005, compared with non-
agricultural trade barriers? 
• How might the demands for Special and Differential Treatment for 
developing and least-developed countries be met without compromising the 
potential welfare gains from trade expansion for those economies? 
• What are the consequences, in terms of opening up to imports, of alternative 
formulas for cutting bound agricultural tariffs? 
• In the case of products whose imports are subject to tariff rate quotas, what 
are the trade-offs between reducing in-quota or out-of-quota tariffs versus 
expanding the size of those quotas or the in-quota tariffs? 
• To what extent would the erosion of tariff preferences, that necessarily 
accompanies MFN trade liberalization by developed countries, reduce the 
developing countries’ interest in agricultural and other trade reform? 
• What should be done about agricultural export subsidies, including those 
implicit in export credits, food aid, and arrangements for state trading 
enterprises? 
• Based on recent policy changes in key countries, how might domestic farm 
support measures be better disciplined in the WTO? 
• What are the consequences of reducing the domestic support commitments 
made in the Uruguay Round, in terms of cuts to the actual domestic support 
levels currently provided to farmers? 
• In particular, how might reductions in cotton subsidies help developing 
country farmers in West Africa and elsewhere? 
• What difference does it make to expand market access for non-agricultural 
products at the same time as for farm goods under a Doha agreement? 
                                            
Knudsen 1990, Tyers and Anderson 1992); estimates of protection rates were somewhat cruder 
and less complete; and analysts grossly overestimated the gains because they did not anticipate that 
tariffication would be so “dirty” in the sense of creating large wedges between bound and MFN 
applied tariff rates, nor did they have reliable estimates of the tariff preferences enjoyed by 
developing countries or the ad valorem equivalent of specific tariffs. Some of these limitations also 




• Which developing countries would have to reduce their farm output and 
employment as a result of such a Doha agreement? 
• Taking a broad brush, and in the light of past experience and our 
understanding of the political economy of agricultural policies in rich and 
poor countries, how might reform of those policies best be progressed during 
the DDA negotiations? 
• What would be the overall market and welfare consequences, for various 
countries and regions as well as globally, of the alternative Doha reform 
commitments considered in addressing each of the above questions? 
 
 
5.3 Reform scenarios modelled 
 
So as to focus in this chapter on the agricultural component of the DDA proposals 
in particular, scenarios are considered that make simplifying assumptions about non-
agricultural components of the negotiations, namely no reform in services, and no 
new trade facilitation measures. Also, agricultural export subsidies are assumed to be 
eliminated (as indeed was agreed in the WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in 
December 2015), and domestic support for agriculture is cut in just four economies: 
by an average of 28% for the U.S., 18% for Norway, 16% for the EU and 10% for 
Australia.  
More difficult to determine were the likely nature and extent of reductions in 
market access barriers, so a number of scenarios are considered initially for 
agricultural and food products in isolation of non-agricultural tariff cuts, before 
incorporating (as in Scenarios 5 and 6 below) some non-agricultural market access. 
A total of six simulations are designed to evaluate the consequences of different 
approaches to liberalization, and particularly different degrees of tops-down 
progressivity in the tariff cuts, and different degrees of Special and Differential 
Treatment. Throughout this study, the WTO usage of the term ‘developing 
countries’ applies when allocating Special and Differential Treatment (SDT), which 
means Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan are all able to enjoy SDT despite 
their high-income status. 
The experiments begin for Scenario 1 with a progressive or tiered reduction 
formula with marginal agricultural tariff rate reductions of 45%, 70% and 75% 
within each of the three bands defined by the Harbinson (WTO 2003) inflection 
points of tariff rates of 15% and 90% for developed countries (that is, for low 
agricultural tariffs the marginal rate of reduction is 45%, for medium-level tariffs it 
is 70%, and for the highest tariffs it is 75%), and for developing countries the 
reductions are 35%, 40%, 50% and 60% within each of their four bands (and least-
developed-countries are not required to undertake any reduction commitments). 
These cuts are greater than those proposed in the Harbinson draft (WTO 2003) 
because its cuts were too light to have much impact (providing only two-thirds of 




Scenario 2 considers the impact of a proportional cut formula that brings about 
the same reduction in average agricultural tariffs in developed countries as a group 
(44%), and developing countries as a group (21%), as Scenario 1’s tiered formulas.  
Scenario 3 has the same proportional cut formula as Scenario 2 but adds 2% 
Sensitive Products24 in developed countries and 4% Sensitive and Special Product 
(SSP) in developing countries, thereby reducing the average cut to 16% for 
developed countries and 9% for developing countries.  
Scenario 4 considers the effects of adding to Scenario 3 a tariff cap of 200% 
such that any product with a bound tariff in excess of that limit will be subjected to 
a reduction down to that cap rate, which leads to average cuts in food and agricultural 
tariffs of 18% for both developed and developing countries.  
Scenario 5 adds to Scenario 1 the cuts in non-agricultural tariff bindings of 50% 
in developed countries, 33% in developing countries, and zero in LDCs.  
Finally, Scenario 6 makes developing (including least-developed) countries full 
participants in the round, undertaking the same reductions in bound (but not 
necessarily applied) tariffs as the developed countries in Scenario 5. 
 
 
5.4 The DDA proposals: model results 
 
It is not possible in this chapter to provide details of analysts’ answers to all of the 
questions posed in Section 5.2, but in this section a paragraph summarizes each of 
the main findings and provides a guide to the pertinent literature. The modeling 
results are based on the LINKAGE Model of the global economy (van der 
Mensbrugghe 2005) and Version 6.05 of the GTAP database which is calibrated to 
2001, but the model is projected to 2015 which is when implementation would have 
been completed had the DDA negotiations been concluded at the biennial Trade 
Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong in late 2005. Details of the modeling features and 
scenarios are in Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a,b). The first few 
lessons below come from a scenario involving full trade liberalization and farm 
subsidy removal, while the rest come from a series of partial liberalizations which 
are listed for convenience in Table 5.3.  
 
What’s at stake: inferences from simulating full global trade liberalization? 
 
The potential gains from further global trade reform are huge. Global gains from trade reform 
post-2004 are estimated to be large even if dynamic gains and gains from economies 
of scale and increased competition are ignored. Freeing all merchandise trade and 
agricultural subsidies is estimated to boost global welfare by nearly $300 billion per   
                                            
24 As described in Jean, Laborde and Martin (2006, 2011), “Sensitive Products” are chosen for each 
country by taking into account the importance of the product, the height of its existing tariff, and 




Table 5.3: Six Doha partial liberalization scenarios  
  
Scenarios: Description 
Pre-simulation 2001 protection measures are amended by allowing EU15 eastward 
enlargement to make 25 members, implementation of WTO 
accession commitments by China and Taiwan, and implementation 
of Uruguay Round commitments including abolition of quotas on 
textiles and clothing by end-2004, followed by normal global 
growth projection for ten more years to 2015 (baseline simulation) 
Scenarios 1-6 All assume agricultural domestic support cuts in developed country 
markets and the abolition of agricultural export subsidies, plus:  
Scenario 1 Harmonizing formula for agricultural market access with lesser 
cuts for Developing Countries and none for Least Developed 
Countries 
Scenario 2 Proportional cut in agricultural tariffs of Developed Countries 
(with lesser cuts for Developing Countries and none for Least 
Developed Countries) to get the same cut in the average tariff as in 
Scenario 1 
Scenario 3 Proportional cut as in Scenario 4 + Sensitive Products (2% for 
Developed Countries and 4% for Developing Countries) 
Scenario 4 Scenario 2 + reductions in high tariffs down to a 200% tariff cap 
Scenario 5 Scenario 1 plus 50% proportional cut in all tariffs on non-
agricultural products for Developed, 33% for Developing, zero for 
Least Developed Countries 
Scenario 6 Developed countries’ Harmonizing formula cuts for agriculture, 
plus Developed Countries’ 50% proportional cut in all non-
agricultural tariffs, are also each applied in Developing and Least 
Developed Countries 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 12.8). 
 
 
year by 2015, plus whatever productivity effects that reform would generate.25  
Developing countries could gain disproportionately from further global trade reform. The 
developing countries (as defined by the WTO) would enjoy 30% of the global gain 
from complete liberalization of all merchandise trade, well above their share of 
global GDP. Their welfare would increase by 0.8%, compared with an increase of 
just 0.6% for developed countries (Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2006b, 2006d). The developing countries’ higher share is partly because they have 
                                            
25 There was already strong evidence by 2005 supporting the view that trade reform in general was 
also good for economic growth and, partly because of that, for poverty alleviation (Winters 2004, 




relatively high tariffs themselves (so they would reap substantial efficiency gains 
from reforming their own protection), and partly because their exports are more 
concentrated in farm and textile products whose tariffs in developed country 
markets are exceptionally high (see Table 5.1) – notwithstanding non-reciprocal 
tariff preferences for many developing countries, which contribute to losses 
associated with terms of trade deterioration for some of them.  
Benefits could be as much from South-South as from South-North trade reform. Trade 
reform by developing countries is just as important economically to those countries 
as is reform by developed countries, including from agricultural liberalization (Table 
5.4b). Hence choosing to delay their own reforms or reforming less than developed 
countries, and thereby holding back South-South trade growth (detailed in 
Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 2006e), could reduce substantially the 
potential gains to developing countries. 
Agriculture is where cuts are needed most.  To realize that potential gain from 
opening up goods markets, it is in agriculture that by far the greatest cuts in bound 
tariffs and subsidies are required. This is because of the very high rates of assistance 
in that sector relative to other sectors. Food and agricultural policies are responsible 
for more than three-fifths of the global gain foregone because of merchandise trade 
distortions (column 1 of Table 5.4(a)) – despite the fact that agriculture and food 
account for less than 10% of world trade and less than 4% of global GDP. 
Agricultural reform is at least as important to the welfare of developing countries as 
it is for welfare in the rest of the world: the gains to developing countries from global 
agricultural liberalization represent almost two-thirds of their total potential gains, 
which compares with just one-quarter from textiles and clothing and one-ninth from 
other merchandise liberalization (Table 5.4b).  
Subsidy disciplines are important, but increased market access in agriculture is crucial. 
Extremely high applied tariffs on agricultural relative to non-farm products are the 
major reason for food and agricultural policies contributing 63% of the welfare cost 
of current merchandise trade distortions. Subsidies to farm production and exports 
are only minor additional contributors: 3 and 1 percentage points respectively, 
compared with 59 points due to agricultural tariffs.26 This is even truer for 
developing countries than for developed ones (compare columns 1 and 2 of Table 
5.5). A more-detailed empirical analysis by Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) 
includes estimates of implicit forms of farm export subsidization such as via food 
aid, export credits or state trading enterprises, but even they conclude that 93% of 
the global welfare cost of agricultural policies was due to market access barriers and  
 
                                            
26 This result is very similar to that reported from a partial equilibrium study by Hoekman, Ng and 
Olarreaga (2004). In terms of their impact on the value of global agricultural trade, domestic 
support measures are responsible for 17% of its reduction; and in terms of their impact on net 
farm income in developing countries, domestic support measures are responsible for 38% of its 




Table 5.4: Projected effects on economic welfare of full trade liberalization from 
different groups of countries and products (%) 
 
 
(a) Distribution of effects on global welfare 
 
 





















46 6 3 55 
DC policies 
 
17 8 20 45 




(b) Distribution of effects on developing countries’ welfare 
 
 





















30 17 3 50 
DC policies 
 
33 10 7 50 
ALL POLICIES 63 27 10 100 
 
 
a The HIC (high-income country) group includes the transition economies of Eastern Europe and 
the former Soviet Union. The DC group includes all developing countries. 
 







Table 5.5: Distribution of global welfare impacts of fully removing 2001 agricultural 
tariffs and subsidies (%) 
 
                                                                           Beneficiary region: 
Agricultural 
liberalization 
component: HICsa  DCs World 
         
        Import market access 66 27 93 
        Export subsidies 5 -3 2 
        Domestic support 4 1 5 
All measures 
 
75 25 100 
a High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that joined the EU 
in April 2004. 
 
Source: Summarized from Hertel and Keeney (2006, Table 2.7), as explained in 
Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006). 
 
 
only 2% to export subsidies and 5% to domestic support measures.27 That study also 
estimated that market access restrictions are responsible for 89% of the policy-
induced reduction in global farm trade, and for the majority of the policies’ boost to 
net farm incomes in high-income countries and to the loss in net incomes of 
developing country farmers. Disciplining domestic subsidies and phasing out export 
subsidies remained very important agenda items though (Hart and Beghin 2006), not 
least to bring agriculture into line with non-farm trade in terms of not using export 
subsidies and to reduce the risk of re-instrumentation of assistance from import 
tariffs to domestic subsidies. 
In developing countries the poor would gain disproportionately from multilateral trade 
reform. Full global merchandise trade liberalization would raise real factor returns for 
the poorest households most. This is implied in results showing that, for developing 
countries, the biggest factor price rise is for farm land, followed by unskilled labour. 
Since farmers and other low-skilled workers constitute the vast majority of the poor 
in developing countries, such reform would be highly likely to reduce both inequity 
and poverty.  
 
 
                                            
27 Laborde (2014) provided an update of that estimate based on 2007 distortions data, and found 




Effects of partial reform as proposed in the DDA 
 
Large cuts in domestic support commitments are needed to erase binding overhang. In turning to 
what has been proposed under a Doha partial reform package, the devil as always is 
in the details. For example, commitments on domestic support for farmers were so 
much higher than actual support levels at the time that the 20% cut in the total 
bound Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) promised in the July Framework 
Agreement as an early instalment would require no actual support reductions for any 
WTO member. Indeed a cut as huge as 75% for those with most domestic support 
is needed to get some action, and even then it would only require cuts in 2001 levels 
of domestic support for four WTO actors: the US (by 28%), the EU (by 18%), 
Norway (by 16%) and Australia by 10% – and the EU and Australia had already 
introduced reforms of that order between 2001 and 2005, so they would have needed 
to do no further cutting under even that formula.  
Large cuts in bound rates are needed also to erase binding overhang in agricultural tariffs. 
Table 5.2 shows there has been substantial binding overhang in agricultural tariffs: 
the average bound rate in developed countries was almost twice as high as the 
average applied rate in 2001, and in developing countries the ratio was even greater. 
Thus large reductions in bound rates are needed before it is possible to bring about 
any improvements in market access. To bring the global average actual agricultural 
tariff down by one-third, bound rates would have to be reduced for developed 
countries by at least 45%, and up to 75% for the highest tariffs, under a tiered 
formula.   
A complex tiered formula may be little better than a proportional tariff cut. It turns out 
that, because of the large binding overhang, a tiered formula for cutting agricultural 
tariffs would generate not much more global welfare – and no more welfare for 
developing countries as a group – than a proportional cut of the same average size 
(columns 1 and 2 of Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8). This suggests there may be little value 
in arguing over the finer details of a complex tiered formula just for the sake of 
reducing tariff escalation. Instead, a simple tariff cap of, say, 100% or even 200% 
could achieve essentially the same outcome (Jean, Laborde and Martin 2006, 2011). 
Even large cuts in bound tariffs do little if “Sensitive Products” are allowed, except if a cap 
applies. If members succumb to the political temptation to put limits on tariff cuts 
for the most sensitive farm products, much of the prospective gain from Doha could 
evaporate. Even if only 2% of HS6 agricultural tariff lines in developed countries are 
classified as sensitive (and 4% in developing countries, to incorporate also their 
“Special Products” request), and are thereby subject to just a 15% tariff cut (as a 
substitute for the tariff rate quota (TRQ) expansion mentioned in the Framework 
Agreement), the welfare gains from global agricultural reform would shrink by three-
quarters. However, if at the same time any product with a bound tariff in excess of 
200% had to reduce it to that cap rate, the welfare gain would shrink by ‘only’ one-





Table 5.6: Projected welfare effects of possible Doha reform scenarios 
(% difference from baseline, and Equivalent Variation in income in 2001 US$ 
billion) 
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 of which: China -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.06 
       















 (and in $billion) 74.5 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1 119.3 
 
a Elimination of agricultural export subsidies and cuts in actual domestic support as of 2001 of 
28% in the US, 18% in the EU, and 16% in Norway. 
 
b In Scenarios 1 and 2 the applied global average tariff on agricultural products is cut by roughly 
one-third, with larger cuts in developed countries, smaller in developing countries, and zero in 
least developed countries. In Scenario 1 there are three tiers for developed countries and four 
for developing countries, following Harbinson (WTO 2003) but 10 percentage points higher.  
 
c Non-agricultural market access (NAMA) is expanded by a 50% tariff cut for developed 
countries, 33% for developing countries, and zero in least developed countries. 
 
d Developing and least developed countries cut all agricultural and non-agricultural tariffs as 
much as developed countries. 
 
e High-income countries (HICs) include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories 
of Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that 
joined the EU in April 2004. 
 






 TRQ expansion could provide additional market access. Only a small number of farm 
products are subject to tariff rate quotas, but they protect over half of all developed 
countries’ production and 44% of their agricultural imports (de Gorter and Kliauga 
2006). Bringing down the (out-of-quota) MFN bound tariffs on those products 
could be supplemented by lowering their in-quota tariffs or expanding the size of 
the quotas. While this may increase the aggregate rent attached to those quotas and 
hence resistance to eventually removing them, the extent of binding overhang is such 
that quota expansion may be the only way to get increased market access for TRQ 
products in the Doha round – especially if they are among the ones designated as 
‘sensitive’ and hence subject to lesser cuts in their bound tariffs.  
High binding overhang means most developing countries would have to make few cuts. 
Given the high binding overhang of developing countries, even with their high 
applied tariffs – and even if tiered formulae are used to cut highest bindings most – 
relatively few of them would have to cut their actual tariffs and subsidies at all (Jean, 
Laborde and Martin 2006). That is even truer if “Special Products” are subjected to 
smaller cuts and developing countries exercise their right – as laid out in the July 
Framework Agreement – to undertake lesser cuts (zero in the case of LDCs) than 
developed countries.  
Politically this makes it easier for developing and least developed countries to 
offer big cuts on bound rates – but it also means the benefits to them are smaller 
than if they had a smaller binding overhang. 
Cotton subsidy cuts would help cotton-exporting developing countries. The removal of 
cotton subsidies (which have raised producer prices by well over 50% in the US and 
EU – see Sumner 2006) would raise the export price of cotton (although not equally 
across all exporters because of product differentiation). If those subsidies were 
removed as part of freeing all merchandise trade, that price rise is estimated to be 
8% for Brazil but less for Sub-Saharan Africa on average. However, cotton exports 
from Sub-Saharan Africa would be a huge 75% larger, and the share of all developing 
countries in global exports would be 85% instead of 56% in 2015, vindicating those 
countries’ efforts to ensure cotton subsidies receive specific attention in on-going 
negotiations.28 
Expanding non-agricultural market access would add substantially to the gains from 
agricultural reform. Adding a 50% cut to non-agricultural tariffs by developed countries 
(and 33% by developing countries and zero by LDCs) to the tiered formula cut to 
agricultural tariffs would double the gain from Doha for developing countries 
(compare Scenarios 1 and 5 in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8). That would bring the global 
gain to $96 billion from Doha merchandise liberalization, which is a sizable one-
third of the potential welfare gain from full liberalization of $287 billion. Adding 
services reform would of course boost that welfare gain even more.  
  
                                            




Table 5.7: Projected dollar change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios  
(change in real income in 2015 in 2001 $billion compared to baseline scenario) 
       
 
                   
Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 6 
       Australia+ NZ 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 2.8 
EU 25 + EFTA 29.5 28.2 10.7 10.9 31.4 35.7 
United States 3.0 3.4 2.5 2.1 4.9 6.6 
Canada 1.4 1.2 0.4 0.4 0.9 1.0 
Japan 18.9 15.1 1.4 12.9 23.7 25.4 
Korea + Taiwan 10.9 7.3 1.7 15.9 15.0 22.6 
Hong Kong+Sing. -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 1.5 2.2 
Argentina 1.3 1.4 1.1 1.0 1.3 1.6 
Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
Brazil 3.3 3.2 1.1 1.1 3.6 3.9 
China -0.5 -0.4 -1.4 -1.1 1.7 1.6 
India 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 2.2 3.5 
Indonesia 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.0 1.0 1.2 
Thailand 0.9 1.0 0.8 0.8 2.0 2.7 
Vietnam -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.1 -0.5 -0.6 
Russia -0.3 -0.1 -0.7 -0.7 0.8 1.5 
Mexico -0.2 -0.2 -0.3 -0.3 -0.9 -0.2 
South Africa 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.7 
Turkey 0.6 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.7 1.4 
HICs 65.6 57.2 17.8 43.2 79.9 96.4 
DCs 9.0 9.1 0.1 1.1 16.1 22.9 
     Middle-income  8.0 8.3 0.0 1.0 12.5 17.1 
     Low-income  1.0 0.8 0.2 0.0 3.6 5.9 
     East Asia  0.5 0.9 -0.4 0.6 4.5 5.5 
     South Asia 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 2.5 4.2 
     EEurope+CAsia 0.1 0.2 -0.9 -0.9 0.8 2.1 
     ME+NthAfrica -0.8 -0.9 -1.2 -1.2 -0.6 0.1 
     SSaharanAfrica 0.3 0.3 -0.2 -0.1 0.4 1.2 
     Latin America 8.1 8.0 2.5 2.1 7.9 9.2 
WORLD  74.5 66.3 17.9 44.3 96.1 119.3 
 
 









Table 5.8: Projected change in real income in alternative Doha scenarios 
(change in real income in 2015 in % compared to baseline scenario) 
 
 
                   
Sim 1 Sim2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 Sim 6 
       Australia+ NZ 0.35 0.38 0.22 0.20 0.42 0.48 
EU 25 + EFTA 0.29 0.28 0.11 0.11 0.31 0.36 
United States 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.05 
Canada 0.15 0.13 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.11 
Japan 0.38 0.30 0.03 0.26 0.48 0.51 
Korea + Taiwan 0.86 0.58 0.14 1.26 1.19 1.79 
Hong Kong+Sing. -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 0.35 0.52 
Argentina 0.32 0.34 0.27 0.26 0.34 0.39 
Bangladesh -0.06 -0.06 -0.03 -0.04 -0.10 -0.09 
Brazil 0.50 0.49 0.17 0.17 0.55 0.59 
China -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 -0.04 0.07 0.06 
India 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.25 0.40 
Indonesia 0.05 0.08 0.09 0.01 0.37 0.44 
Thailand 0.43 0.49 0.38 0.38 0.99 1.33 
Vietnam -0.20 -0.22 -0.11 -0.16 -0.83 -0.97 
Russia -0.06 -0.03 -0.15 -0.15 0.16 0.31 
Mexico -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 
South Africa 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.17 0.25 0.49 
Turkey 0.25 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.26 0.55 
HICs 0.20 0.18 0.05 0.13 0.25 0.30 
DCs 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.16 0.22 
     Middle-income  0.10 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.15 0.21 
     Low-income  0.05 0.04 0.01 0.00 0.18 0.30 
     East Asia  0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.02 0.13 0.16 
     South Asia 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.21 0.36 
     EEurope+CAsia 0.01 0.02 -0.09 -0.09 0.08 0.21 
     ME+NthAfrica -0.07 -0.07 -0.10 -0.10 -0.05 0.01 
     SSaharanAfrica 0.06 0.06 -0.04 -0.02 0.10 0.27 
     Latin America 0.29 0.29 0.09 0.08 0.29 0.33 
WORLD 0.18 0.16 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.28 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 12.14). 
 
Adding non-agricultural tariff reform to agricultural reform helps to balance the exchange 
of “concessions”. The agricultural reforms would boost the annual value of world trade 
in 2015 by less than one-quarter of what would happen if non-agricultural tariffs 
were also reduced. The latter’s inclusion also would help balance the exchange of 
“concessions” in terms of increases in bilateral trade values: in that case developing 
countries’ exports to high-income countries would then rise by $62 billion, which is 
close to the $55 billion increase in high-income countries’ exports to developing 
countries. With only agricultural reform, the latter’s bilateral trade growth would be 




Table 5.9: Projected effects on bilateral merchandise trade flows of adding non-
agricultural tariff cuts to agricultural reform under Doha 
(2001 $billion increase over the baseline in 2015) 
                                                                         












     
Exports from :     
HICsc  20 11 80 55 
     
DCs 18 5 62 16 
     
WORLD 38 16 142 71 
      
 
a Scenario 2 in Table 5.3. 
b Scenario 5 in Table 5.3. 
e High-income countries include the newly industrialized East Asian customs territories of Hong 
Kong, Korea, Singapore and Taiwan as well as Europe’s transition economies that joined the 
EU in April 2004. 
 
Source: Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 12.16). 
 
 
Most developing countries gain, and the rest could if they reform more. Even though 
much of the developing country gains from that comprehensive Doha scenario go 
to numerous large developing countries, notably Brazil, Argentina and Other Latin 
America plus India, Thailand and South Africa. The rest of Sub-Saharan Africa gains 
too. This is particularly so when developing countries participate as full partners in 
the negotiations. An important part of this result comes from the increases in market 
access – on a non-discriminatory basis – by other developing countries. 
Preference erosion may be less of an issue than commonly assumed. Some least developed 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere appear to be slight losers in our Doha 
simulations when developed countries cut their tariffs and those LDCs choose not 
to reform at all themselves. These simulations overstate the benefits of tariff 
preferences for LDCs, however, since they ignore the trade-dampening effect of 
complex rules of origin and the grabbing of much of the rents by developed-country 
importers. Even if they would lose after correcting for those realities, it remains true 
that preference-receiving countries could always be compensated for preference 
erosion via increased aid at relatively very small cost to current preference providers 




Table 5.10: Projected effects of a comprehensive Doha reform on agricultural 
output and employment growth growth, by region 
(annual average growth rate, 2005 to 2015, %) 
 
                             Output                         Employment 
 Baseline Sim 5 Baseline Sim 5 
     
Australia+New Zealand 3.5 4.3 0.4 1.0 
Canada 3.5 4.0 0.2 0.6 
United States 2.2 1.9 -0.8 -1.4 
EU 25 + EFTA 1.0 -0.3 -1.8 -2.8 
Japan 0.5 -1.4 -2.7 -4.1 
Korea and Taiwan 2.2 1.5 -1.3 -2.1 
     
Argentina 2.9 3.5 0.9 1.5 
Bangladesh 4.2 4.2 1.1 1.2 
Brazil 3.3 4.4 1.1 2.2 
China 4.3 4.3 0.8 0.8 
India 4.3 4.4 1.0 1.0 
Indonesia 3.0 3.0 -0.7 -0.6 
Thailand -0.1 0.4 -4.6 -4.3 
Vietnam 5.8 5.9 3.9 4.0 
Russia 1.5 1.4 -2.3 -2.4 
Mexico 3.9 4.0 2.0 2.3 
South Africa 2.5 2.6 0.0 0.1 
Turkey 3.0 3.0 -0.5 -0.5 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006a, Table 12.17). 
 
 
would enjoy greater access to the markets of reforming developed countries (Bouët, 
Fontagné and Jean 2006; Hoekman, Martin and Braga 2009). 
Farm output and employment would grow in developing countries under Doha. Despite a 
few low-income countries losing slightly under our Doha scenarios when they 
choose to reform little themselves, in all the developing countries and regions shown 
the levels of output and employment on farms expand. It is only in the most 
protected developed countries of Western Europe, Northeast Asia and the US that 
these levels would fall – and even there it is only by small amounts, contrary to the 
predictions of scaremongers who claim agriculture would be decimated in reforming 
countries (Table 5.10). Even if there was a move to completely free merchandise 
trade, the developed countries’ share of the world’s primary agricultural GDP by 




Table 5.11: Projected impact of Doha reform scenarios on average international 
product prices (% relative to baseline) 
 
                  
Sim 1 Sim 2 Sim 3 Sim 4 Sim 5 
Rice 0.9 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.1 
Wheat 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.7 
Other grains 3.7 3.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 
Oilseeds 4.5 3.9 3.9 4.5 4.4 
Sugar 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.9 2.7 
Cotton 6.0 5.8 5.8 5.9 5.8 
Fruit and vegetables 1.2 0.9 0.8 1.3 1.0 
Other crops 0.9 0.5 0.5 1.2 0.8 
Vegetable oils and fats 0.7 0.6 0.6 1.0 0.8 
Livestock 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.9 0.6 
Processed meats 3.5 3.3 3.3 3.5 3.4 
Dairy products 11.8 11.8 11.8 11.7 11.8 
Other food, bev. & tobacco 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.1 
All agriculture and food 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.9 1.7 
    All primary agriculture 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.1 1.9 
    All processed agriculture 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.6 
Textile and wearing apparel 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 -0.1 
 
Source: Anderson, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2006b, Table 5). 
 
 
of global agricultural exports would be diminished considerably more: from 53% to 
38%). 
International prices for staple foods rise very little. Opening up global markets as 
proposed raises the prices of foods in international markets, but only slightly: it is 
the cotton price that rises most, followed by animal products consumed by the 
relatively affluent, followed by livestock feedstuffs (Table 5.11). The expanded 
demand in the international market for staples such as wheat and rice is met by a 
sufficient supply response as to keep those rises to below 2%. In domestic markets 
that would be less 
protected after such a DDA agreement, food prices would fall, thereby lowering the 
cost of living for consumers in those countries.  
Poverty could be reduced under Doha. Under the full merchandise trade 
liberalization scenario, extreme poverty in developing countries (those earning no 
more than $1/day) is projected to drop by 32 million in 2015 relative to the baseline 




projected to be in Sub-Saharan Africa, and there the reduction would be 6%. 29 
Under our Doha scenarios, the projected poverty impacts are far more modest. The 
number of poor living on less than $1/day would fall by 2.5 million in the case of 
the core Doha Scenario 5 (of which 0.5 million are in SSA) and by 6.3 million in the 
case of Doha Scenario 6 (of which 2.2 million are in SSA). This corresponds to the 
relatively modest ambitions of the merchandise trade reforms as captured in these 
Doha scenarios. If only agriculture was reformed (Doha Scenario 1) there would be 
much less poverty alleviation globally and none at all in SSA (Anderson, Martin and 
van der Mensbrugghe 2006c). This shows the importance for poverty of including 
manufactured products in the Doha negotiations. 
Developing countries could trade off Special and Differential Treatment for more market 
access. If developing countries were to tone down their call for Special and 
Differential Treatment (see Josling 2006), in terms of wanting smaller cuts and 
longer phase-in periods, reciprocity means they could expect bigger tariff and 
subsidy cuts from developed countries. Similarly, if they were to forego their call for 
lesser cuts for “Special Products”, they could demand that developed countries 
forego their call for some “Sensitive Products” to be subject to smaller tariff cuts. A 
comparison of Scenarios 5 and 6 in Tables 5.6, 5.7 and 5.8 shows that the economic 
payoffs for low-income countries even if high-income countries do not reciprocate 
with larger offers is considerable. Moreover, embracing those options to reform 
more in the context of the Doha round would have made it harder for high-income 
countries to resist the call to respond with larger reforms themselves.  
More-recent economic modelling reinforces the above findings. With the stalling of the 
DDA since 2008, there have been few new studies of its prospective effects. An 
important exception is a pair of papers by Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe 
(2011, 2012) that not only analyze what was still on the Doha negotiation table but 
also incorporate new and better ways of including estimates of the price distortions 
caused by trade and farm subsidy policies. They too use the World Bank’s 
LINKAGE model (but version 7.1, see van der Mensbrugghe 2011), and they also 
provide estimates of gains from partial global liberalization of all merchandise trade 
and subsidies. Laborde, Martin and van der Mensbrugghe (2011) estimate that if the 
                                            
29 The approach here has been to take the change in the average per capita consumption of the 
poor, apply an estimated income-to-poverty elasticity, and assess the impacts on the poverty 
headcount index. We have done this by calculating the change in the real wage of unskilled workers, 
deflating it by a food/clothing consumer price index which is more relevant for the poor than the 
total price index. That real wage grows, over all developing countries, by 3.6%, or more than four 
times greater than the overall average income increase. We are assuming that the change in 
unskilled wages is fully passed through to households. Also, while the model closure has the loss 
in tariff revenues replaced by a change in direct household taxation, the poverty calculation 
assumes – realistically for many developing countries -- that these tax increases only affect skilled 
workers and high-income households. While these simple calculations are not a substitute for 
more-detailed individual country case study analysis using detailed household surveys as in, for 





basic formula approach to reducing trade barriers and subsidies, as proposed, were 




5.5 What has been learnt from analyses of DDA proposals? 
 
Among the numerous implications that can be drawn from the above findings, the 
following are worth highlighting. 
 Prospective gains are large enough to deserve the attention of politicians. Even if there 
were no reforms forthcoming in services and if the counterfactual would be the 
status quo rather than protectionist backsliding, the proposed DDA partial 
liberalizations would be non-trivial, especially for developing countries. Multilateral 
cuts in MFN bindings are helpful also because (a) they can lock in previous unilateral 
trade liberalizations that otherwise would remain unbound and hence be vulnerable 
to backsliding, (b) they make it illegal to sharply increase protection when 
international food prices slump (Francois and Martin 2004), and (c) they can be used 
as an opportunity to multilateralize previously agreed preferential trade agreements 
and thereby reduce the risk of trade diversion from those bilateral or regional 
arrangements. 
            Since developed countries would gain most, and have the most capacity and influence, they 
need to show leadership at the WTO. The large developed countries cannot generate a 
successful agreement on their own, but nor can the Doha round succeed without a 
major push by those key traders. Their capacity to assist poorer economies could 
hardly manifest itself more clearly than in encouraging global economic integration 
via trade reform, and in particular in opening developed country markets to the items 
of greatest importance to poorer countries, namely farm (and textile) products. The 
more that is done by developed countries, the more developing countries will be 
encouraged to reciprocate by opening their own markets more – accelerating South-
South trade in addition to South-North trade. 
             Outlawing agricultural export subsidies was the obvious first step. That has been 
needed for decades (Hoekman and Messerlin 2006), to bring agriculture into line 
with the basic GATT rule against such measures, and in the process to help limit the 
extent to which governments encourage agricultural production by other means 
(since such a ban raises the cost of surplus disposal). China has already committed 
not to use them, and other developing countries too can find more-efficient ways of 
stabilizing their domestic food markets than by dumping surpluses abroad. 
Somewhat unexpectedly, it was agreed at the biennial Trade Ministerial Meeting in 
Nairobi in December 2015 to phase out farm export subsidies.   
             Agricultural tariff and domestic support bindings must be cut hugely to remove binding 
overhang and provide some genuine market opening. Getting rid of the binding overhang that 
resulted from the Uruguay Round, particularly with ‘dirty tariffication’, remains a 




to reduce their domestic support not just for the sake of their own economies but 
also to encourage developing countries to reciprocate by opening their markets as a 
quid pro quo. But more than that is needed if market access is to expand. If a choice 
had to be made, reducing MFN bound tariffs in general would be preferable to 
raising tariff rate quotas, because the latter help only those lucky enough to obtain 
quotas and crowd out non-quota holders. (Being against the non-discrimination 
spirit of the GATT, they deserve the same fate as textile quotas, which were 
abolished at the end of 2004.) Exempting even just a few Sensitive and Special 
Products is undesirable as it would reduce hugely the gains from reform and would 
tend to divert resources into, instead of away from, enterprises in which countries 
have their least comparative advantage. If it turns out to be politically impossible not 
to designate some Sensitive and Special Products, it would be crucial to impose a 
cap such that any product with a bound tariff in excess of, say, 100% had to reduce 
it to that cap rate. 
             Expanding non-agricultural market access at the same time as reforming agriculture is 
essential for a balanced exchange of concessions. With other merchandise included, the trade 
expansion would be four times greater for both rich and poor countries – and 
poverty in low-income countries would be reduced considerably more.   
             South-South “concessions” also are needed, especially for developing countries, which 
means reconsidering the opportunity for developing countries to liberalize less. Since developing 
countries are trading so much more with each other now, they are the major 
beneficiaries of reforms within their own regions. Upper middle-income countries 
might consider giving least developed countries duty-free access to their markets 
(mirroring the initiatives of developed countries), but better than such discriminatory 
action would be MFN tariff reductions by them. Even LDCs should consider 
reducing their tariff binding overhang at least, since doing that in the context of 
Doha gives them more scope to demand “concessions” (or compensation for 
preference erosion or other contributors to terms of trade deterioration) from richer 
countries – and yet would not require them to cut their own applied tariffs very much.  
 
 
5.6 Is WTO passé? 
 
It has become fashionable in some circles to suggest that the swathe of preferential 
trade agreements that have been signed recently or are under serious negotiation 
mean that there is no need to return to the WTO’s multilateral trade negotiating 
table. Such a view is unfortunate, for at least two reasons.30 First, the TTP among 
Pacific Rim countries including the US, and the TTIP negotiations between the US 
and EU, may both be abandoned when the new US President takes office in January 
                                            




2017, given the candidates’ pronouncements during 2016 election campaigning. That 
would also apply to a prospective APEC-wide free trade agreement. 
Second, that adverse view of WTO’s future reflects an incomplete 
understanding of what the WTO still has to offer the world. The WTO has four 
areas of competence in addition to providing a forum to negotiate reductions in 
policy-induced distortions to the free international flow of goods and services 
(including when non-members seek to accede to WTO). Those four other roles are 
to: 
• establish and revise from time to time the core rules and disciplines on 
international trade that have served the world well since first introduced in 
1948; 
• provide a forum for settling trade-related disputes between members via a 
well-proven consultation, Panel and Appellate process; 
• monitor, record notifications and disseminate information on trade and 
trade-related policies of members; and 
• coordinate with other international organizations on trade-related issues. 
A comprehensive theoretical analysis by Bagwell, Bown and Staiger (2016) 
makes clear that the rules-based, non-discriminatory multilateral trading system still 
has far more to offer the world economy than a series of preferential trading 
agreements of the sort that have been signed in the past decade or so. This is 
supported by a recent survey of the empirical evidence on the contribution to global 
economic welfare of the GATT and WTO (Anderson 2016). And with newly-
compiled evidence, Bown (2016a) argues that the scope for even just negotiating 
tariff reductions to boost South-South trade in goods – not to mention also services 
– is still very large among WTO members. True, additional regional preferential trade 
agreements also could provide opportunities for trade growth. However, even the 
mega-agreements being negotiated at present, most notably the TTP and TTIP, offer 
developing countries at best only a small fraction of the welfare benefits that the 
proposals made under the DDA could offer (Bureau, Guimbard and Jean 2016).31 
Recall too that multilateral cuts in MFN bindings are helpful also because they 
can lock in previous unilateral trade liberalizations that otherwise would remain 
                                            
31 On the various motives for the rapid spread of FTAs and what it means for the WTO, see 
Bagwell and Staiger (2016), Bown (2016b), Grossman (2016) and Limão (2016). A regional 
agreement potentially of more importance to Australian trade is the Regional Comprehensive 
Economic Partnership (RCEP) between the ten ASEAN members and the six countries with 
which ASEAN has existing FTAs: Australia, China, India, New Zealand, Japan and South Korea. 
The 16 member states of the RCEP agreed to finalize negotiations on the agreement before the 
end of 2016, but that deadline may slip. It would be the world’s largest FTA, covering a population 
of 3.5 billion, or more than half the world total, and two-fifths of world trade. Because it includes 
China, RCEP would involve three-fifths of Australia’s trade, compared with TTP which covers 






unbound and hence be vulnerable to backsliding. Also, they make it illegal to sharply 
increase protection when international food prices slump, and they can be used as 
an opportunity to multilateralize previously agreed preferential trade agreements and 
thereby reduce the risk of trade diversion from those bilateral or regional 
arrangements. Clearly the WTO is very far from passé – but it will take strong 
political leadership to get WTO members to return to the negotiating table each with 






ONGOING AND EMERGING ISSUES IN 




Given the scope that still remains for economic welfare gains to developing 
countries from further agricultural and trade policy reforms, as laid out in the 
previous chapter, what can be done by WTO members? One of the key impediments 
to members reaching agreement on the DDA package in August 2008 was 
widespread scepticism about what the DDA would deliver in terms of improved 
market access. Yet detailed analyses have suggested that even with the proposed 
flexibilities with respect to sensitive and special products, the gains from the 
framework agreement of 2008 would have been substantial, and developing 
countries would have gained disproportionately. Those gains have been estimated to 
depend heavily on the extent of further trade reforms by developing countries 
themselves, however, especially as South-South trade continues to grow in 
importance. 
The inability to bring the DDA to a successful conclusion has led numerous 
WTO members to focus in negotiating bilateral, regional and plurilateral trade 
agreements.32 Some already have reached agreement and begun to be implemented, 
while some very large ones are still being negotiated. The latter plurilateral ones 
include the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) and the Environmental Goods 
Agreement (EGA) along with a planned initiative on fisheries subsidies, and regional 
ones include the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) among 12 Pacific rim countries, 
the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) between the US and 
EU, and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) among Asian 
economies plus Australia and New Zealand. Since both TPP and TTIP involve the 
US, both may be abandoned when the new US President takes office in January 
2017, given the candidates’ pronouncements during the 2016 election campaign. The 
TPP also faces headwinds in getting through Japan’s Diet because of farm trade 
liberalization sensitivities, as does the TTIP in EU member countries. 
Preferential trade agreements may have been easier to conclude than the 
DDA in recent years because they involve a much smaller number of countries than 
the full 164 in the WTO. However, they have tended so far to do little to liberalize 
                                            
32 On the pros and cons of these alternatives to multilateral, single-undertaking negotiations, see 




agricultural markets or cut farm subsidies, and even their non-agricultural trade 
reforms have had only a modest impact in terms of welfare gains to signatories – 
and in most cases they harm some outsiders. A new comprehensive study by Bureau, 
Guimbard and Jean (2016) finds that all the preferential agreements completed 
between 2001, when the DDA was launched, to 2013 contributed only a 0.3% cut 
in applied import tariff duties on all goods worldwide. That compares with that 
study’s estimate of an average cut of 1.0% due to WTO commitments and an 
additional 1.3% cut due to unilateral decisions over that 2001-13 period. 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the ongoing and emerging issues in 
agricultural trade negotiations that are making it difficult to bring the DDA to a 
successful conclusion with a comprehensive agreement.33 The key unresolved issues 
in the agricultural part of the DDA negotiations relate to export competition, market 
access, domestic support, cotton, safeguards, public stockholding, and export 
restrictions.   
Despite gains made in the WTO Trade Ministerial meeting in Nairobi in 
December 2015, particularly in agreeing to phase out agricultural export subsidies, 
little progress was made towards meeting broader goals of disciplining domestic 
support and increasing market access for farm products; and even with respect to 
export competition, the Nairobi reforms were limited in the areas of export credits, 
agricultural-exporting state trade enterprises (STEs), and food aid. In this chapter 
we examine those ongoing unresolved issues in the context of the DDA’s draft 
negotiating text of 6 December 2008 (the so-called Rev 4 text).34 The “new” trade 
issues that have emerged over the past decade, largely as a result of the food price 
spikes from 2007, include food security concerns relating to public stockholding and 
export restrictions and bans.  
 
 
6.1 Export competition 
 
Arguably the most significant outcome from the Nairobi Ministerial is the agreement 
on export competition (Ortiz, Bellman and Hepburn 2016). It involved four 
elements: export subsidies, export credits, state trading enterprises, and food aid.  
 
 
                                            
33 This chapter draws heavily on Glauber (2016b). 
34 On 6 December 2008, New Zealand’s Ambassador to WTO, Crawford Falconer, as chairperson 
of the agricultural negotiations, circulated a draft “modalities” text that reflected the “July 2008 
package” talks when ministers came to Geneva, 21–30 July to try to agree on “modalities” in 
agricultural and non-agricultural market access. The so-called Rev 4 text (the text was the fourth 
revision to a draft modalities text circulated 1 August 2008) is a lengthy document that reflected 
hundreds of hours of negotiations on proposed disciplines on domestic support, market access 





Export subsidies   
 
WTO members agreed on an immediate standstill and phase-out of agricultural 
export subsidies. Developed countries agreed to remove their existing export 
subsidy entitlements immediately.35 Developing countries have until 2018 to remove 
their export subsidies, and up to 2022 for products or groups of products for which 
a Member has notified export subsidies in one of its three latest export subsidy 
notifications.  Developing countries are also committed to eliminate export subsidies 
permissible under Article 9.4 of the Agreement on Agriculture by the end of 2023, 
or the end of 2030 in the case of Net Food Importing Developing Countries. 
Export subsidies have long been viewed as particularly trade-distorting 
because of their targeted use for specific commodities in specific markets (Gardner 
1996; Diaz-Bonilla and Hepburn 2016). The use of export subsidies has declined 
significantly since implementation of the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
in 1995 though, particularly with higher international food prices in recent years. As 
well, domestic reforms in the US and EU have reduced their need for export 
subsidies to dispose of production surpluses. That de facto reduction in subsidies may 
lead some to discount the importance of an agreement to eliminate agricultural 
export subsidies. However, analysis by Diaz-Bonilla and Laborde (2015) suggests 
that full use of export subsidies could displace almost US$12 billion worth of 
production in developing countries and further drive down international food prices. 
Indeed, as the use of dairy export subsidies by the US and EU in 2008 and 2009 
demonstrates, political pressures to use such instruments to respond to domestic 
concerns remain strong in the absence of such disciplines.   
 
Export credits   
 
On export credits, the Nairobi outcome establishes a maximum repayment period 
at 18 months except for LDCs, NFIDCs, and a few additional developing countries 
for whom the maximum repayment rate will be between 36 and 54 months (or an 
unlimited period in the case of Cuba). All credit insurance and guarantee programs 
are to be self-financing.  The key difference between the Nairobi agreement and 
Annex J of the Rev 4 text is that the repayment period under the latter would have 
been capped at 6 months. 
Over 80% of agricultural exports that received export financing in 2015 were 
supported by some sort of risk cover, with most of this provided by Canada (31%) 
and the United States (28%). The value of US exports supported by risk cover was 
US$2.5 billion in 2015 while that of Canada was $3 billion. The 18-month repayment 
period is consistent with recent changes in the US export credit program as part of 
its settlement of its dispute with Brazil over cotton subsidies. 
                                            
35 Canada, the EU, Norway and Switzerland can extend export subsidies for processed products, 
dairy and swine meat up to 2020, provided that they eliminate them for LDCs in 2016 as well as 





Agricultural-exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs)  
 
Based on the most recent WTO notifications, 17 members notified or reported to 
WTO some 60 agricultural-exporting STEs covering a variety of commodities 
(WTO 2016). STEs by country and product group are summarized in Table 6.1. 
Fruit, vegetables and tobacco account for 57% of the products dealt with by reported 
STEs. China (25) and India (14) reported the most agricultural-exporting STEs, 
accounting for almost two-thirds of all reported STEs.  
Since 2001, a number of prominent STEs have been dissolved or privatized. 
They include the Australian and Canadian wheat boards and the New Zealand STE 
for dairy products. Currently STE export volumes and values appear small relative 
to global trade volumes, although there are some significant exceptions. For 
example, the New Zealand STE accounted for more than one-third of global trade 
in kiwifruit during the period reported.  
 
 
Table 6.1: Reported agricultural-exporting State Trading Enterprises (STEs) 
 
WTO member No. of agric- 
exporting STEs 
Commodities covered 
Australia 1 Rice 
Canada 1 Wheat, barley, canola 
China 25 Rice, maize, cotton, tobacco, tea, soybeana 
Columbia 4 Rum and other cane-based alcohols 
Costa Rica 1 Cane sugar 
Dominica 1 Bananas 
Ecuador 1 Maize, rice and cerealsb 
Fiji 1 Raw sugar, molasses 
Grenada 1 Cocoa beans 
India 14 Onions, gum karaya, sugar 
Indonesia 1 Rice 
Israel 3 Groundnuts, eggs, fruits and vegetables 
Moldova 1 Wine 
New Zealand 1 Kiwifruit 
Trinidad&Tob. 1 Cocoa, coffee 






a No activity for soybean since China’s accession to the WTO in late 2001. 
b Ecuador reports no export activities through its STE. 
 




Under the December 2015 Nairobi outcome, WTO members are to ensure 
that agricultural-exporting STEs operate in a manner that does not undermine the 
new export subsidy disciplines. This Nairobi outcome is limited to best efforts, 
which is thus somewhat weaker than the disciplines listed under Annex K of Rev 4 
which would eliminate the use of export monopoly powers for STEs (such as single 
desk sellers). Nor does the Nairobi outcome require that governments refrain from 
providing exporting STEs with financing or capital at below market rates, or 
underwriting their losses, both of which would have been disciplined under Rev 4 
(Diaz-Bonilla and Hepburn 2016). 
 
Food aid  
 
The Nairobi outcome also includes new disciplines on food aid. The new disciplines 
attempt to balance concerns that food aid is available in times of humanitarian crises 
with concerns that food aid does not provide a means by which to circumvent 
disciplines on export subsidies (Clay 2014).  Under the Nairobi outcome, food aid 
must be needs-driven, provided in fully grant form, and not tied directly or indirectly 
to commercial agricultural exports or other goods and services. In addition, 
agricultural food aid is not to be re-exported in any form, and its provision must take 
into account of local market conditions of like products.  
Members are encouraged to procure international food aid from local or 
regional sources to the extent possible. Members are also encouraged to restrict 
monetization (selling in-kind food aid to raise cash) only to situations where there is 
a demonstrable need for monetization for the purpose of transport and delivery of 
the food assistance, or to re-address chronic food deficit requirements – and only 
after local or regional market analyses show it would not disrupt local or regional 
commercial markets. 
In 2001, food aid totalled about 10 MMT, about half of which, according to 
the World Food Programme (WFP), was provided in the form of non-emergency 
food aid. By 2012, food aid totalled 4.7 MMT, about 30% of which was non-
emergency food aid. Recent notifications to the WTO reveal that 12 of the 13 food 
aid donors’ programmes are consistent with the Nairobi food aid disciplines (WTO 
2016). Nonetheless, concerns over the use of food aid as a surplus disposal tool 
remain, as evident in the uproar over the recently announced US donation of peanuts 
to Haiti (Bovard 2016). 
 
 
6.2 Market access 
 
As discussed above in Chapter 3, under the Uruguay Round Agreement on 
Agriculture members agreed to convert non-tariff barriers to tariff equivalents and, 
where necessary, guarantee minimum access to domestic markets through the 




cut the tariffs (the higher out-of-quota rates in the case of tariff-quotas) by an average 
of 36%, in equal steps over six years. Developing countries would make 24% cuts 
over 10 years. Several developing countries also used the option of offering ceiling 
tariff rates in cases where duties were not “bound” (that is, committed under GATT 
or WTO regulations) before the Uruguay Round.36  
This was a significant first step in liberalizing the global agricultural sector, yet 
the tariffication process resulted in many countries having very large bound 
agricultural tariffs, many over 100%, particularly in dairy products, meat, poultry and 
sugar (Gibson et al. 2001).   
Fortunately, not all countries apply tariffs at their bound rate. Tariff 
“overhang” – the difference between bound and applied rates – can be quite large, 
particularly in developing countries where tariffs are often the primary means by 
which the country protects its producers. Such overhangs leave the country with the 
ability to raise tariffs quickly should it wish to insulate its domestic market from 
fluctuations in world prices. However, as pointed out in Chapter 2, when countries 
exercise that ability, they reduce the benefit that stable, bound tariffs have over 
nontariff barriers, and they contribute toward greater instability in international 
prices.   
Lowering tariffs benefit the world economy by providing consumers with 
lower-cost goods and by encouraging productive resources to move to activities in 
which each country has its strongest comparative advantages. Empirical studies have 
shown that the vast majority of benefits from freeing agricultural markets are still to 
be obtained in the market access pillar (Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela 2006; 
Hertel and Keeney 2006; Hoekman, Ng and Olarreaga 2007b; Laborde and Martin 
2012). Yet agreement to lower import restrictions has been difficult to achieve. The 
Rev 4 text on market access represents a compromise between those members who 
sought aggressive tariff cuts and those who sought to protect the most politically 
sensitive commodities.  
A central feature of the Rev 4 text was a tiered formula for cutting bound 
agricultural tariffs which provides for large proportional cuts on higher tariff rates. 
The level of ambition in the tiered cut formula was high, with a minimum average 
cut of 54% for developed countries and maximum average cut of 36% for 
developing countries.  However, to address sensitivity concerns of members, the 
text also introduced a wide range of exceptions and flexibilities in the form of 
Sensitive Products and Special Products that weakened the disciplines. Moreover, 
the discretionary aspect of the flexibilities created uncertainties about members’ 
market access gains.37 
                                            
36 Least-developed countries did not have to cut their tariffs. 
37 In a recent paper Laborde and Martin (2015) argue that negotiators in the DDA chose formulas 
that, while ideal from an economic efficiency viewpoint in that they most sharply reduce the 
highest – and most economically – costly tariffs, came at a high cost for politically sensitive 




Recent analyses by Laborde (2014) and Laborde and Martin (2015) provide 
estimates of the impact of the market access provisions of Rev 4 on average bound 
and applied tariff levels. Based on the formula reductions proposed in Rev 4, average 
bound tariff levels are estimated to decline by almost 49%. Tariffs for high-income 
countries are estimated to decline by 61% while developing countries (excluding 
LDCs) would see tariffs fall by 38%. Even after flexibilities, the average tariff level 
for high-income countries was 40% lower while that for developing countries was 
14% lower.   
Table 6.2 shows that the result is far more muted when applied rates are 
considered. Most of the gains are in high-income countries where applied rates are 
closer to bound rates and where flexibilities (such as sensitive product designation) 
would still require tariff cuts even if at a reduced rate. Potential access gains are 
considerably less in developing countries due to the larger gap between bound and 
applied rates and the flexibility afforded to special products (which require no tariff 
cuts). 
The relatively small gain in market access was one of the reasons why the 
negotiations broke down in 2008 (Blustein 2009). Nonetheless, reducing tariff 
binding overhang is of value because it reduces the ability of countries to raise 
applied tariffs to bindings in the future (Francois and Martin 2004).  
 
Table 6.2: Average applied agricultural tariffs before and after tariff cuts under two 






Baseline Formula cuts 






All countries 14.6 9.0 11.9 
HICs 15.5 7.5 11.1 
DCs (excl. LDCs) 13.3 11.3 13.2 
    
Selected countries:  
Brazil 7.4 7.3 7.4 
China 7.0 5.7 6.7 
EU 28 13.9 4.9 6.9 
India 49.9 47.3 49.9 
Japan 23.2 12.7 17.6 
US 3.3 1.9 2.6 
 
Source: Laborde (2014). 
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6.3 Domestic support 
 
A landmark achievement of the Uruguay Round, and specifically of the URAA, was 
the full inclusion of agriculture in the global system of multilateral rules and 
disciplines, including those governing agricultural support.38 Domestic support 
levels were bound and subject to reduction commitments (20% reduction over 6 
years for developed countries, 13% cuts over 10 years for developing countries). 
Significantly, countries were encouraged to adopt support policies that had minimal 
production- and trade-distorting effects and which were exempt from reduction 
commitments (the so-called green box). 
Trade-distorting support as measured by the total aggregate measurement of 
support (AMS) has declined substantially for the major subsidizing countries over 
the last 20 years (Brink 2014a, 2017). Major domestic policy reforms in Japan, the 
EU and US have resulted in support levels for those countries significantly below 
bound levels. All are well below 50%, although there is some variation particularly 
for countries whose support levels are tied to market prices (such as the US and 
Canada).   
Despite those reductions in AMS levels, concerns about domestic support 
levels remain. First, the URAA also contain provisions which exempt large levels of 
support from reduction commitments. Those exemptions include certain direct 
payments to farmers where the farmers are required to limit production (sometimes 
called “blue box” measures covered under Article 6.5 of the URAA), certain 
government assistance programmes to encourage agricultural and rural development 
in developing countries (covered under Article 6.2 of the URAA), and other support 
on a small scale (“de minimis”) when compared with the total value of the product 
or products supported (5% or less in the case of developed countries and 10% or 
less for developing countries). Blue box support accounts for about 26% of non-
green box support over the period for the EU, and 14% for Japan. De minimis 
support accounts for almost 50% of US non-green support, about two-thirds of 
support for Canada and Brazil, and 100% of China’s support.39 Support under 
Article 6.2 accounts for 28% of Brazil non-green box support, 97% of India's 
support and 100% of Indonesia's support. 
Second, the current caps on domestic support apply only to the aggregate 
level of support across all commodities. The URAA provides no disciplines on 
spending on individual commodities for members with AMS bindings.40 Thus 
                                            
38 For a detailed history of the negotiations, see Josling, Tangermann and Warley (1996). At the 
outset of the Uruguay Round it was suggested that domestic supports would be less economically 
costly than trade measures because they would tend to be scrutinized in annual reviews of 
government budgets (Snape 1987) 
39 China, India and Indonesia do not have bound AMS levels. China is ineligible for Article 6.2 
support. 





countries could theoretically concentrate support to one commodity and remain 
compliant with URAA disciplines.41   
Third, concerns have been expressed about the growth in green box spending, 
particularly in the areas of decoupled income support (paragraph 6 of Annex 2) and 
agricultural insurance programs (paragraphs 7 and 8). Both the EU and US have 
notified large amounts of decoupled support under paragraph 6. In 2012/13, the EU 
notified its Single Payment Scheme and other decoupled programs totalling more 
than €33 billion under paragraph 6 of Annex 2. In 2013, the US notified direct 
payments totalling US$5 billion under paragraph 6 (the direct payment program was 
eliminated in the 2014 farm bill). Recent empirical research has questioned whether 
decoupled support is truly decoupled (Goodwin and Mishra 2006; Gardner, Hardie 
and Parks 2010; Hendricks and Sumner 2014). 
Agricultural insurance programs have grown from $2 billion in premiums in 
1986 to over $30 billion in 2014 (Glauber 2015). Programs in the US and China 
account for about half of this total. The evidence on the effects on agricultural 
insurance on production is mixed (Goodwin and Smith 2012; Lau, Schropp and 
Sumner 2015). While some countries report their insurance programs as amber box 
programs, Glauber (2015) points out that a number of programs are reported as 
green box despite providing no evidence to show that they are compliant with Annex 
2 criteria. 
While non-green box support levels in high-income countries have largely 
declined from 1995, support in advanced developing countries such as China, India 
and Indonesia has increased, although from very low levels (Brink 2014a,b, 2017; 
Anderson and Strutt 2014; OECD 2016). Support has largely been in the form of 
input subsidies in India (and investment subsidies in Brazil). China's price support 
programs have grown considerably in recent years, particularly since the fall in global 
prices since 2013 – prompting the United States on 20 September 2016 to initiate 
WTO dispute proceedings regarding China’s domestic support for such crops as 
wheat, rice and corn. With build-ups in government-held grain stocks in emerging 
markets such as China, questions have arisen as to the sustainability of such policies. 
To that end, China has recently announced reforms in domestic support policies for 
maize (Shuping and Stanway 2016).   
The Rev 4 text tried to address many of these concerns by capping and 
reducing blue box support, reducing amber box support, and reducing de minimis 
levels. Product-specific caps were introduced on amber and blue box support, and a 
new measure of support was bound and reduced: Overall Trade Distorting Support 
(OTDS), defined as the sum of amber, de minimis and blue box supports. Similar to 
the approach to market access, tiered cuts for AMS and OTDS were proposed, with 
support in the highest tier having the steepest percentage cuts.  
Because many of its support programs are tied to market prices, the US is 
                                            





particularly vulnerable to the proposed caps under Rev 4. In a recent analysis, 
Glauber and Westhoff (2016) found the likelihood of US support levels exceeding 
proposed support caps under Rev 4 at least once over the next 10 years is quite high, 
reflecting lower projected international food prices and new domestic support 
policies under the 2014 farm bill. 
If the WTO rules on domestic support are to be effective, compliance must 
be monitored and enforced. Article 18 of the URAA requires domestic support 
measures to be notified to the WTO Committee on Agriculture. The Committee on 
Agriculture identified a need for annual reporting of applied support and prompt 
notification of new or modified measures (Brink 2011). Notification requirements, 
however, are not binding, and there have been significant delays in reporting, 
including for major subsidizing members.42 Questions have arisen as well as to 
whether domestic support has been notified appropriately in accordance with Article 
6 and Annex 2. Crop insurance subsidies have been reported by members as 
product-specific amber box, non-product-specific amber, green box and as Article 
6.2 support, often with little documentation on how the specific measure operates 
(Brink 2017). For example, China has failed to report subsidies for its agricultural 
insurance programs, which totalled almost US$3 billion in 2012 alone (Glauber 
2015). Concerns have also been raised about the reporting of price support programs 





In the area of cotton, some progress was made in the December 2015 meeting in 
Nairobi towards eliminating cotton export subsidies and providing duty free/quota 
free access for LDCs (Townsend 2016). However, there was no progress on its 
domestic support. At the Hong Kong Ministerial in 1995, it was agreed that cuts on 
cotton domestic support would be deeper and would occur sooner than formula 
cuts for other commodities, but little further progress was made, except that, as part 
of the settlement with Brazil in the US-Upland Cotton case, the US agreed to modify 
its support programs in the 2014 farm bill.  
Townsend (2016) notes that US cotton area sown and US cotton subsidies 
have both fallen dramatically since the late 1990s and early 2000s when Brazil 
brought the case before the WTO. Lau et al. (2015) point out the potential 
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to 2013 (Brazil, Russian Federation), 2012 (European Union, Japan, United States), 2011 






distortions of the new Stacked Income Protection Plan (STAX), although 
participation in STAX has been low in its first two years of operation.  
China has been the biggest subsidizer of cotton since 2009-10 (Imboden 
2014), and its policies have driven world cotton stocks to nearly double the average 
levels—and 45% above the previous record—for the years since 1950  (MacDonald, 
Gale and Hansen 2015). Recent market-oriented reforms in China are expected to 
align its production decisions more in line with market prices, but the large overhang 
of its burdensome stocks is expected to continue to weigh on imports and on cotton 





Under the URAA, members were entitled to use of the Special Safeguard (SSG) for 
agricultural products that had been tariffied. While SSG usage has declined, it is still 
used by some countries for sensitive products such as dairy, rice, and processed grain 
products.  
Since developing countries that did not tariff have been unable to access the 
SSG (Dhar 2016), they argued, and won concessions in the WTO’s 2005 Hong Kong 
Ministerial, for a price- and volume-based SSM to protect sensitive products, in the 
context of a single DDA undertaking.  
Disagreement over details of the proposed Special Safeguard Mechanism 
(SSM) was one of the principal causes of the breakdown in DDA negotiations in 
July 2008. Proponents argued that a mechanism was needed to insulate producers 
from price fluctuations and import surges, given that most developing countries 
were not eligible to utilize the SSG. Critics have argued that such an SSM could 
restrict normal growth in trade and be used improperly as trade protection, thus 
potentially destabilizing global markets and harming domestic consumers (Hertel, 
Martin and Leister 2010; Martin and Anderson 2012). Moreover, Thennakoon and 
Anderson (2015) point out that the domestic producer benefits may be illusory, in 
so far as not just food-importing countries but also food-exporting countries actively 
raise their protection in response to a slump in international prices. 
 
 
6.6 Public stockholding  
 
The increases in commodity prices and price volatility since 2007 have led countries 
to implement numerous policies ostensibly aimed at food security. Following the 
price spikes of 2007/08, 2010/11 and 2012/13, a number of countries expressed 
renewed interest in the role of public stockholding programs to address food needs 





 Public stockholding programs may serve to buffet the effects of drought and 
other food shortages, but concerns have been raised when they also provide market 
support to farmers. Those concerns include the possibility that products, ostensibly 
purchased for domestic public stockholding purposes, are ultimately released on to 
global markets, distorting international prices and undermining global food security. 
The issue of public stockholding was raised in both the Bali and Nairobi trade 
ministerial meetings, and it continues to be a contentious issue at the WTO (Diaz-
Bonilla 2014; Matthews 2014, Glauber 2016a).  
The Nairobi Ministerial saw WTO members reaffirm their commitments to 
engage constructively to negotiate a 'permanent solution'  on public stockholding for 
food security purposes, as well as previous decisions which commit members to 
refrain from bringing trade disputes under WTO rules on farm subsidies until a 
lasting agreement on this issue can be found. Yet positions have not changed much 
between WTO Members since an interim compromise was agreed to at the Bali 
Ministerial in 2013. Developing countries, led by the G-33 coalition, argue the way 
in which farm subsidies are currently calculated at the WTO fails to take into account 
the impact of price inflation that has occurred since reference prices were established 
in the URAA over two decades ago. High-income countries and many developing 
country exporters are concerned that such programs may distort production and 
trade, and hence are reluctant to exclude food purchases from domestic support 
calculations. 
A number of recent analyses have explored how the URAA could be modified 
to accommodate public stockholding programmes within Annex 2 without 
undermining domestic support obligations (Bellman et al. 2013; Montemajor 2014; 
Matthews 2014; Diaz-Bonilla 2014; Brink 2014a; Glauber 2016a). Any such 
modifications have yet to be agreed on, however.  
 
 
6.7 Export restrictions  
 
The international food price spikes of 2007/08, 2010/11 and 2012/13 led many 
countries to respond by banning exports or imposing high taxes on them. As Martin 
and Anderson (2012) point out, such export restrictions exacerbate world price 
volatility by shorting world supplies. That encourages other countries to follow suit 
by banning exports in their country or by panic buying in importing countries. 
Anderson and Nelgen (2012) estimate that changes in restrictions on global grain 
trade during 2006-08 were responsible for increasing rice prices by 40%, maize prices 
by 20% and wheat prices by 10%.43  
In the DDA negotiations leading up to December 2008, no consensus was 
reached on disciplining export restrictions. Rev 4 proposed that members introduce 
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new export restrictions to notify them within 90 days of implementation, and 
provide additional information on their operation. The text also provides for 
consultation with affected parties. 
 Leaders of the G-20 group of major economies agreed in 2011 not to impose 
export restrictions on humanitarian food aid being procured by the WFP.  However, 
subsequent efforts to adopt this agreement by the entire WTO membership were 
unsuccessful, in part due to the opposition by large developing countries within the 
G-20 who did not want to expand the agreement to the WTO (Diaz-Bonilla and 
Hepburn 2016; Anania 2014). This is unfortunate because, as the analysis in Section 
2.2 of Chapter 2 shows, such temporary export restrictions exacerbate price spikes, 
and yet when food-importing countries respond by temporarily lowering their 
import barriers they raise international prices further which offsets the domestic 
price-insulating effect of the exporters’ action. In short, when a similar proportion 
of the world’s food-exporting and food-importing countries so act at the same time, 












Progress in WTO negotiations to liberalize markets multilaterally beyond URAA 
commitments has been limited because key parties have not been sufficiently willing 
to compromise – particularly on agricultural issues – during the DDA talks. That has 
caused many to shift their focus to preferential trade agreements. Such sub-global 
agreements are poor substitutes for a multilateral agreement though, for at least three 
reasons: they can provide only a (usually tiny) fraction of the global gains that a 
multilateral agreement could deliver; they typically deliver very little market opening 
for farm products; and their discriminatory nature ensure they hurt at least a sub-set 
of countries not included in the agreement.  
 In the first section of this chapter, some ideas are presented within the context 
of the DDA aimed at bringing negotiators back to Geneva to finish the agricultural 
policy reform process. But they are not silver bullets, nor are they necessarily free of 
controversy. In each case a proposal is offered for consideration, with the extent of 
cuts subject to negotiation and so placed in square brackets.44 
 The second section of the chapter returns to a theme in Chapter 2, namely to 
focus on the gains that can come from unilateral action, but in a way that draws on 
new opportunities for developing countries. Those new opportunities arise from 
recent technological revolutions that have been major contributors to the current 
globalization wave – but have yet to be fully taken on board in many of the world’s 
poorer economies. If the more-advanced members of the WTO were to assist others 
to harness these opportunities, including through aid-for-trade initiatives, the 
DDA’s agricultural stumbling blocks may well be lessened even if it is not possible 
for that WTO round to be concluded as a comprehensive single undertaking. 
 
 
7.1 Some proposals for dealing with agricultural DDA issues 
 
With the agreements made in new export competition disciplines in the Nairobi 
package of December 2015, many might argue that the low-hanging fruit of 
agricultural negotiations has already been harvested. Yet much remains to be done 
to free up the world’s agricultural markets.  Paragraph 31 of the Nairobi Ministerial 
                                            




Declaration reaffirms the strong commitment to advance negotiations on the 
remaining issues including market access and domestic support as well as export 
competition. Falconer (2016) has recently spoken of the importance of confidence-
building measures in reducing some of the ‘water’ (or ‘binding overhang’) in tariffs 
and domestic support. The proposals put forward here are modest in that regard but 
are aimed at achieving a more comprehensive package across all three pillars of the 
WTO’s agricultural trade negotiations. 
What farm trade reforms would do the greatest good?  The clear consensus 
of empirical studies is that the market access pillar offers by far the largest share of 
benefits for developing countries and the world economy. In an analysis of the 
proposed Rev 4 text, Laborde (2014) concludes that 89% of the global gains would 
come from a reduction in tariffs. That is not much lower than the 93% calculated by 
Anderson, Martin and Valenzuela (2006) a decade ago when farm policies were more 
import protectionist.  
The proposed formula for reducing bound tariffs under Rev 4 looks 
aggressive, but its effects on applied tariffs are muted by tariff binding ‘overhang’, 
and by complex flexibilities that reduce ambition and introduce large uncertainties 
as to how flexibilities would be implemented. We therefore offer an alternative 
proposal: 
 
Proposal 1: In lieu of complicated formula, consider a simpler tariff reduction 
formula that sets an average reduction level and gives WTO members the 
flexibility to meet the average reduction. Unlike the URAA formula which 
was based on an average tariff cut, developed country members could be 
required to cut their average bound tariff by [36]%, and developing country 
members by [24]%. A more ambitious approach could include minimum cuts 
for all tariff lines, and tariff caps to bring down the most extreme tariff 
bindings.    
 
How can recent domestic support reforms be built upon? Applied domestic 
support levels for the major developed country subsidizers are currently below 
URAA bindings, and some key developing countries have brought in domestic 
support reforms as well. However, without structured disciplines, those reform 
efforts are at risk of being reversed, especially when international market prices fall 
or domestic policies change. There have already been some increases in supports 
over the past decade in some rapidly emerging economies. 
The Rev 4 formula provides for substantial cuts in this policy space but 
through a complex set of sub-disciplines relating to amber box, blue box, de minimis, 
product-specific support, and overall trade-distorting support. It also provides for 
specific carve outs and exceptions, leading to uncertainty regarding the overall 





Proposal 2: Commensurate with the approach taken for market access, 
reduce and harmonize domestic support levels using a simplified set of 
formulae. Eliminate exemptions under Articles 6.2 (development subsidies), 
6.3 (de minimis) and 6.5 (blue box), and cap total amber support at [5]% of the 
total value of agricultural production for developed countries, [8.5]% for 
China, and [10]% for other developing countries. The value of production 
could be determined each year, much akin to a PSE-type concept, or it could 
be based on a recent base period [e.g., 2013-15]. To avoid concentration of 
support in a handful of commodities, product-specific caps could be put 
forward, perhaps based on higher percentages [7.5%/15%]. If there are to be 
additional flexibilities, allow for a more gradual phase-in of cuts for 
developing countries. Support for cotton could be limited to [5%] of the value 
of agricultural production. Basing support caps on the value of production 
would have the additional advantage of harmonizing support levels across 
commodities. The Green box could be maintained but subjected to a 
comprehensive review by the OECD. And reporting requirements for 
domestic support could be tightened to get more timely, detailed, accurate 
and complete notifications (e.g., as laid out in Annex M of Rev 4). Ideally that 
would involve mandated annual notifications to the Agriculture Committee 
of all forms of applied support in each category, and prompt reporting of all 
new or modified measures. 
 
How could reforms in export competition best contribute? Significant 
progress was made in Nairobi in December 2015 by agreeing to phase out export 
subsidies, but there remain some areas where further progress could be made. For 
example:  
 
Proposal 3: On export credits, deeper cuts on repayment terms could be 
phased down to [12] months. On STEs, export subsidy monopolies could be 
eliminated, at least for those commodities where member exports exceed 
[5%] of global exports of that commodity.45    
 
What to do about safeguards? Following Nairobi, discussions on safeguards 
and public stockholding are scheduled to continue to take place in the Committee 
on Agriculture. Little consensus has emerged to date. The Special Safeguard (SSG) 
for agricultural products that have been tariffied is rarely used, yet it provides an 
excuse for developing countries that have not yet tariffied their farm products to 
demand a Special Safeguard Mechanism (SSM). An SSM would open up the 
possibility of tariff bindings being flaunted, which is why agricultural-exporting 
members oppose it so strongly. What does not seem to be appreciated is that if used 
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when international prices slump, it will depress those prices further which will (a) 
encourage other importers to raise their tariffs and (b) trigger some exporting country 
governments into supporting their exporters – the effect of which would be to offset 
the domestic effect of the actions of those invoking SSM, via further depressing the 
international price. Just as with recent responses to upward price spikes, such actions 
by each national government to price slumps can be made ineffective when a similar 
proportion of exporting countries act to offset the importers’ actions. Instead we 
offer the following proposal (to be elaborated on in Section 7.2 below): 
 
Proposal 4: The SSG could be eliminated immediately, and food-importing 
developing countries could be encouraged to put in place more-efficient 
domestic measures rather than seek to use trade measures via an SSM to deal 
with international price slumps or import surges.  
 
What should be done about subsidized public stockholding? It is commonly 
assumed in developing countries that public stockholding of basic foods is essential 
to ensure national food security, rather than relying on international markets to boost 
domestic availability in future periods of domestic shortfall. Large countries 
especially worry about food import dependence, fearing they may not be able to 
afford to pay what it would take if their shortfall coincided with shortfalls elsewhere. 
India, for example, is proud of its record at stabilizing domestic prices of its staple 
foods, which has been possible partly by holding large stocks of wheat and rice (Saini 
and Gulati 2016; Gouel, Gautam and Martin 2016). But public stockholding can be 
extremely expensive, and almost inevitably it leads to corruption and physical 
spoilage. As well, decisions as to when to alter the level of stocks can be manipulated 
by the government to suit its political purposes. That tends to crowd out private 
stockholding both domestically and abroad, because private agents cannot then 
predict when the government will build up or run down those public stocks. Even 
so, we propose: 
     
Proposal 5: Make the Bali compromise permanent and extend it to 
developing countries. Exempt LDCs from reporting public stockholding 
programs as part of their AMS. Public stockholding programs would remain 
vulnerable to challenge under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. 
 
How best to address export restrictions? When altered in times of price 
spikes they exacerbate international price volatility and undermine confidence in the 
international market as a trustworthy source of food. Little consensus has been 
reached in this area, except to avoid using them to inhibit humanitarian aid. Now 
that Argentina has abandoned its taxes on farm exports, perhaps the time is ripe to 





Proposal 6: As a first step, require consultation and monitoring as proposed 
in Rev 4, and adopt G-20 language prohibiting export restrictions on 
humanitarian food aid being procured by the World Food Program. 
Ultimately, members could go further and adopt disciplines on export 
measures that parallel those on import measures (including bindings and 
phased reductions).  
 
 
7.2 New reasons and opportunities for re-instrumenting support 
 
The core message from this study is that open agricultural markets maximize the 
role that trade can play to boost developing country welfare and global food security 
and ensure the world’s agricultural resources are used most sustainably.  
Declining costs of trading internationally reinforce that message, with thanks 
in particular to the information and communication technology (ICT) revolution 
and to evolutionary innovations in transport, handling, and supermarket retailing. 
As well, the WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, once ratified by members over 
coming months, will add to that lowering of trade costs (Zaki 2014), complementing 
the dramatic recent developments in regional and global value chains (Baldwin 
2016). 
If global warming and extreme weather events are to become more damaging 
to food production as climate change proceeds, then that provides all the more 
reason for countries collectively to open up food markets so as to lower the variance 
of international food prices and allow trade to buffer seasonal fluctuations in 
domestic production.  
Yet the projected decline in food self-sufficiency in many emerging 
economies may concern some groups in those countries enough for them to push 
for increased barriers to their nation’s food imports. This section therefore begins 
by rehearsing why import protection is unlikely to boost most households’ economic 
access to food, and hence is likely to undermine rather than enhance national food 
security and nutrition. Indeed any policy that distorts markets tends to reduce 
national income and hence the aggregate capacity to afford food.  
By contrast, expanding public investments in areas where the marginal social 
rate of return is above the opportunity cost of funds not only raises the level of 
national income in the short-run by enhancing the nation’s aggregate stock of capital 
but also raises the long-run rate of economic growth. If those public investments 
include agricultural R&D, rural infrastructure, and rural education and health, that 
incidentally would boost farm productivity growth and thus food self-sufficiency. In 
doing so, however, it would also boost national and global food security, nutrition 
and health. According to a just-released modelling study, with trade liberalization 
included those initiatives could end global hunger by 2030 at a very modest cost 




After contrasting these two alternative initiatives that both lead to less 
dependence on imported food, this section examines the increasing efficacy of 
generic social protection measures as another way to assist poor rural households 
that avoids using trade-restrictive measures.  
 
Food market-distorting measures 
 
Numerous market price-distorting measures are used by governments in their 
attempts to ensure social stability through improving national food security and 
reducing farm-nonfarm income inequality and poverty. The most common are trade 
measures such as an import tariff, which is the equivalent of a production subsidy 
plus a consumption tax at the same rate as the tariff (as is also an export subsidy).  
In theory, a measure that distorts just the production or consumption side of 
the domestic market at the same rate as a trade measure would reduce national 
income less than that trade measure. That is not always true in practice though. A 
case in point is the rice policy of Thailand’s government that was first introduced in 
October 2011. There the government would buy rice from farmers at above the 
market price and store it for exporting later, pending a rise in the export price. 
However, because the international price did not rise, much of that stored rice was 
spoiled and the government had to dispose of some of the rest at a loss (Permani 
and Vanzetti 2016). Such production subsidies, when combined with inefficiently 
(and often corruptly) managed public storage activities, therefore may involve an 
even greater national loss than a trade measure. Moreover, that government 
expenditure could have been directed instead toward investments in high-payoff 
rural public goods (see below).  
India’s government also buys grain from farmers at above-market prices when 
the latter fall below a threshold level, and has similar wastage problems to Thailand. 
India subsidizes also the farmers’ purchase of key inputs such as fertilizer, electricity, 
fuel, credit and seeds. During the past decade these input subsidies have amounted 
to around 10% of the value of farm production (Hoda and Gulati 2013, p. 1, Brink 
2014b). They are more wasteful than an equivalent transfer to farmers via an output 
subsidy, because in addition to over-encouraging output they also distort the mix of 
inputs used in production. Moreover, when many of those subsidized inputs are 
provided by inefficient government agencies, as is the case in India (Hoda and Gulati 
2013, p. 2; Jha et al. 2013), this adds further to their wastefulness. 
How would farmers in a developing country such as India cope if their 
government opened up and allowed international price volatility to be fully 
transmitted to the domestic market? Even if that were to be done unilaterally ahead 
of other WTO member countries (in which case international prices would not yet 
have had the stabilizing influence that multilateral reform would bring through 
‘thickening’ agricultural markets), Allen and Atkin (2016) provide evidence that such 
reforming countries would be better off. Using forty years of agricultural micro-data 




the lowering of trade costs following road construction) that farmers simply shift 
production toward less risky crops. Even though the volatility of farmers’ real 
incomes would have increased had their crop choice remained constant, by changing 
what they produced farmers were able to avoid this increased volatility and benefit 
from the opening up of trade. 
Similarly, food consumer subsidies can be much more wasteful in practice 
than in theory. India is again a case in point, as it broadens its rice and wheat 
consumer subsidy scheme so as to extend discounts to two-thirds of India’s 
households (involving a potential annual payment of more than US$20 billion, see 
Kishore, Joshi and Hoddinott 2014). Apart from the wasteful corruption and losses 
by the public procurement and distribution system associated with such schemes,46 
recent studies in both India and China demonstrate that such consumer subsidies 
do almost nothing to boost nutrition, as consumers tend to eat the same amount of 
nutrients but do so by switching, for example, from less-preferred coarse grains to 
subsidized rice and wheat (Jensen and Miller 2011; Kaushal and Muchomba 2015).  
To avoid the budgetary outlays that producer or consumer subsidies involve, 
some other food-importing countries have imposed import restrictions on at least 
their key food grains (e.g., Japan, Korea and Indonesia for rice). In the interest of 
boosting farm incomes to reduce the urban-rural income gap, Japan and Korea have 
imposed import restrictions also on meat and milk products – but not on coarse 
grains and oilseed products required for animal feedstuffs, which means that sub-
sector would still not be self-reliant insofar as it continues to depend on imported 
ingredients for feed.  
This option was examined for China and India in Chapter 2. That modelling 
suggests that if those countries banned imports of grains, domestic resources would 
move toward rice, wheat and livestock production but self-sufficiency would fall for 
crops that provide inputs into animal feedstuffs, and also for other crops (Table 2.6). 
In the case of China the tariff equivalents of such import restrictions by 2030 would 
range from 115% for wheat to 160% for non-ruminant meats and milk products to 
255% for red meats. These are well above China’s WTO-bound tariffs and so would 
be inconsistent with China’s WTO commitments under international law. Moreover, 
such a policy response would impose a burden on households that are net buyers of 
those grain, meat and milk products, because domestic consumer prices for those 
products would increase along with the producer price rise. In short, such a policy 
response to declining food self-sufficiency undermines national food security and 
nutrition by reducing economic access to food for the vast majority of households. 
 
Growth-enhancing investment measures 
 
Price-distorting measures re-distribute well-being between farmers, food consumers 
and taxpayers but at the expense of overall national welfare. By contrast, investments 
                                            




in rural public goods can raise national income, boost economic growth and, in some 
cases, enhance the food security of both farm and nonfarm households in the 
country (Fan and Hazell 2001). Three types of rural investments are considered here 
by way of examples: agricultural research and development (R&D), infrastructure, 
and human capital (basic education and health).  
Public agricultural R&D investments in developing countries have risen 
considerably in recent times. As a result, the developing countries’ share of global 
public agricultural R&D has risen by half over the past three decades, from an 
average of 31% in 1980-2000 to 45% by 2011 (Pardey et al. 2016a,b). Yet the 
marginal returns from boosting such levels of public investment in most developing 
countries are still extremely high (Hurley, Rao and Pardey 2012; FAO 2012), 
suggesting scope for high returns from more such expenditure.  
The Green Revolution contributed hugely to food supplies and economic 
growth over many countries and several decades (Gollin, Hansen and Wingender 
2016). The more-recent evidence from Brazil also is compelling: during the 1980s 
and 1990s, Brazil invested far more in public agricultural R&D as a percentage of 
national agricultural GDP than most other countries. Not surprisingly, Brazil’s 
outputs of both crop and livestock products have more than doubled since the early 
1990s, and its food self-sufficiency has been boosted commensurately. By biasing 
that research toward labour-saving technologies, that investment also helped farmers 
adjust to rising rural wages – something that becomes more pressing as economic 
growth proceeds, including in China where the supply of under-employed labour in 
rural areas has shrunk.  
Raising agricultural R&D spending is clearly an option for countries to choose 
if they wish to slow their decline in food self-sufficiency. In addition to also boosting 
national income growth, such investments would lower domestic consumer prices 
for (at least nontradable) foods and so would benefit not only farmers but also net 
buyers of those foods, thereby contributing to both the availability and access 
dimensions of food security. This contrasts with food import restrictions, which 
reduce the range of foods available and raise domestic prices which benefit net sellers 
of food but at the expense of net buyers of food. More people will be harmed than helped 
by such a policy measure in countries where the majority of workers are (or will be 
in a few years) employed in non-farm jobs. And in most developing countries the 
poor (i.e., households below the international extreme poverty line) are net buyers 
of food on average (Anderson, Ivanic and Martin 2014, Table 1).  
To illustrate this point, Anderson and Strutt (2014) model increases in total 
factor productivity that would be required in Chinese agriculture for the country (a) 
to achieve the same overall food self-sufficiency rate in 2030 as would result from a 
ban on grain and livestock product imports (94%) and, even more ambitiously, (b) 
to return to the same overall agricultural self-sufficiency as in 2007, namely 97%. In 
case (a), a cumulative 33% improvement in agricultural TFP for China over the 
period to 2030 roughly achieved that target. In case (b), it takes a 59% cumulative 




generates higher incomes and so leads to higher volumes of various foods 
consumed, thus boosting national food security – in contrast to its deterioration in 
the import protection scenario. While the tightening of food import restrictions are 
estimated to reduce China’s real GDP by 0.9%, an increase in agricultural TFP of 
33% (or 59%) raises estimated real GDP by 4.5% (or 7%).47  
Turning to another investment area, poor infrastructure such as rural roads 
add to the cost of procuring off-farm inputs, and also to the gap between the farm-
gate and market prices of outputs. It thereby depresses farmer incentives and reduces 
consumers’ economic access to food. So too do poor-quality telecommunications in 
rural areas, through raising the costs of such things as price information in distant 
markets and e-banking and farm credit.48 Likewise trade facilitation investments at a 
country’s border: they can reduce poverty by both raising the price received by 
exporters and lowering the price paid for imported goods.49 Better rural 
infrastructure also improves the opportunities for farm household members to earn 
part-time incomes off the farm, insofar as it lowers commuting costs (Fan and Zhang 
2004). Experiences in many developing countries show that part-time off-farm 
earning opportunities for farm household members can reduce rural poverty and the 
farm-nonfarm income gap – and without reducing farm production greatly, thanks 
to the capacity to move to internationally available labour-saving techniques as rural 
wages rise (Otsuka, Estudillo and Sawada 2009). 
China is one country that has been investing vast sums in infrastructure in 
recent decades, but whether there have been sufficient investments flowing into rural 
areas to ensure the marginal rate of return is driven down to that from further urban 
infrastructure investment is a moot point. Fan and Chan-Kang (2008), for example, 
examine returns from investments in local as compared with national roads in China. 
Their study suggests the benefit-cost ratio for local roads is four times greater than 
for highways. That does not mean rural people would not benefit from major 
highway networks though: Roberts et al. (2012) estimate that such investments could 
boost Chinese real incomes by 6% in the short run without increasing rural-urban 
income inequality. Even so, highway networks between pairs of major cities are 
found to benefit the larger city more (Faber 2012). The allocation of infrastructure 
investment funds even among rural areas may be less than optimal. Fan and Zhang 
(2004) found that the lower productivity in China’s western regions could be 
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annual rates required would be only 1 or 2% more than historically, which is not excessive – see, for 
example, Alston, Babcock and Pardey (2010) and Fuglie, Wang and Ball (2012). 
48 Hoddinott, Rosegrant and Torero (2013) show that expenditures that improve access to market 
information through SMS messaging and interventions has a benefit/cost ratio between four and eight. 
This intervention is relatively cheap to provide, costing around $4 per capita in 2013 – and scale economies 
are driving that cost down rapidly. 
49 World Bank and WTO (2015). The WTO’s Trade Facilitation Agreement, if ratified by two-thirds of the 
members in coming months, is projected to boost the world economy substantially. As with the DDA, that 




explained by the lower levels there of rural infrastructure, education, and science and 
technology. They concluded that improving both the level and efficiency of public 
capital in the west would be key to narrowing the productivity difference between it 
and other regions of China, thereby reducing the country’s income and wealth 
inequality. 
As for basic education and health investments, they tend to be lower in quality 
as well as quantity in rural versus urban areas in many developing countries (World 
Bank 2007). This means the productivity of future farm workers and managers will 
be lower than is socially optimal, and farm production will be less. But it also means 
those wishing to work part- or full-time in nonfarm jobs will be less successful in 
finding and thriving in such positions and thus in repatriating earnings back to their 
relatives still working the farm. Both outcomes lower national economic growth and 
contribute to the farm-nonfarm household income gap (Rozelle et al. 2005). 
 
Freeing up factor markets  
 
Markets for labour, land, water and financial capital are still far from free of 
restrictions in lots of developing countries, which means productive factors are used 
inefficiently. Making it easier for rural workers to access urban jobs would go a long 
way to reducing the rural-urban income gap. In the case of China, that would mean 
relaxing the Hukou household registration system. A recent study of Russia, for the 
period 1995-2010, found that when barriers that hindered internal labour migration 
in the 1990s were eliminated, the economies of the poorer Russian regions grew out 
of their poverty trap and their income levels converged toward those in more-
affluent Russian regions in the first decade of this century (Guriev and Vakulenko 
2015). Reducing such barriers to worker movements would increase the payoff from 
boosting the above-mentioned under-investments in rural education, health and 
infrastructure too.  
Regulations that restrict or prohibit the sale of farm land also are a constraint 
in numerous developing countries. As wages rise there is plenty of scope for 
mechanization to improve labour productivity, but far more so where economies of 
farm land size can be exploited. That is, farm land consolidation is required to allow 
more efficient use of farm machinery. In China land rental markets have developed 
to alter the operational size of some farms, but least so in areas where tenure security 
is weakest. 
Markets in developing countries for water use in farming are even less 
developed than markets for land use. Whenever farmers are paying less than the true 
cost of irrigation water, they will be over-using it and thereby making less available 
for urban households and industries. Once water markets are developed with well-
defined access, they provide greater certainty and hence more asset security for 
farmers (and other users). 
The absence of tight land and water tenure rights makes it more difficult for 




cost of food production. Again farmers have found innovative ways around their 
credit constraints, such as renting rather than buying farm machinery (Christiaensen 
2013), but freeing up capital markets so that more rural micro-credit institutions 
could develop would reduce this constraint on growth outside urban areas. 
Improving the efficiency of markets for all key factors of agricultural 
production – and for intermediate inputs such as fertilizer and seeds – are important 
ways to improve not only current farm incomes but also the pathways for farm 
households to accumulate wealth. Without that security, farmers will be less inclined 
to support the government’s other economic reform efforts (Morrow and Carter 
2013). 
 
Expanding the role for generic social protection instruments 
 
Fortunately for many developing countries there are politically feasible alternative 
policy instruments to market-distorting measures that are more efficient and 
effective in improving national food security and nutrition, lowering the gap between 
farm and nonfarm household incomes, and reducing extreme poverty. The 
information and communication technology (ICT) revolution recently has made it 
far cheaper and easier than in the past to target income supplements, as and when 
needed, to the poorest and hence most food-insecure households, whether they be 
urban or rural. Such payments were unaffordable in developing countries in the past 
because of the fiscal outlay involved and the high cost of raising taxes and 
administering small handouts. However, the ICT revolution has not only lowered 
the cost of knowledge in remote areas (World Bank 2011) but also made it possible 
for conditional cash transfers to be provided electronically as direct assistance to 
even remote households who have access to electronic banking. The extent to which 
households in developing countries have a bank account or its equivalent is now 
very high (World Bank 2015). As well, debit cards can be used to retrieve cash from 
collection centres (as in Pakistan, see Cheema et al. 2016) 
Evidence of the practical workability of such conditional social safety net 
programs in developing countries is growing rapidly. Hoddinott and Wiesman (2010) 
explore such programs in Mexico, Honduras and Nicaragua, and conclude that 
exposure to these programs raised both the quantity of calories consumed and the 
quality of the recipients’ diets – and the benefits were most pronounced among the 
poorest households. Adado and Bassett (2012) assess programs in six southern 
African countries, and they too find substantial improvements in the quantity and 
quality of food consumed by recipients in poor households there. They also note 
that the benefits could be even greater with complementary activities such as 
nutrition counselling and micro-nutrient supplements. Following a survey of results 
on consumption from a wide range of Latin American countries, Fiszbein and 
Schady (2009, Ch. 4) conclude that conditional cash transfers have had substantial 




Even unconditional cash transfers have generated significant impacts. For 
example in Pakistan, the Benazir Income Support Program, which has reached more 
than five million people since it was introduced in 2008, has enabled recipient 
households to increase their ownership of livestock and consumption of high-quality 
protein, lower the proportion of girls who are malnourished, and empower the 
females who are the recipients of the debit card into which funds are deposited every 
three months (Cheema et al. 2016). 
Prospective offsetting effects that were a source of concern when such 
programs were created do not appear to have been sufficiently large as to offset the 
benefits of the transfer. For example, the schemes do not seem to reduce the labour 
supply of adults or to crowd out private transfers; and some programs increase 
productive investment, which boosts and sustains the impact on poverty. The latter 
is further supported by evidence from Mexico reported in Gertler, Martinez and 
Rubio-Codina (2012), who find that one-quarter of cash transfers were invested in 
productive activities, thereby ensuring sustained higher living standards even after 
such programs end. While the political challenge of switching from market-
distorting trade measures to domestic policy instruments for addressing non-trade 
domestic concerns is evidently non-trivial, this emergence in a wide range of 
developing countries of new, lower-cost social protection mechanisms involving 
conditional cash e-transfers is encouraging.  
China is more capable than most developing countries in being able to 
effectively deliver social protection payments electronically to its rural households. 
Huang, Wang and Rozelle (2013) point out that the government has set up a special 
account for each household in a local bank, and an annual allocation is made just 
prior to the planting season to each account from the Agricultural Financial Subsidy 
Fund. This provides China a way to avoid going any further down the agricultural 
protection growth path and thereby repeating the economically costly mistakes of 
higher-income countries, or going as far down the producer and consumer subsidy 
pathway that India has taken – and then having to reverse either of those processes, 
the political cost of which would be larger the longer such programs are in place. 
Moreover, such cash transfers would have an even more favourable national food 
security impact if combined with an increase in agricultural R&D investment. 
The ICT revolution is making it more and more feasible for governments to 
provide social protection to any losers from any policy reforms who might otherwise 
fall into poverty (Klapper and Singer 2014; World Bank 2015). More than that, such 
social protection can even contribute to economic growth, thereby potentially also 
pulling more people out of poverty (Alderman and Yemtsov 2014). To the extent 
that the more-widespread scope for providing social protection lowers the political 
resistance to trade policy reforms, there may be room for more optimism in the 
future than there has been in the past about prospects for trade liberalization. 
Even with new trade agreements, there will continue to be millions of poor 
and hungry people needing assistance to rise or remain above extreme poverty, 




The key point to conclude on is that policies to avert disastrous losses for such 
groups need not be as dependent on trade measures in the future as they have been 
in the past. Trade-distorting policy measures are very blunt instruments for dealing 
with either short-run price volatility or long-run concerns such as raising government 
revenue or reducing rural-urban income inequality and poverty. Myriad financial 
instruments are rapidly becoming available even in low-income countries for both 
farmers and food consumers to manage price risk (World Bank 2014). As well, 
instruments such as a value-added tax are becoming lower-cost ways to raise 
government revenue than trade taxes even in low-income countries. The more such 
complementary domestic measures are set at their optimal level from society’s 
viewpoint, the easier it will be for a country to choose to liberalize agricultural (and 
indeed all) trade, the more efficient and sustainable will be the future use of the 
nation’s resources, the faster the economy will grow, and the more equitable will be 
the outcome in that any potential losers could be compensated by the winners so 





As ample as those above new opportunities are for facilitating unilateral trade 
liberalization, it remains true that even more can be achieved for each national 
economy when countries do so collectively. The more of the world’s markets that 
are liberalized, the ‘thicker’ international markets become and hence the less volatile 
they will be. That benefit – an international public good – would be even greater if 
WTO member countries were to agree collectively to desist from temporarily 
altering their food trade restrictions when prices spike up or down. That would 
require binding not only import tariffs but also export taxes on farm products and 
agreeing to phase them down over time. It would also require developing countries 
to abandon their demand for an agricultural Special Safeguard Mechanism, the 
impact of which would be to raise international food price volatility.  
Is there a way to bring negotiators back to Geneva to finish the agricultural 
policy reform process? It would be easy to be pessimistic, especially given the anti-
globalization mood of many polities at present, including in the United States and 
European Union. Much of that mood is driven by migration issues, and by concerns 
that open trade is ‘unfair’ in its outcomes. Hence the importance of alleviating those 
concerns by enhancing social safety nets – which, as discussed above, can now be 
provided at much lower cost than in the past. Even if the currently negotiated mega-
regional free-trade negotiations involving the United States (TTP and TTIP) are 
unable to be ratified, other opportunities are in play. The Asian mega-regional 
(RCEP) has perhaps the best prospects for succeeding, because its participating 
countries have so much to gain from the emergence of regional and global value 




sides of the north Atlantic eases, an RCEP agreement may well provide a foundation 
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